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Abstract 
 
Nationalist Discourses in Turkey from a Psychoanalytical Perspective 
Harika Yücel 
 
This study aimed to explore the psychic characteristics and the dynamics of 
the nationalist discourses and to analyze the Turkish nationalist discourses 
through certain psychoanalytic conceptualizations. For this aim, the official 
texts of fifteen political parties, a press statement of one governmental 
organization, the founding texts of five non-governmental organizations and 
one political journal, and two national organizing texts were analyzed using 
discourse analysis method. The main arguments which were confirmed in 
the Turkish cases were as follows: Nationalist discourses gain ground in 
regressive group processes which are generally triggered by new socio-
political circumstances. These discourses frequently use primitive defenses, 
i.e. splitting, projection, projective identification, idealization, and 
devaluation. Due to excessive use of primitive defenses, the thinking 
process is impaired and reality can be distorted. In these discourses, the 
collective superego is harsher and the collective ego ideal is high, rigid, and 
less realistic. As the essentialist nationalist emphasis increases, these 
tendencies become more visible. It was concluded that it is important to take 
these powerful psychic dynamics into account in a long-term struggle for 
overcoming nationalism.  
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Özet 
 
Psikanalitik Bir Perspektiften Türkiye’de Milliyetçi Söylemler 
Harika Yücel 
 
Bu çalışmanın amacı, milliyetçi söylemlerin psişik özelliklerini ve 
dinamiklerini araştırmak ve belli psikanalitik kavramsallaştırmalar 
aracılığıyla Türk milliyetçi söylemlerini analiz etmektir. Bu amaçla, on beş 
politik partinin resmi metni, bir devlet kuruluşunun basın açıklaması, beş 
sivil toplum kuruluşunun ve bir politik derginin kurucu metni ve iki milli 
örgütleyici metin söylem analizine tabi tutulmuştur. Türk milliyetçi 
olgularının analizinde doğrulandığı üzere temel iddialar şunlardır: Milliyetçi 
söylemler, genellikle yeni sosyo-politik durumlar tarafından tetiklenen 
gerilemeci grup süreçlerinde güç kazanmaktadır. Bu söylemlerde sıklıkla 
ilkel savunma düzenekleri kullanılmaktadır; bunlar bölme, yansıtma, 
yansıtmalı özdeşleşme, yüceleştirme ve değersizleştirmedir.  İlkel savunma 
düzeneklerinin aşırı kullanımı nedeniyle, düşünme süreçleri bozulmakta ve 
gerçeklik çarpıtılabilmektedir. Bu söylemlerde daha katı bir kolektif üstbene 
rastlanmakta, kolektif ben idealinin de yüksek, katı ve daha az gerçekçi 
olduğu görülmektedir. Milliyetçi söylemlerin özcü vurgusu arttıkça bu 
eğilimler daha görünür hale gelmektedir. Sonuç olarak, milliyetçiliğin 
üstesinden gelmek için yürütülecek uzun dönemli bir mücadelenin bu güçlü 
psişik dinamikleri göz önüne almasının önemli olduğu vurgulanmıştır.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 Subject Matter of the Study 
The phenomenon of nationalism has been conceptualized and 
explained by different disciplines in the 20
th 
century. It is accepted that 
nationalism is mainly a modern concept which refers to an organizing 
ideology of nation-states. It is definitely not a simple phenomenon and also 
it cannot be said that there is a single nationalism. It has different meanings 
in different geographies and different contexts. Social theorists approach 
this issue in order to understand its formation, manifestations and functions 
within the social processes. Social psychologists are interested in 
nationalism especially in relation to the concept of social identity. However, 
it is not frequently examined in terms of psychic processes which are both 
conscious and unconscious. 
Nationalism is generally described according to either the principle 
of citizenship and territoriality or of ethnicity and culture. Turkish 
nationalism that is the organizing ideology of the Republic of Turkey, is 
predominantly based on cultural identity, i.e., all people living in Turkey 
and sharing the ―same‖ culture are accepted as Turkish. Nationalism is still 
the central part of the dominant political culture of Turkey. Moreover, in 
recent decades, it seems that Turkish nationalism has been climbing and 
becoming widespread. Although there are different nationalist discourses in 
Turkey, these various discourses can be integrated to the dominant political 
culture. In parallel with the rise of nationalism, there have been many efforts 
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to understand the characteristics of Turkish nationalism. This dynamic 
phenomenon can also be examined in the light of psychoanalytic theory.  
Although, the primary object of psychoanalysis is the psyche and 
psychoanalysis is mainly a theory which explains psychic life of the 
individual, as can be traced in Freud‘s work as well, the theory is used to 
understand the communities and to explain societal life and its dynamics. 
The community is not only understood in terms of its role on the psychic 
life of the individual, but also in terms of social constructs and processes. 
From the beginning of the foundation of psychoanalysis, social phenomena 
and group dynamics have largely been investigated. The idea that 
psychoanalytic theory can make an important contribution to explaining the 
social life as well as the psychic life has been increasingly accepted by 
many theorists. In practice, analysis of small and large groups has 
contributed to this effort.  
It is accepted that just as social and cultural discourses construct the 
psyche, psychic structures and processes create the sociality. Freud (1930) 
noted that process of civilization and psychic development follows a similar 
path. When the social phenomena are handled without taking into 
consideration the psychic processes which have conscious and unconscious 
dynamics, the outcome is an incomplete conception of the problem.  
Without social, economic and political analysis, it would be 
impossible to understand the context and effects of phenomena such 
as these; but without the addition of an investigation of subjectivity 
and the unconscious, the social explanations fail to give an account 
of what drives people on, when no objective, rational interests are 
perceivable. (Frosh, 2001, p.63).  
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It can be said that social identity or collective identity takes place at 
the intersection of social and psychic life. In other words, social identities 
are derived from both the psychic and social life. Today, national identities 
which constitute an important part of the collective identity and the 
nationalist discourses which shape that identity can be examined in this 
context.  Frosh argues that rigid self-defining of whole communities in 
terms of ‗nationality‘ is a powerful organizing principle for people‘s lives 
(Frosh, 2001).  
In the light of these arguments, this study aims : 1) to examine the 
concept of nationalism in the light of psychoanalytic theory; and 2) to 
explore the psychic characteristics of the nationalist discourses and the 
psychic dynamics which have a role in forming and strengthening of these 
nationalist discourses. In the psychoanalytical literature, there are just a few 
studies dealing with the issue of nationalism directly and comprehensively. 
In the current study, first, psychoanalytic conceptualizations which have 
been developed in order to understand individuals, groups, and communities 
are discussed for the purpose of explaining nationalism and nationalist 
discourses. In the second step, different nationalist discourses in Turkey are 
analyzed in the light of those conceptualizations.  
It can be argued that dominant nationalist discourses tend to shape 
the collective identities in the large groups, but also those discourses are 
formed within specific group dynamics. In other words, the groups are both 
subjected to and subjects who generate the nationalist discourses. Thus, 
different nationalist discourses being produced at the macro level tend to be 
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regenerated at the micro levels of the society. In this context, Butler‘s view 
(2005a) that the subject is neither determined entirely by the power nor the 
subject itself entirely determines the power is very meaningful.  
The effort to explore the psychic characteristics of nationalist 
discourses also sheds light on the psychic processes operating in large 
groups which describe themselves as nationalists and/or display nationalist 
characteristics and attitudes. In other words, psychic dynamics in the groups 
in which nationalist discourses emerge are explored. As Balibar emphasizes, 
racism and nationalism are not simply an attitude of the individuals, but are 
a social relationship (Balibar, 2000a). It is important to note at this point that 
the groups are not assumed to be homogeneous constructs. Similarly, all 
members in a group are not thought to share these attitudes to the same 
extent. This study does not focus on group characteristics which are usually 
conceived as static, but on group dynamics or group processes.  
While approaching to this phenomenon from a psycho-political 
perspective, the importance of current context cannot be omitted. In the 
analysis of nationalist discourses in Turkey, social and political context is 
taken into consideration. Furthermore, the role of various triggering factors 
at the social and political levels on the formation of nationalist discourses is 
considered. The study also aims to look at the question as to how these 
socio-political factors activate the various psychic dynamics which operate 
in nationalist discourses.   
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 Questions 
The nationalism as an attitude or a tendency of a group which is 
shaped by specific group dynamics and as a manifestation of a collective 
identity will be explored in the light of the following questions: 
1. Which group processes facilitate the emergence of nationalist 
discourses? 
2. Can the nationalist attitudes be explained in the context of 
narcissism and the collective ego ideal? 
3. Can the nationalist attitudes of the groups be understood in terms of 
the collective defense mechanisms such as splitting, idealization, 
devaluation, projection and projective identification? 
4. Can the nationalist attitudes be understood in terms of rigid 
collective superego?   
It should be noted that these questions are inherently connected with 
each other, and these connections will also be highlighted wherever 
appropriate. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1. Definitions and Explanations of Nationalism 
2.1.1. The Concept of Nationalism 
Nationalism has been defined and explained by many authors. 
According to the primordialist approach which is represented by Antony D. 
Smith, nation and nationalism as a reality have pre-modern roots although 
they are differently formed in modern world. This approach argues that 
nationalism should be understood as a product of natural ethnic belongings 
(Smith, 1989/2001; 1991). 
From the modernist viewpoint, it is commonly accepted that 
nationalism is rooted in modernity and the nation-states of the modern era. 
In line with this explanation, Gellner thinks that nationalism is a product of 
certain social and historical conditions. Although nationalism is perceived 
as a universal, everlasting and self-evidently valid principle, it is neither 
universal nor necessary (Gellner, 1997a). Benedict Anderson sees the nation 
as an imagined political community which is not based on actual interaction. 
It is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. The members of a 
nation do not know most of their fellow-members; instead they have an 
image of their communion in their mind. According to him, nationalism is 
the result of the development of capitalism and modernism. It is understood 
in relation to large cultural systems (Anderson, 1991).  
Gellner defines nationalism based on a cultural element. According 
to him, ―nationalism is a political principle which maintains that similarity 
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of culture is the basic social bond‖ (Gellner, 1997a, p. 3). A state should be 
composed of people who have the same culture. In other words, the 
essential component of being a member of a nation is sharing of the same 
culture. For extreme versions of nationalism, this is the necessary and the 
sufficient condition of legitimate membership (Gellner, 1997a). Nations 
tend to be idealized by asserting that it consists of a high and homogeneous 
culture. In Gellner‘s view, nations are prone to sacralization in the modern 
world, nation-state epoch. Members of a nation are expected to be loyal to 
the political unit consisting of this shared culture; however memberships of 
a nation as a political unit may sometimes be sacralized and takes a 
dangerous form (Gellner, 1997b).  
It is commonly accepted that nationalism is constructed and 
reconstructed according to historical dynamics; therefore it consists of 
different constructions in each of historical geography. Sometimes bottom-
up dynamics can be strongly marked; sometimes top-down dynamics are 
dominant. However, while nationalism generally reflects the dominant 
ideology, it is at the same time fostered by cultural and historical bonds, 
shared codes and myths within the community. Within this frame, among 
many different types of nationalisms, it is commonly accepted that there are 
basically two models of nationalism. The first is based on the citizenship 
and territoriality (political nation/the French model), the second is based on 
blood, ethnicity and culture bonds (cultural nation/the German model) 
(Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç, 2007). It can be argued that the latter is closer to 
racism because it emphasizes blood and ethnicity. 
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David Brown (2000) summarizes the models of contemporary 
nationalisms conceptualized in different ways. According to Brown, 
nationalism is accepted as an embedded loyalty of individual identity to the 
organic community or as a political resource being used to mobilize 
individuals for the rational pursuits of common interest or as an ideology 
appealing to confused individuals who seek simple formulas to understand 
complex situations. According to these conceptualizations, nationalism may 
be seen as an instinct, an interest, or an ideology. When it is associated with 
an instinct, nation is depicted as based upon natural, organic community 
which defines the identity of its members who feel an innate and 
emotionally powerful attachment to it. According to this view, the members 
have collective memories and there are certain myths of common ancestry. 
The interest implies the resources employed by groups of individuals for the 
pursuit of their common interest. The constructivist approach sees 
nationalism as an ideology. It suggests that national identity is constructed 
on the basis of institutional or ideological frameworks which offer simple 
and indeed simplistic formulas of identity and diagnosis of contemporary 
problems because otherwise individuals feel confused or insecure.  
Nationalism is seen as a modern ideology which organizes the 
nation-states. In this frame, the nationalism consists of a series of discourses 
at the macro level. Because nation-states intend to create a homogenous 
nation based on citizenship, ethnicity or ―shared‖ cultural history, they 
describe the nation and demand their citizens to accept this description. 
National symbols are produced according to this description. This effort can 
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be seen as the strategy of nationalism at the macro level. This ideology tries 
to create a desired collective identity. Construction of the collective identity 
is based on the discourses of power to a large extent; however, people 
(citizens) regenerate these discourses of ideology at the micro levels while 
they consume it. Therefore, nationalism cannot remain an official ideology 
per se, and also it does not consist of a homogeneous ideology (Kentel, 
Ahıska, and Genç, 2007). Here, the concept of popular nationalism can be 
introduced. The nationalism as a hegemonic ideology forms the daily life 
and relationships of the people and also it presents a viewpoint that enables 
people to give meaning to and interpret the world. It is difficult for people to 
refuse and challenge this ideology. The ideology of nationalism expects 
volunteer obedience from the citizens by using surrounding discourses and 
national symbols. Official nationalism is accepted, reproduced at the micro 
levels, and continuously goes through certain transformations. In other 
words, popular nationalism is a result of the official ideology but at the 
same time it has a potential to differentiate itself from official discourses. 
There are also different nationalisms which to various extents differ from 
official nationalism at the macro levels. It can be accepted that the mass 
media is one of the main reproducers of the popular nationalism in the 
global world (Özkırımlı, 2002). 
 
2.1.2. Contemporary Nationalism and Racism 
Balibar (2000a), states that racism and contemporary nationalism as 
a societal relationship are close to each other. It is argued that there is a 
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reciprocal relationship between these two. Both of them idealize a certain 
ethnicity, culture, or nation while devaluing and excluding the others. 
Racism is differentiated as an exclusive annihilation and inclusive pressure 
or exploitation. Whereas the former aims to purify the society from danger 
or contamination that is represented by inferior races, the latter intends to 
categorize the society. Here, it is argued that contemporary racism is covert 
and symbolic. It is not simply based on biological origin or blood; rather it 
is based on cultural origin. According to this point of view, it is possible to 
have a cultural homogeneity which is to be protected (Balibar, 2000b).  
Balibar uses the concepts of ―neo-racism‖ and ―differentialist 
racism‖ (2000b). This is racism without race. What determines this racism is 
not biological heredity but cultural differences. This racism does not suggest 
explicitly that a group is superior to others but assumes that the cultural 
differences cannot be overcome. Differentialist racism is closely related to 
xenophobia. It argues that the ―mixing of cultures‖ would be dangerous and 
bring intellectual death of humanity. Here, it can be noted that there is a 
discussion on the conceptualization of ―new racism‖. According to Leach 
(2005), racism displays historical continuity; therefore it is not appropriate 
to use the concept of new racism. 
  
2.1.3. Nationalism According to Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory is commonly used for understanding and 
explaining the nationalist attitudes from a social psychological perspective. 
National identities are conceptualized as social identities. According to this 
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theory, social identities ensure people to satisfy the need for a sense of 
positive self-identity.  
According to Dekker, Malova and Hoogendoorn (2003), national 
attitudes are classified in terms of their type (positive or negative) and 
strength (moderate, very, and extremely positive or negative) of affection. 
The positive or negative attitudes refer to whether people like or dislike 
their nations. Strength of these attitudes refers to the rigidity of these links. 
Nationalism is seen as the most rigid positive attitude to the nation. 
Nationalist people tend to keep their nation as pure as possible and they also 
desire to establish a separate state for their nation (Dekker, Malova and 
Hoogendoorn, 2003). It must be noted that this conceptualization disregards 
the context and position of certain ethnic groups in a society.   
Positive attitudes toward a nation may also be national liking, 
national pride, national preference and national superiority. There is also a 
neutral attitude which is the feeling of belonging to one‘s own country. 
National preference and national superiority are also results of intergroup 
comparison and discrimination. Individual‘s development of nationalism is 
related to highly negative attitudes toward other groups living within the 
country or other countries (Dekker, Malova and Hoogendoorn, 2003). This 
theory emphasizes the importance of out-group comparisons for people to 
achieve extremely positive social identity. 
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) suggests that people 
tend to make positive in-group and negative out-group evaluations. To 
various extents social identity is based on intergroup differentiation. When 
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intergroup differentiation is applied extremely, people tend to develop out-
group derogation. In this context, nationalism can be seen as essentially 
related to out-group derogation. Some authors differentiate between 
nationalism and patriotism. Whereas nationalism is related to out-group 
evaluation, patriotism refers to a positive relation to one‘s own country 
independent of out-group derogation. Also, if people formerly have socially 
comparative perspective, the link between national identification and the 
derogation of foreigners is expected to be stronger (Mummendey, Klink and 
Brown, 2001). In intergroup comparison, the people are likely to project 
their own ―bad‖ characteristics onto the other group which results in a 
negative description of out-group, in persecutory ways. Also, the people 
may use devaluation of this out-group in order to idealize themselves. 
Nationalist identification is actually an idealization.  
An identity does not have a static character. It is a continuous and 
dynamic construct. It also refers to a position; people place themselves in a 
certain psychic, social, or political position. For instance they define 
themselves according to the state of belonging to their nation, ethnicity, and 
class. The character and extent of these belongings may also vary according 
to specific contexts. According to Hopkins and Murdoch (1999), the identity 
is not defined as fixed and constant, but defined relationally and fluctuating 
according to comparative contexts. 
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2.2. Nationalism from a Psychoanalytical Perspective 
2.2.1. Identity in Psychoanalytic Theory 
2.2.1.1. The Concept of Identity 
Identity was not the concept of psychoanalytic theory at the 
beginning. It was accepted as a psycho-social construct. Freud used the 
concept of ―inner identity‖ to describe an individual's link with the unique 
values, having been raised in a unique history. Here, Freud emphasized the 
unique character of the identity that is special to an individual, not a social 
character which is shared by others (Erikson, 1956). Erikson frequently used 
the concept of identity in his theory. He also expanded the psychoanalytic 
theory for the sake of explaining the social phenomena. In 1956, he 
described identity as ―a mutual relation in that it connotes both a persistent 
sameness within oneself (self-sameness) and a persistent sharing of some 
kind of essential character with others‖ (Erikson, 1956, p. 57). He 
emphasized the social aspect of identity and used the term ―identity‖ with a 
number of connotations; expressing that ―It will appear to refer to a 
conscious sense of individual identity; at another to an unconscious striving 
for a continuity of personal character; and, finally, as a maintenance of an 
inner solidarity with a group's ideals and identity‖ [Italics not mine] 
(Erikson, 1956, p. 57). 
Many authors have contributed to the understanding of the sense of 
identity. It is stressed that the sense of identity is constructed through the 
interaction between three links of integration. These links are spatial, 
temporal and social links of integration. Spatial link maintains the cohesion 
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of different parts of the self. The temporal link enables the continuity of 
different representations of the self in time and also establishes a sense of 
sameness. The third link is the social aspect of identity such that identity is a 
resultant of identification with the others (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1974).  
Two aspects of the identity have been highlighted by various 
authors. The first emphasizes the similarities with oneself, and the other 
focuses on the differences between the self and the others. The latter stresses 
the importance of comparison and contrast for the constitution of identity. 
While the person seeks the feeling of unity by integrating her fragments into 
the organization of a whole, she needs to differentiate herself from the 
others with her unique features (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1974).  
 Identity is built and formed starting from infancy as the self relates 
to external objects. According to Brody and Mahoney (1964), three 
assimilative mechanisms are important for identity formation: introjection, 
identification, and incorporation. They are distinguished according to ego 
development and ego functioning. Introjection is the first form of this 
process where the infant is not aware of objects yet. There are only 
pleasure-pain experiences. The infant introjects these experiences. Primitive 
relations to objects are formed through introjections. Introjection is essential 
for the separation of the self from the outside world. The mechanisms of 
introjection and projection form a basis for later identifications.  
Identification is a more mature assimilative process where the ego has been 
developed and the infant is aware of the objects around her. Here, the 
developmental step is the transition from primary to secondary thinking 
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process. Secondary thinking process refers to the capacity of thinking about 
one‘s own psychic life and of evaluating the psychic experiences in a 
complex and multi-dimensional way. It refers to highly complex mental 
functioning and it also shows the ego strength of the person. Incorporation is 
a regressive reaction to object loss which may appear during developmental 
processes. Incorporation is related to the mechanism of denial.  
It is expected that the identity formation is mainly based on 
identifications although to various extents all these mechanisms continue to 
be used by all of us (Brody and Mahoney, 1964).  Volkan (1998) stresses 
that for identity formation, identifications which include both ―good‖ and 
―bad‖ parts of the self and the other should be integrated. Therefore, the 
individual can perceive herself as having both good and bad parts. People 
who mainly use introjection and projection have difficulty integrating 
―good‖ and ―bad‖ parts of themselves and of the others in which case 
nonintegrated good or bad parts of the person may be projected to the 
others.  
 Erikson (1956) suggested that identity does not consist of only 
earlier identifications; it is also the result of an additional set of 
identifications. The identity is formed especially in adolescence in which all 
significant identifications belonging to childhood are altered in order to be 
made a coherent whole of them. Actually, identity formation begins when 
identification mechanism loses its efficacy. It should be emphasized that 
identity formation does not end with adolescence; it is a life-long process 
that is mainly unconscious. From the beginning to the end, life is full of 
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developmental crises. According to him, identity formation is an 
unconscious process but the sense of identity is both unconscious and 
preconscious meaning that the person can become aware of it.  
 According to Erikson (1956), identity and ideology which group 
identity is based on, are parts of the same process, providing the necessary 
conditions for individual maturation. Here, it is the solidarity aspect of 
identity which links common identities. According to him, an ideological 
system consists of shared images, ideas, and ideals providing people with a 
coherent and overall orientation in space and time especially when this 
system simplified. Ideologies add certain meanings to the group ideals but 
there is a price for it. He (1956) states that: 
 All ideologies ask for, as the prize for the promised possession of a 
future, uncompromising commitment to some absolute hierarchy 
of values and some rigid principle of conduct: be that principle 
total obedience to tradition, if the future is the eternalization of 
ancestry; total resignation, if the future is to be of another world; 
total martial discipline, if the future is to be reserved for some 
brand of armed superman; total inner reform, if the future is 
perceived as an advance edition of heaven on earth; or (to mention 
only one of the ideological ingredients of our time) complete 
pragmatic abandon to the processes of production and to human 
teamwork, if unceasing production seems to be the thread which 
holds present and future together (Erikson, 1956; p. 113). 
  
 According to him, the role of superego is likely to dominate the 
totalism and exclusiveness of some ideologies. In such cases, identity is 
seen as a manifestation of the superego. 
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2.2.1.2. Collective Identity 
 It can be proposed that the mechanisms of introjection, projection, 
incorporation, and identification are effective on the formation of collective 
identity. People can identify with different groups, such as their ethnic, 
national, or political groups and they can adopt these collective identities to 
various extents. They may identify with both good and bad parts of their 
own groups or introject the good parts of their groups and project the 
unwanted parts onto the other groups. The characteristics and dynamics of 
collective identity are varied according to which mechanisms are mainly 
used. 
 Volkan (1998) notes that the people identify with their social 
groups, ethnicities, nations, etc. The groups have some shared reservoirs 
which are accessible to all people in a group. And also, these reservoirs have 
a constant character; for example, a nation has a national flag, national 
monuments etc. As people emotionally invest their unintegrated good parts 
in these reservoirs, they connect to the same reservoir and develop a sense 
of we-ness. This sense of we-ness provides people with a sense of security. 
Education process in which parents and teachers have an important role 
contributes to the formation of group identity. In accordance with the focus 
of large group‘s identity, the people make an investment in ethnicity, 
nationality, religion or some combination of these.  
Sometimes people project their unintegrated good parts onto their 
group and project their unintegrated bad parts onto the other group. He 
states that ―The utilization of shared reservoirs from childhood on for the 
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bad and unintegrated parts, as well as projections of unacceptable thoughts 
and feelings, also helps create an ethnic marker for the recipient group‖ 
(Volkan, 1998, p.96). As one of the many psychoanalysts who study social 
phenomena, Falk who examined Arab-Israeli conflict from a psychoanalytic 
perspective also stresses that the groups project or externalize their 
unacceptable parts onto the other groups while idealizing their own group 
(Falk, 2004). 
It can be argued that the collective identity has narcissistic 
characteristics in groups which generate nationalist discourses. From the 
perspective of self psychology, Falk (2004) emphasizes that the group 
narcissism which is the dominant characteristic of a group self has an 
important role in interethnic conflicts. He sees that for many, the nation is 
the part of their extended self; it is especially true for the groups which 
dominantly display nationalist attitudes. It can also be called as grandiose 
group self that protects the group from the feelings of inferiority, sense of 
worthlessness, and helplessness. Pride, which is a manifestation of the 
grandiose group self, covers these embarrassing feelings. Generally, this 
narcissism has gained strength as a result of a defense against painful 
emotional experiences which has created narcissistic injuries in the past, 
collective history. In other words, group narcissism strengthens as the 
painful experiences are not processed psychically, and the group cannot 
mourn its losses. 
According to Volkan, individuals are not generally concerned about 
their large-group identity as long as the sense of threat against this identity 
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does not prevail. Therefore, a sense of threat is created at the socio-political 
level in order to strengthen and to activate collective identity. The members 
of large-groups are mobilized when faced with a sense of danger (Volkan, 
1998).  
 
2.2.1.3. The Organizing Role of Collective Traumas for 
Nationalist Discourses 
Collective traumas have important effects at social and historical 
levels. Regarding severe traumatic events which affect most of the large 
group, the link between the psychology of the individual and that of the 
group is spontaneously established. Collective trauma refers to the psychic 
experience due to a traumatic event which affects a large group or a society. 
These include unintended and unplanned incidents such as earthquakes or 
accidents; or intended actions perpetrated by people such as wars, ethnic 
cleansings, and genocides. The latter is defined as human-made traumas. 
The term of collective trauma generally implies the destructive actions 
which are intended by a group of people. These kinds of events cause mass 
deaths, injuries, migrations, and also serious psychological harms. A threat 
of destructive action against the people such as a threat of war may also be 
traumatic. These traumatic cases have an important place on collective 
memories as well as on survivors‘ memories. World Wars, Holocaust, 
Vietnam War, genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, ethnic cleansings in many 
countries can be given as an example to some of these kinds of traumatic 
events. These events are generally triggered by racism and nationalism 
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arrogating that a group of people is superior to the other, and is entitled to 
attack other people. The group which attempts these actions not only 
stigmatizes the other group as an enemy but also it dehumanizes the other. 
Dehumanizing creates serious psychic damages on the victims per se. The 
victim is unconsciously affected by the perpetrator‘s unconscious fantasy, 
and it is most probably transmitted from one generation to the next (Bass, 
2003). 
Many studies have shown that the collective traumas have important 
effects not only on the survivors but also on the collective memories and 
unconscious processes in later generations of survivors. The traumatic 
stories may be internalized by the children of survivors. The children may 
try to transform the tragic memory and repair the broken chain of familial 
and cultural history (Adelman, 1995). As Prager notes, because the trauma 
is transgenerationally transmitted, the collectivity is deprived of critical 
sources of social renewal (Prager, 2003). 
Transgenerational effects of trauma vary according to the type and 
the severity of trauma, psychological experiences of the survivors, different 
coping styles and defense mechanisms used by the survivors, and the 
attitudes of the survivors about telling these stories and experiences to the 
next generations. It is well known that even when the traumatic experiences 
of the survivors are not told to the next generations, unconscious 
transmission takes place. The survivors may carry over emotional messages 
relating to these events (Apprey, 2003; Rowland-Klein and Dunlop, 2001). 
Traumatic experiences are generally encoded in implicit memory that is 
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unconscious and non-linguistic. Therefore, it is difficult to verbalize but at 
the same time inevitably transmitted in non-linguistic ways (Brenneis, 
1996). To various extents, the next generations become aware of prior 
generation‘s experiences regardless of whether or not the stories are told 
overtly (Rowland-Klein and Dunlop, 2001). 
The mental representation of the traumatic event is shared by many 
people (Volkan, 1998). The traumatic events continue to remain in 
collective memory on both conscious and unconscious levels. The groups 
may tend to deny their experiences or to identify with these. Actually, denial 
and identification processes have similar functions including tolerance of 
painful affects and allowance to recover one's self-representation and family 
representation (Klein and Kogan, 1986). While sometimes denial, repression 
and dissociation defenses are used in social groups which have experienced 
traumatic events, sometimes the traumatic experiences are remembered and 
told again and again to the next generations. In the collectivity, there may be 
a great effort not to forget the trauma. Thus, next generations are identified 
with these experiences. These narratives construct the collective memory 
and also they have an organizing role on the collective identity 
(Kestenbaum, 2003). Dominant political discourses in the society may be 
organized based on these memories. These memories may be distorted and 
misrepresented due to their overwhelming characteristic and the 
transmission process. Historical reality may be distorted, and also fantasy 
and reality may be interpenetrated. 
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The collective traumas shape the mental representations of all the 
members of a group. The group has a common, shared feelings, images, 
fantasies, and interpretations of the trauma. The defenses against trauma 
such as denial, dissociation and repression are also common on the 
collective level as well. These burdensome mental representations may be 
difficult to carry and therefore the traumatized self-images are transmitted to 
the next generations. Consequently they become part of the group identity 
(Volkan, 1998).  
Sometimes, the survivors tend to keep distance between themselves 
and the event; they try to avoid the effects of the trauma. Later generations 
may also try to erase the memory of the past. Nonetheless, this memory may 
continue to remain in group‘s memory and it reemerges under certain 
conditions (Volkan, 1998). Sometimes the trauma sleeps on the collective 
level until a threat against the society reactivates the historical trauma 
(Kogan, 1993). In some cases, a political leader may reactivate the 
collective memory which carries on traumatic experience in the face of a 
sense of threat against the society and/or the nation. In this case, mental 
representation of the trauma gains a mobilizing function (Volkan, 1998). 
The society may try to protect itself against the sense of threat; this way of 
protection may be seen constantly in the society. The society may attempt 
violent actions in order to protect itself.  
Volkan uses the term ―chosen trauma‖ to describe the collective 
memory of a trauma that is activated mainly by political forces. It is 
doubtless that the people do not choose to be victimized but they may 
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choose to mythologize the traumatic events (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1994). 
The term of chosen trauma refers to the shared mental representation of the 
collective traumatic event(s) which carries on both realistic and fantasized 
characteristics. Similar collective traumas are condensed in order to embody 
the ethnic identity. As an example he explains Milosevic‘s reactivation of 
the victimhood of Serbs in The Battle of Kosovo as an effort to build 
Serbian nationalism. He states that the Battle of Kosovo has not been a 
sleeping memory for the Serbs; it has already been presented on the 
collective level, for example it has been the most important history topic for 
the elementary school children. These mythologized tales of the battle 
which are carried on from one generation to the next strengthen the Serbs‘ 
sense of a traumatized, shared identity.  When it was powerfully reactivated 
by Milosevic at that time, the collective memory was strengthened, and also 
the sense of entitlement of revenge was created (Volkan, 1998).  
In some situations, traumatized societies may subsequently attempt 
to get involved in violent acts. This may be related to the wish for revenge. 
Being traumatized may be defined as one‘s cause for the acts of violence 
(Apprey, 2003). Similar to the identification with the aggressor on the 
individual level, people may identify with the perpetrators of trauma on the 
collective level (Klein and Kogan, 1986). This is an attempt to gain mastery 
over trauma and it can be adaptive as well as maladaptive, and transient as 
well as permanent. Because it is related to the projection of blame and guilt, 
the survivor tends to be not self-critical but critical of others (Blum, 1987). 
Identification with the aggressor may be seen as an effort to deny being the 
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victim and the sense of helplessness creating a wish for revenge (Klein and 
Kogan, 1986). 
 
2.2.1.4. The Organizing Role of Collective Glories for 
Nationalist Discourses 
Large groups are not affected only by traumatic events at the 
collective level, but also they are identified with collective glories which 
have been achieved as a result of a triumph and/or any other success. Those 
glories as well as traumatic events are generally kept in collective memory 
and also transmitted to the next generations. Nationalist movements 
generally build their discourses around these glories, called as ―national 
glories‖.  
Volkan (1998) uses the concept of ―chosen glory‖ to describe a 
historical event which generally refers to a deserved victory. These events 
have a crucial role on the formation of collective identity; in fact most of the 
time they have an organizing role for that identity. The collective glories 
which usually induce feelings of triumph in large groups can be an 
important part of the shared reservoir of the group. The mental 
representations of such events generally bring members of a group together; 
for example the shared mental representations of independence wars 
become powerful aspect of a collective identity. These events are 
mythicized in the same way, as in the case of chosen traumas. In contrast to 
traumatic events, the symbols of the collective glories are proudly 
displayed. The members of the groups are expected to identify with those 
 25 
glories and also carry on the memories of the events. The representations of 
those events may be reactivated in certain sociopolitical conjunctures to 
support the self-esteem of the group.  
 
2.2.2. The Group Processes  
2.2.2.1. The Rigid Collective Superego and the Capacity to 
be Individual in the face of the Group 
In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud states that a cultural 
superego which is similar to that of an individual develops in the 
communities. He says, ―It can be asserted that the community, too, evolves 
a super-ego under whose influence cultural development proceeds‖ (Freud, 
1930, p.141). He continues as follows: ―Another point of agreement 
between the cultural and the individual super-ego is that the former, just like 
the latter, sets up strict ideal demands, disobedience to which is visited with 
‗fear of conscience‘‖ (Freud, 1930, p. 141). Superego is derived from 
introjected/internalized aggression and it takes a form of conscience. In the 
civilization process, individual‘s dangerous aggression is weakened and 
supervised by an agency within him. The source of superego is also the fear 
of loss of love due to aggression. The individual has such a fear because he 
faces the risk of being deprived of protection from dangers if he loses the 
love of another person. The individual who is afraid of the authority 
internalizes this fear, and consequently superego is established. Once the 
superego is established, the individual begins to be afraid of his superego. 
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The sense of guilt arises from fear of authority and of the superego. Freud 
states that: 
Conscience (or more correctly, the anxiety which later becomes 
conscience) is indeed the cause of instinctual renunciation to begin 
with, but that later the relationship is reversed. Every renunciation of 
instinct now becomes a dynamic source of conscience and every 
fresh renunciation increases the latter's severity and intolerance 
(Freud, 1930, p. 128).  
 
In summary, from the drive theory perspective, internalization of the 
law of a society is a prerequisite for people to be able to place themselves in 
the society. When this internalization is succeeded, the superego evolves. It 
does not mean that people must completely submit himself into this law, 
rather he sees this law and places himself into that. Consequently, the 
person can get involved in joint activities with others in the society. In the 
collective work, the superego of the person can be transferred to the 
superego of the group. This experience is needed for the participation in the 
collectivity that leads to productivity.  Nonetheless, it is also possible to 
construct oneself as an individual within the law. Roussillon (1999/2002) 
stresses that the person can put a distance between himself and the law of 
the society at the same time. This experience enables the person to generate 
the things which will be new and original within the culture while he 
continues to be a part of the collectivity. This is crucial for the development 
of the capacity to be alone in the group and for maintaining individuality 
within the group. The attitude of the society or the group is naturally very 
important in this process. The groups can permit and tolerate this kind of 
individuality or prohibit it. Roussillon states that the groups which have a 
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strong narcissistic agreement are most likely to exclude people who 
challenge this agreement. In this context, nationalist attitudes are seen as a 
manifestation of or as an extension of the narcissistic agreement of the 
society in which case nationalist attitudes of the people may be reinforced 
by the society. Idealization of a group‘s identity refers to a narcissistic 
phenomenon. Identification with the value of a group/society is needed but 
also putting a distance between oneself and the group is important for 
individuality. 
It is most likely difficult to keep one‘s own individuality within the 
community with a rigid collective superego. In the presence of a rigid 
collective superego, the members of the group tend to accept the values of 
the community and obey the demands of this community without 
reservation. They identify with the community and its values excessively. 
The members submit to the collective superego of the community and 
therefore they relinquish their individuality and their responsibility. This 
may be due to the fear of losing the love of the community as well as the 
fear of punishment that will come from the community. In this situation, 
people do not show aggression in a more neutralized way because the 
community does not allow assertiveness. Taking individual moves or 
making personal protests may be seen as dangerous because in such cases 
displaying aggression is likely to create a sense of guilt in the members. 
Therefore the people do not have the opportunity to neutralize their 
aggression. As a result, they may tend to show aggression to the other 
groups. Moreover, because the members identify with the values of the 
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community excessively, the other values are likely to be seen as worthless. 
The other group will also be the container of the group‘s aggressive 
tendencies. From this conceptualization, it can be argued that to a certain 
extent, the rigidity of the collective superego may be seen as responsible for 
the rigid national identity and nationalist attitudes. Nationalism generally 
demands people to identify with and idealize the national values; while 
one‘s own values are idealized, the other‘s values are devalued. The 
attempts of criticism against the national values are perceived as 
unacceptable and also dangerous. As the members have internalized the 
collective superego, they avoid criticism which would be perceived as 
disobedience. The members are afraid of their conscience that would lead to 
a sense of guilt. 
 
2.2.2.2. The Collective Ego Ideal 
Formation of a rigid collective identity may be explained in terms of 
transferring of the ego ideal to the community. Freud introduced the concept 
of the ego ideal into psychoanalytic theory in On Narcissism: an 
Introduction (1914). This was conceptualized as heir to primary narcissism. 
Primary narcissism refers to the early objectless state. It is the condition 
involving absolute satisfaction for the child. The child takes himself as his 
own ideal in this stage and there is no unsatisfaction, no desire and no loss. 
The child does not want to give up this state of perfection, but departure 
from primary narcissism is necessary for ego development. The child 
 29 
struggles to recover perfection; therefore he develops an ego ideal. Freud 
wrote: 
As always where the libido is concerned, man has here again shown 
himself incapable of giving up a satisfaction he had once enjoyed. 
He is not willing to forgo the narcissistic perfection of his childhood; 
and when, as he grows up, he is disturbed by the admonitions of 
others and by the awakening of his own critical judgment, so that he 
can no longer retain that perfection, he seeks to recover it in the new 
form of an ego ideal. What he projects before him as his ideal is the 
substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was 
his own ideal (Freud, 1914/1964, p.94).  
 
Khan (1996) describes the ego ideal from the object relations 
perspective. According to him, in the psychic development, in order to deal 
with deprivation of the primary object, the child tends to idealize it. This 
idealized internal object as the ego ideal is used to ward off all sense of 
hopelessness, emptiness, and uselessness. In this context, the ego-ideal is 
the carrier of the earliest psychic experience in which the separateness from 
the object is not yet stably established. The concept of ego ideal is also 
explained by Chasseguet-Smirgel. According to her, the ego ideal appears 
as a substitute for primary narcissistic perfection but there is always a gulf, a 
split that man is constantly seeking to abolish (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985). 
The development of the ego ideal is a usual process but the greatness and/or 
the rigidity of the ego ideal may be related to wideness of this gulf. This 
also seems to be related to the unwillingness of giving up the illusionary 
perfection.  It indicates an attempt to regain the lost omnipotence. It tends to 
return to a previous illusion. (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985). 
The role of the ego ideal is important for the understanding of group 
experience. The group identity (e.g. national, religious) can be established 
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as a result of the transfer of the individual ego ideal to the community. 
Collective ego ideal does not only consist of transferring of the individual 
ego ideal, communities also develop an ego ideal. Actually, as Freud 
showed, the ego ideal has a social aspect as well as an individual aspect. He 
stated that ―The ego ideal opens up an important avenue for the 
understanding of group psychology. In addition to its individual side, this 
ideal has a social side; it is also the common ideal of a family, a class or a 
nation‖ (Freud, 1914/1964; p. 101).  
Freud (1921) initiated the psychoanalytic study of group process. He 
explained the group process in terms of libidinal principle. People in a 
group, project their ego ideals on to the same object which is usually the 
group leader and consequently identify themselves with this object. In other 
words, people in the group put an object in the place of the ego ideal. Thus, 
the function of self-observation and conscience is attributed to this object. 
Freud states that ―The individual gives up his ego ideal and substitutes for it 
the group ideal as embodied in the leader‖ (1921, p.129).  The leader 
represents the primal father which is dreadful for the group. The members of 
the group have also a passion for authority and obedience. The army and the 
Christian Church as artificial groups were given as examples by Freud in 
order to explain this group process (Freud, 1921).  In Freud‘s view, ego 
ideal is a part of the superego. Kernberg notes that in Freud‘s theory, people 
in mobs get rid of moral constraints, self-criticism and responsibility when 
they project their ego ideal onto the leader. Also in this process they have a 
sense of unity and belonging protecting them from losing their sense of 
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identity. This process leads to primitive drives and affects to be handed over 
to and directed by the leader (Kernberg, 1998a). Freud stated that: 
There is always a feeling of triumph when something in the ego 
coincides with the ego ideal. And the sense of guilt (as well as the 
sense of inferiority) can also be understood as an expression of 
tension between the ego and the ego ideal (1921, p. 131).  
 
When people put the object (or leader) in the place of their ego ideal, 
they also attribute the responsibility for the actions to the leader, 
consequently getting rid of the feeling of blame, guilt, etc (Freud, 1921). 
Racist and nationalist identities may be related to the projection of 
the individual ego ideal onto the group. At a collective level, a nation may 
be an ego ideal of the group. Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985) uses the ego ideal 
concept to explain the ideological groups. For her, an ideology always has a 
fantasy of narcissistic assumption that is related to the wish to return to a 
state of primary fusion. There is also a wish to exclude the conflict, thus an 
illusion is created.  The wish to return to a state of primary fusion refers to 
the wish to go back to the primary narcissistic perfection in which there is 
no conflict which is obviously an illusion. Therefore, the leader in the 
ideological groups is not a representation of the father; these groups aim to 
abolish the world of the father. There is a reluctance to respect the father as 
a carrier of law. The people have wishes for maintaining the illusion of 
coming back to the primal fusion with the mother. There is a lack of reality 
testing. In these groups, the role of the reality testing is delegated to the 
group ego ideal (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985).  
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The concept of ego ideal was described differently in Freud and in 
Chasseguet-Smirgel, and also its role and function within the group process 
are different. Whereas the ego ideal of the individual is projected onto the 
leader who is the representative of the father in Freud; group does not seek a 
substitute father, conversely it cannot endure law of the father in 
Chasseguet-Smirgel. Here, it can be said that Freud did not describe the 
process in ideological groups only as Chasseguet-Smirgel did; however his 
explanation seems to compromise such groups as well. Actually Freud used 
the concept of ego ideal as a part of the superego, whereas Chasseguet-
Smirgel used it as a separate agency. When Freud developed the concept of 
ego ideal in 1914, it was seen as a separate part of the ego (Garcia, 2003). 
However, he later defined the ego ideal as a part of the superego within the 
structural theory developed in 1923. In his formulation, the superego is the 
heir to the Oedipus complex and involves prohibiting function and also it 
motivates the individual to aspire toward high ideals which are more or less 
realistic (Frank, 1999). Chasseguet-Smirgel was faithful to the first 
conceptualization of the ego ideal by Freud; she argued that there was a 
fundamental difference between the ego ideal and the superego. In her 
conceptualization, the ego ideal was to heir the primary narcissism, the 
superego was heir to the Oedipus complex.  She wrote that ―positive 
injunction emanates from the heir to narcissism and the negative form the 
heir to the Oedipus complex‖ (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985; p. 77). In fact, the 
origin of ego ideal is the same both in Freud and Chasseguet-Smirgel, but 
according to Freud, it is integrated with the superego. In Freud‘s theory, 
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when ego ideal is projected onto the leader of the group, people are released 
of the responsibility and self-criticism; therefore reality testing is also likely 
to be transferred to the leader. Consequently, reality testing may be lacking. 
In Chasseguet-Smirgel‘s formulation, too, reality testing is weakened but 
this is due to the illusion wished to be created by the group. 
From these conceptualizations, it can be argued that the rigidity of 
collective ego ideal is related to the tendency to deny sense of helplessness 
and powerlessness and also idealization of certain social values belonging to 
a certain society. Under these circumstances, the communities which are 
assumed to not share the values of them may be devalued. As a defense 
against helplessness, omnipotence can be developed. The communities 
which are established on a rigid ego ideal tend to have grandiosity. There is 
also a seeking for wholeness. Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985) stated that the 
group members lose their individualities in such a situation. Each member 
has an opportunity to identify with the whole group and therefore they 
acquire omnipotence. In other words, they lose their individuality but they 
experience a primitive narcissistic gratification of greatness and power by 
the shared sense of omnipotence. Therefore, members need to destroy any 
external reality that threatens the group‘s illusionary ideology (Kernberg, 
1998a). A threat against this omnipotence which comes from the other 
activates the aggression towards the other. In these kinds of groups which 
are established on idealization, any criticism that shatters this idealization is 
most likely to be seen as a threat. The people who do not accept the superior 
characteristics of the group are seen as a threat and they also become targets 
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of aggression. In the groups which have these kinds of characteristics, there 
is a demand for mere obedience of the members. 
 
2.2.2.3. Narcissistic Fantasy 
Kristeva (1993) describes the withdrawing into the ethnicity, nation 
or race as an attempt to preserve oneself or to go back to a primal paradise 
in the face of despair and frustration. The feeling of despair and frustration 
may increase in social change processes. When the structures which are 
familiar to the members of group tend to change, people may face a chaotic 
situation which is felt as unbearable. Nationalist discourses tend to increase 
when the social despair and frustrations widespread. The sense of threat also 
increases in parallel with these. In case of these kinds of experiences, the 
narcissistic world is more trustworthy than interpersonal world which may 
create frustration. Hatred of others is explained in terms of this 
phenomenon. Kristeva (1993) states that: 
Hatred of those others who do not share my origins and who affront 
me personally, economically, and culturally: I then move back 
among ‗my own,‘ I stick to an archaic, primitive ‗common 
denominator,‘ the one of my frailest childhood, my closest relatives, 
hoping they will be more trustworthy than ‗foreigners,‘ in spite of 
the petty conflicts those family members so often, alas, had in store 
for me but that I would rather forget (pp. 2-3) [Emphasis not mine]. 
 
The term of ―narcissistic fantasy‖ refers to a desire for narcissistic 
wholeness, seeking oneness, sameness and homogeneity. This desire implies 
a psychic world in which the other does not exist. The other can only be 
one‘s narcissistic extension who is expected to be as desired. Because the 
other cannot be absolutely desired, s/he would be targets of aggression. The 
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independent existence of the other cannot be tolerated; desire of oneness 
cannot be given up. Frosh (2001) reminds us that this is a regressive 
impulse, seeking the lost oneness. The other would be a threat against 
maintaining the fantasy of oneness, a source of a fear of contamination, of 
degeneration. He emphasizes that wish to return to the fantasized oneness is 
common in fundamentalist ideologies. He states that: 
In the context of a global social order teetering on the edge of 
collapse, with fragmentation and disruption of identity always 
staring the one eye, fundamentalism thus offers a way of staying in 
one piece, of riding this whirlwind of dissolution by disowning it, 
projecting it outside. Its narcissistic energy is based on omnipotent 
fantasies and on the denial of Otherness, the disavowal of legitimate 
contradiction and alternative ways of being. It offers solace to lost 
souls, ways of succeeding the world where the forces seem ranged 
against one, an easily accessible terrain of meaning and value, 
translated into the language of ‗purity‘ and truth (Frosh, 2001, p. 73).  
 
In this framework, these characteristics can be associated with 
racism. Racism suggests that a certain race is superior to others, biologically 
and/or culturally. Contemporary racism highlighted the cultural differences 
which are irremovable. Where does this need for sense of superiority come 
from? The claim of purity seems to be related to a narcissistic fantasy. It can 
be remembered here that racism and nationalism produce some conspiracy 
theories about those other ethnicities‘ or nations‘ intending to destroy their 
societies. These conspiracy theories are derived from the persecutory 
anxiety of the groups because they have projected their aggression onto the 
others but also these theories are emanated from perceiving one‘s own 
group as an object of desire. In this frame, conspiracy theories are related to 
a narcissistic fantasy. The group has grandiosity about the other‘s wishes to 
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destroy them because they have very valuable things which the other has 
not. Grotstein (2000) also relates hate to the narcissistic phenomenon. He 
sees that hate which implies a narcissistic injury constitutes a manic defense 
against one‘s sense of smallness and helplessness in the face of a chaotic 
situation. Hate is the result of collapse of the narcissistic fantasies. When the 
narcissistic fantasy of people about being special and deserving of whatever 
they want (sense of entitlement) is injured due to various reasons, they tend 
to hate the people who are hold responsible for this injury.  
 
2.2.2.4. Regressive Group Processes 
Bion studied with small groups and developed three basic 
assumptions to explain the unconscious life of the groups. The 
conceptualization of these basic assumptions has been used for explaining 
the large group process. These assumptions are dependency, fight/flight and 
pairing. Another group process which he described is called work group or 
sophisticated group. The developmental levels of the three basic-assumption 
groups and the work group are different. In contrast to the basic assumption 
groups, the work group has a powerful psychological structure and also a 
capacity for co-operation. There is a similar difference in their relation to 
the external reality. The basic assumptions refer to the regressive processes 
of the groups. These group processes are not stable; there are emotional 
oscillations because powerful emotional drives emerge in the group and the 
groups frequently have difficulty containing the emotional situations, 
especially anxiety (Bion, 1959).  It can be said that this oscillation is 
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between paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. According to Hopper 
(2003), the basic-assumption groups are characterized by the fantasy that 
their members are under similar states of regression. In these group 
processes, the members distort the reality. 
Dependency basic assumption is ―that the group is met in order to be 
sustained by a leader on whom it depends for nourishment, material and 
spiritual, and protection‖ (Bion, 1959, p. 147). Fight-flight assumption is 
―that the group has met to fight something or to run away from it‖ (p. 152). 
Pairing assumption is ―that people come together as a group for purposes of 
preserving the group‖ (p. 63). The members in this third group have a 
messianic hope; they wait for an unborn leader such as a genius. Bion states 
that dependency assumption underlies the church, fight-flight assumption 
underlies the army, and pairing assumption underlies the aristocracy. 
Kernberg summarizes these three basic assumptions developed by Bion. In 
dependency assumption group, the members who are greedy perceive 
themselves as inadequate, immature and incompetent. They idealize their 
leader and they perceive him as omnipotent and omniscient. They expect the 
leader to be a representative of goodness, power and knowledge. The 
common defense mechanisms which are used by the members are primitive 
idealization, projected omnipotence, denial, greed, and envy. In fight-flight 
assumption group, the members get together against external enemies which 
are vaguely perceived. The leader is expected to combat against these 
enemies and to protect the members from infighting. The members have 
serious difficulty tolerating the opposition to their shared ideology; therefore 
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they tend to split into subgroups in case of conflict. The members of this 
kind of group commonly deny the existence of intragroup hostility; instead, 
they project aggression onto an out-group. In fight-flight group, the defenses 
of splitting, projection of aggression and projective identification are 
dominantly used. According to Kernberg, this kind of group has a difficulty 
developing a coherent ideology because its integration capacity is lacking. 
In pairing assumption groups, members tend to preserve their group‘s 
threatened identity. Whereas the first two have a pregenital character, the 
third has a genital character (Kernberg, 1998a).  
Kernberg discusses the regressive group situations using Bion‘s 
conceptualization. He proposes an approach for understanding small groups, 
large groups and the mobs in terms of object relations perspective. Two 
levels of internalized object relations are described. Basic level refers to 
multiple self and object representations which consist of primitive fantasy 
formations linked with primitive impulse derivatives. Higher level is 
sophisticated, integrated self and object representations linked with higher 
levels of affect dispositions. The value systems of the groups which have 
basic level of object relations are simplistic, conventional, black-or-white 
morality. He states that certain group conditions tend towards regression 
that activates primitive psychological levels. When the groups lose their 
ordinary social structure, primitive levels of psychological functioning may 
also be activated. Aggression is expressed more directly and intensely when 
group process is unstructured. Hence, large group processes can be 
controlled by rigid social structuring (Kernberg, 1998a). 
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Kernberg (1998a) describes the messianic ideology and its 
characteristics. He states that this ideology splits the world into good and 
evil; the advocates of this ideology think that the totalistic quality of their 
belief system will resolve all the problems of the world and/or of the group; 
their leaders promise their members a golden future; they demand complete 
submission to the group rules and also full obedience to themselves. 
Moreover, this ideology tends to regulate the details of the members‘ daily 
lives. It tries to eliminate individual boundaries, to discourage private 
thinking and access to knowledge that can threaten its belief system. Such 
ideologies transform the unstructured large groups into fight-flight and/or 
dependency group. The ideology also tends to rationalize the expression of 
aggression against out-groups. In such cases, it may need to dehumanize all 
relationships in out-groups.  
Kernberg states that ―Leaders and members in groups regress 
between two axes: dependency, narcissism, primitive hedonism, 
psychopathy; and moralism, paranoid-persecutory control, sadism, 
violence‖ (Kernberg, 1998a, p. 47). There is a fluctuation between 
narcissistic/dependent and paranoid polarity. In the narcissistic/dependent 
polarity, there is a sense of impotence, of helplessness, and at the same time 
a search for an idealized but cognitively simplistic leader who is expected to 
provide total gratification. In the paranoid polarity the world is splitted 
between ―us‖ and ―them‖. ―They‖ are the objects of aggressive attacks. The 
people expect violent actions from the combative leader who can take the 
responsibility of these actions (Kernberg, 1998b). Actually these polarities 
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can sometimes exist together.  From this perspective it can be argued that 
nationalist groups prefer combative leaders. This kind of leadership is 
reinforced because there is a wish for preservation of the nation. In Turkey, 
the nationalist leaders ask the citizens to protect the nation against internal 
or external dangers. According to these leaders‘ discourses, the people who 
are obedient to these discourses are seen as ―good us‖, and the others as 
―bad other‖, traitors, and/or enemies.  
According to Kernberg (1998b), aggressive tendencies can increase 
in certain social circumstances. In these situations, regression in the society 
and the psychopathology of the individual are integrated. Nationalist leaders 
may frequently activate certain historical traumas. He states that: 
Unstable, turbulent, potentially threatening social, economic, 
cultural, or historical conditions activate a deeper level of paranoid 
regression: the forthcoming election is perceived as a potential threat 
as well as a potential opportunity to defy and overcome a real or 
imagined enemy. Social subgroups become sharply divided and 
serve as targets for the projection of aggression and paranoid 
distortions. The potential for political, religious, racial, or nationalist 
hostility latent in the local ideology and cultural tradition is 
maximally activated under such conditions (Kernberg, 1998a, p. 
286).  
 
Kernberg emphasizes that the mass media may play a major role in 
intensifying and exploiting the paranoid regression in the groups by 
producing and reinforcing strong division between good and bad, and 
between friends and enemies. Moreover, it may reinforce the tendency of 
aggression in groups justifying the paranoid ideology. In the mass media, 
while some people are described as members of a valuable, superior and 
rightfully dominant group; others are represented as members of a group 
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which displays threatening, aggressive, malignant and revengeful 
characteristics (Kernberg, 2003, p. 690). 
In the study on unconscious life of groups, Hopper (2003) discusses 
the theory of Bion and the contributions of the subsequent psychoanalysts 
who focus on group processes. He reported that Turquet, a Kleinian 
psychoanalyst, described a fourth assumption in addition to the three 
assumptions conceptualized by Bion. The fourth assumption is ―oneness‖. 
According to this assumption, when people participate in a large group in 
which they are exposed to multiple stimuli and response bombardment, they 
may perceive a threat to their identity and also have a fear of annihilation. In 
this situation, people tend to protect themselves against the loss of identity 
and fear of annihilation; they need feeling of unity. As a result of this 
process, they choose either isolation or creating homogeneity. As a second 
choice, the group seeks for the feeling of existence, well-being and 
wholeness. The group needs absolute equality, absolute sameness of belief, 
also the use of language as a tool for disclosing their identity instead of as a 
tool for expressing their ideas. The members in the group refuse role 
differentiation, and the use of personal authority. These characteristics are 
also related to their desire for fusion as a defense against envy (Hopper, 
2003). 
Kernberg also discusses the conceptualization of Turquet. He states 
that in the large group process, the members feel a complete loss of identity.  
The members‘ capacity for evaluating their and others‘ behaviors decreases 
because the verbal communication disappears. Moreover, people in a large 
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group may have a fear of aggression coming from other members and also 
have a loss of control. These fears can emerge in the large groups anytime. 
Provocative behaviors that follow this fear may be directed at the leader and 
the members who try to maintain their individuality. Efforts of 
homogenization are prevalent because of the sense of threat. Envy of 
thinking and of individuality frequently exists in such groups. Any 
simplistic generalizations can easily be accepted within group and it can be 
transformed into absolute truth functioning as a calming doctrine (Kernberg, 
1998a). 
From this perspective, it can be argued that demand for homogeneity 
on the basis of blood or culture is seen in racism and nationalism. 
Neoracism and increase of nationalism can be seen as a reaction to 
globalization bringing a sense of insecurity, and migration resulting in 
heterogeneity in the society.  
 
2.2.3. Defense Mechanisms of Splitting, Projection, Projective 
Identification, Idealization, and Devaluation  
Melanie Klein (1946) explained some typical defense of early ego 
against the paranoid and schizoid anxieties such as splitting, projection and 
projective identification. She argued that death instinct which is felt as a fear 
of annihilation and its form, a fear of persecution, is responsible for this 
anxiety. Destructive impulses which are emanated from death instinct are 
innate. Splitting is the main ego mechanism and defense against anxiety. 
The infant splits the psychic world into the good and the bad in the face of 
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his destructive impulses, envy and persecutory anxiety. He projects his 
destructive impulses outwards, thus he preserves the good. In other words, 
in order to overcome anxiety, he throws out the bad parts of himself which 
are rooted in his aggressive drives. By means of splitting, the frustrating and 
persecutory object is kept widely apart from the idealized object. 
Idealization is the result of exaggeration of the good aspect of the object. 
There is a denial of psychic reality which becomes possible through the 
feelings of omnipotence. Melanie Klein stated that: 
In the exploration of early splitting processes, it is essential to 
differentiate between a good object and an idealized one, though this 
distinction cannot be drawn sharply. A very deep split between the 
two aspects of the object indicates that it is not the good and bad 
object that are being kept apart but an idealized and an extremely 
bad one. So deep and sharp division reveals that destructive 
impulses, envy, and persecutory anxiety are very strong and that 
idealization serves mainly as a defense against these emotions (M. 
Klein, 1957/175, p. 192). 
 
Projection of hated parts of the self onto the other is likely to lead a 
form of identification which is called projective identification. When the 
wish to harm or to control the other is projected, the other is felt to be a 
persecutor. The fear of being controlled emerges. In the face of destructive 
impulses, the danger of retaliation may also show itself. In the case of 
excessive splitting and projective identification, the ego is weakened. These 
processes operate in paranoid-schizoid position. Here, a feeling of envy is 
worth mentioning. Envy which makes building good object difficult is an 
expression of destructive impulses. Klein stated that ―Envy is the angry 
feeling that another person possesses and enjoys something desirable—the 
envious impulse being to take it away or to spoil it‖ (M. Klein, 1946, p. 
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181). Devaluation of the object is a defense against envy; because devalued 
object is not envied any more. Another defense against envy which is 
experienced is to activate envy in others by one‘s own success and 
possessions in order to reverse the situation. Unfortunately, this method is 
not effective because it leads to persecutory anxiety (M. Klein, 1946).  
The loved and hated aspects of the self and the other cannot be 
separated for long time. The infant gradually integrates the good and bad 
parts of both himself and the other within depressive position. In this 
position, fear of loss and the feeling of guilt arise. In parallel with the 
integration process between inner and external situations, understanding of 
psychic reality and perception of external reality enhance. These positions 
first appear in infancy but all of us continue to fluctuate between them 
throughout life (M. Klein, 1946). Although there is no clear division 
between the two positions and the people fluctuate between different 
developmental levels, and either one or the other is dominant.  
These developmental positions may be adapted to the group 
processes. Groups and communities also fluctuate between different 
developmental levels. Similar to individuals, communities are neither 
homogeneous nor static; some dominant elements of the communities at a 
certain context may emerge and determine the social processes. In the 
dominant political discourses, mechanism of splitting, idealization, 
devaluation, projection and projective identification which belong to the 
paranoid-schizoid position may be used. For example, in the groups in 
which nationalist discourses are dominantly generated, these defenses are 
 45 
frequently used. Idealization and devaluation mechanisms in their relation to 
the splitting function in social life in terms of establishment of the rigid 
national identity. The splitting into ―all good us‖, idealized nation and/or 
ethnicity and ―all bad other‖, devaluated/derogated nation and/or ethnicity 
can prevail. While the undesirable parts of one‘s own group are denied, the 
good parts of the other group are also denied. These good parts of the other 
may stir up envy in the group because they are assumed to have something 
which is desired. Therefore, feeling of envy may produce the wish to 
destroy the other and also other may be devalued. Nationalist discourses and 
attitudes are frequently explained in terms of disintegration of the good and 
bad characteristics in the specific nation. In order to preserve the good parts, 
the undesirable parts are thrown out and projected onto the other. For the 
nationalist discourses which excessively use this defense, the discourses 
which assert that the other group is good can be seen as a threat and the 
people who follow such expressions are suspected to be potential enemies 
because this assertion damages the ―us‖.  
In this frame, it can be said that nationalist discourses are produced 
within the group process in which narcissistic dynamics display themselves. 
Idealization and arrogance are important parts of the narcissistic 
phenomenon. In parallel with these dynamics, the ego ideal of the group is 
high and rigid. This also creates excessive dependence on the national 
identity because it is a representative of one‘s own good parts. Ego ideal is 
the resultant of projection of one‘s own good parts onto the object (M. 
Klein, 1946). 
 46 
According to Emanuel Klein, nationalism provides people with a 
feeling of superiority and also opportunity to express their aggression. It 
functions as a container for the aggressive impulses. The sense of ―us‖ in a 
group also enables people to avoid guilt and anxiety (E. Klein, 1944). Byles 
(2003) highlights the fact that people‘s sadistic fantasies of destructive 
omnipotence are projected onto the other which is perceived as enemy. This 
―other‖ functions as an external stabilizer of people‘s sense of identity and 
inner control. Therefore, the presence of other as enemy is needed. The 
people make an emotional investment to the enemy. At this point, it can be 
discussed that linking the aggressive drives directly with extreme 
nationalism and ethnic hatred leading people to discharge their aggressions 
are not agreeable. Some ideological movements reinforce these processes in 
certain circumstances. Here, there are two important questions. Which 
factors facilitate and justify the expression of aggression? Which factors 
serve a function of container for aggression? An activation of a sense of 
threat against one‘s identity is partly responsible for it. In the group 
processes, many factors facilitate regression. 
Moscowitz (1995) emphasizes the role of fantasy in the group 
processes stating that there is no ethnicity. Actually, there is only need to 
deny people‘s own badness and fear of their own hatred. In this frame, 
ethnicity and race are fantasies in which people‘s own badness are denied 
and projected onto the others (Rustin, 1991). Here, there is the dichotomy of 
good and bad, love and hate, idealized and devalued. This dichotomy of 
ethnic differences runs basically not on the cognitive level but the emotional 
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level. Positive and negative feelings are condensed and then positive ones 
are introjected while negative ones are projected onto the others. As a result 
of projection, persecutory anxiety emerges. This is called as projective 
identification. Persecutory anxiety is the return of the projected elements. 
Consequently, the people/the group who are seen as a persecutor are feared. 
The fear is not accepted and then is transformed into rage and hate. Hated 
other becomes a scapegoat for one‘s unbearable feelings (Kristeva, 1993). 
Rustin states that ―This process can have a self-reinforcing dynamic, in 
which the evidence of damage inflicted on projected internal objects 
generates still more violent persecution, which is again projected on to 
powerless victims‖ (1991, p. 66).  
From Ogden‘s perspective, projective identification is understood 
within the interpersonal process (Ogden, 1979). Once the unwanted parts of 
the individual are projected onto the other, the other is likely to receive 
those parts and then concordantly act on them. Ogden explained this process 
as follows: 
Projective identification is viewed as a group of fantasies and 
accompanying object relations involving three phases which together 
make up a single psychological unit. In the initial phase, the 
projector fantasies ridding himself of an aspect of himself and 
putting that aspect into another person in a controlling way. 
Secondly, via the interpersonal interaction, the projector exerts 
pressure on the recipient of the projection to experience feelings that 
are congruent with the projection. Finally, the recipient 
psychologically processes the projection and makes a modified 
version of it available for re-internalization by the projector (1979, p. 
371). 
 
This conceptualization may shed light on the process of nationalist 
identification. When the ―bad‖ parts of a group are projected onto the other, 
 48 
for example when the members of the other group are perceived as the 
enemy threatening the group‘s unity, the other tends to introject those 
feelings coming from the projector. In that case, the other group starts to 
behave in line with the expectation from it. At the same time, the other 
group is likely to apply the similar mechanism of projective identification. 
Consequently, nationalist attitudes of different groups foster each other. It 
can also be argued that the groups who have nationalist tendencies need 
each other. 
 
2.2.4. Thinking Processes in Nationalist Discourses 
It can be argued that thinking processes are also affected due to 
excessive use of certain defense mechanisms. Splitting, idealization, 
devaluation, projection and projective identification are primitive defenses. 
In regressive group processes, the use of primitive defenses increases in 
parallel with the increase of anxiety level of people. In that case, secondary 
thought process which is an indicator of a mature psychic structure remains 
underdeveloped. While primary process is based on pleasure-principle; to a 
large extent, secondary thought process is based on reality-principle and it is 
characterized by reason, logic and delay of action (A. Freud, 1965). Rational 
thinking and integration the information are related to secondary process. In 
the face of regression, the ability of rational thinking and integration 
capacity weaken and people have difficulty in understanding complex 
nature of the world meaning reality testing is impaired to a certain extent.  
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The development of mentalization capacity or self-reflective 
function is noteworthy here. Mentalization or reflective function refers to 
the ability to interpret reactions of others as a result of their mental states 
and to understand subjective meanings of the other‘s own feelings. It 
includes individual‘s conception of others‘ attitudes, intentions and plans. 
This function is closely related to individual‘s ability to characterize and 
give meaning to her own psychic experiences. It is derived from multiple 
sets of self and other representations of the individual and it implies 
cognitive, affective and experiential capacity to use and integrate awareness 
of self as a subject and as an object. This ability or function has a crucial 
role on development of affect regulation, impulse control, self-monitoring 
and the experience of self-agency (Fonagy and Target, 1998). It can be said 
that these functions are not developed well in people who have rigid self -
and other- representations as seen in the nationalist or racist attitudes. 
Actually, those representations seem to be insufficiently developed and/or 
unintegrated. Fonagy and Target point out to the fact that limited 
mentalization or reflective abilities are responsible for having a difficulty in 
responding flexibly and adaptively to the symbolic, meaningful components 
of others‘ behaviors. People with limited mentalization abilities ―find 
themselves caught in fixed patterns of attribution; rigid stereotypes of 
response; nonsymbolic, instrumental uses of affect—mental patterns that are 
not amenable to either reflection or modulation‖ (Fonagy and Target, 1998, 
p. 93). 
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From a Kleinian perspective, Rustin (1991) notes that splitting 
mechanism which is excessively used in nationalist attitudes affects the 
thinking processes because intense emotions, especially aggression, cannot 
be tolerated by the person and therefore cannot be symbolized within the 
psychic life, rather these emotions are projected to the external life, to the 
other. Because of excessive use of splitting, projection and projective 
identification, the person confuses what comes from the self and what 
comes from the other. When the person projects his own badness, in other 
words, his undesirable parts onto the other and then he introjects it, 
projective identification works. Consequently, reality and truth are distorted 
to some extent. Bion states that: 
The dominance of projective identification confuses the distinction 
between the self and the external object. This contributes to the 
absence of any perception of two-ness, since such an awareness 
depends on the recognition of a distinction between subject and 
object (1962, p. 307). 
 
The use of primitive defense mechanisms of splitting, projection and 
projective identification is related to the incapacity of toleration of 
frustration. Bion (1962) points out that when there is lack of capacity for 
tolerating the frustration, reality principle cannot develop well. This 
inability impedes the development of thoughts and the capacity to think; by 
the same token incapacity to think increases the sense of frustration.  
In this framework, Bion‘s contributions to Klein‘s theory are 
noteworthy. Rustin adopts Bion‘s conceptualization in order to examine the 
phenomenon of racism from a psychoanalytic viewpoint. He reminds us that 
Bion added a third dimension of knowledge to Klein‘s conceptualization of 
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mind being constructed around love and hate (Rustin, 1991). Bion saw a 
close relationship between affect and cognition. He introduced the concept 
of ―O‖ which refers to ultimate reality or the thing-in-itself or unknowable 
(Bion, 1965). The ―O‖ is near to the death instinct in Klein. In order for an 
experience to be able to be thought, in other words, to be transformed, the 
intense feeling must be contained and tolerated by the person; otherwise it 
remains intolerable.  If the feeling cannot be tolerated, it creates persecutory 
feelings because it has not been given a meaning. This experience leads the 
person to defend himself by projecting this feeling outwards. According to 
Grotstein (2003), hate is related to manic defenses against one‘s sense of 
helplessness and impotence in the dreadful presence of ―O‖. This manic 
defense is an effort to control the anxiety. In summary, containment of an 
intense feeling is essential for people to process and transform the 
experience. When people encounter chaotic experiences, they must be 
moderated in order for them to be transformed into knowledge. Otherwise, 
they remain as unbearable and therefore are projected onto the other to 
protect themselves. In the global world, people are likely to have a sense of 
smallness and powerlessness. Mass media continuously reinforces these 
feelings. As a defense, people may tend to cling to their ethnic and cultural 
identities which are idealized and to project their fears onto the others. 
Racism and nationalism use these defenses to various extents and frequently 
blame the other for this sense of smallness. To develop some conspiracy 
theories and to apply them excessively to explain the social, economical and 
political issues can be understood through that mechanism. To various 
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extents, nationalist discourses develop conspiracy theories; many times they 
hold the internal and/or external forces (enemies) responsible for the chaotic 
situation in the country. These enemies are accused of being the cause of 
anxiety and of the sense of helplessness in the society. Thereby, the 
collective unity is maintained by externalizing the malevolent situation and 
transferring the responsibility to the others. As certain enemies are identified 
as responsible forces, people get rid of their anxiety somewhat without any 
attempt to understand the complex reality from different perspectives.  
It can easily be argued that to some extent the reality is distorted in 
racist and nationalist attitudes. The groups which deny and project their 
badness are not in fact acquainted with the characteristics of the people on 
whom the badness is projected. Even when there is an acquaintance, only 
negative characteristics of the other group are perceived and exaggerated by 
the racist/nationalist tendencies. Rustin argues that racism is also related to 
hatred of reality and truth. Indeed, these racist attitudes emanate from 
emotional, not cognitive domain. They are not tested in terms of their 
appropriateness to reality. Racial categories are not based on real 
knowledge, they are arbitrary. There is pseudo-thinking as a defense against 
the apprehension of reality (Rustin, 1991). Many authors writing on racism 
and nationalism draw attention to this fact. It can also be said that racism 
and extreme nationalism have a tendency to devalue thinking and to idealize 
action. This is especially true for critical thinking which may be seen as a 
threat to the narcissistic fantasy. Fascism (and fascist movements) which is 
based on racism and/or nationalism bans critical thinking and freedom of 
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expression. Fascist ideologists have difficulty in tolerating critical/creative 
thinking; they insist that everybody must think in a certain way. Racism and 
nationalism frequently strive for determining how people think and speak. 
As Balibar points out, racist attitude has a fear of words (Balibar, 2000a). 
Intellectualism is denigrated and labeled as malevolent in these ideologies. 
As Rustin notes, racist judgments are immune to the effects of logical 
arguments. He wrote that: 
Racist ways of thinking may be so resistant to argument precisely 
because they don‘t derive from or really engage with these levels of 
mental functioning. They derive from preconceptions, not observed 
facts, and pay little regard to rules of consistency or rational 
inference in the formation of judgments and strong opinions (1991, 
pp. 68-69).   
 
2.3. Summary 
Although collective and group processes have been examined by 
psychoanalysts or social scientists who approach to social issues from a 
psychoanalytic framework, this focus has not yet produced a comprehensive 
study of nationalism. However, there are some valuable theoretical 
contributions which enable to examine the nationalism as both a part of the 
collective identity and a tendency that is produced in a group process. In 
summary, the issue can be addressed from the following theoretical 
conceptualizations: 
Idealization of collective identity: To various extents the groups have 
shared images, representations and ideals which shape the collective 
identity. Nationalist discourses which are a part of an ideological system 
tend to shape and strengthen these shared images, representations and ideals 
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of the collectivity. These are denominated as ―national‖ and subsequently 
idealized. Consequently, a national identity is constituted. 
The organizing role of collective traumas and glories for nationalist 
discourses: The national identity is reinforced through idealizing certain 
national glories and being identified with some collective traumas. 
Frequently, a collective trauma which is kept in collective memory is 
carried over from one generation to the next; sometimes an embedded 
historical trauma is reactivated and it becomes a ―chosen trauma‖ which is 
described by Volkan and Itzkowitz (1994). Nationalist leaders, movements, 
and the mass media play an important role in reactivating these events. 
Moreover, national education systems are extremely instrumental in forming 
national traumas or glories, and keeping them sensitive enough so that they 
could be easily reactivated. 
Harsh collective superego and claim for obedience instead of 
supporting the capacity for being individual in the face of group: In 
nationalist discourses, it is frequently expected that all members of the 
nation should share the idealized images and representations which build the 
national identity. The members are also expected to identify with and be 
committed to the national identity. Demand for commitment and obedience 
comes from the collective superego that can be harsh in groups in which 
nationalist discourses dominantly appear. These groups also tend to 
regenerate the nationalist discourses at the micro levels. In these group 
processes, individuality which may be perceived as disobedience is not 
likely to be permitted and be tolerated. The groups who have an idealized 
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self-image tend to develop a narcissistic agreement. The members who 
display their individuality despite the demands of the collectivity and 
criticize the so-called ―shared‖ values of the collectivity may be perceived 
as a threat to the narcissistic agreement. Consequently, people tend to 
maintain this agreement, because otherwise they may be excluded and 
punished. 
Rigid/high collective ego ideal: It can be said that nationalist groups 
develop a high/rigid collective ego ideal characterized by grandiosity and 
denial of the sense of helplessness and powerlessness. In such case, group 
members forgo their individualities and identify with the group ideal to 
achieve a sense of omnipotence. This excessive identification may lead to a 
distortion of reality. Because the group has a tendency to maintain its 
narcissistic illusion; the external reality may be perceived as a threat against 
to this illusion. The group members get rid of moral constraints and self-
criticism as a result of transferring their ego ideals to the whole group or the 
leader. 
Putting a leader in the place of the ego ideal: In groups, the ego 
ideal can also be transferred to a leader. In groups which have nationalist 
attitudes, a leader who may be the founder of the nation or who have played 
an important role in a triumph can be put in the place of the ego ideal of the 
group. This leader is idealized and followed by the members of the group 
without any questioning; he cannot be criticized. The members identify with 
this leader and consequently his presence protects the members of the group 
from losing their sense of identity. 
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Excessive use of splitting, idealization, devaluation, projection and 
projective identification mechanisms: In nationalist discourses, defense 
mechanisms which are excessively used are usually primitive defenses. 
When a group which is described as ―national‖ is idealized, the other groups 
are likely to be devalued. Idealization and devaluation which is a reflection 
of the splitting between ―all good us‖ and ―all bad other‖ are generally used 
together. Because the aggression cannot be displayed moderately within the 
group, it is projected onto the other group. When idealization is excessively 
applied, the unwanted parts of the own group are projected onto the other. 
Moreover, the good parts of the devalued other are denied, because they 
create envy. As a result of this process, the ―other‖ is perceived as a 
persecutor who is expected to retaliate. Persecutory anxiety is the result of 
projective identification. Naturally, other nationalist groups are likely to use 
similar defense mechanisms which consequently, in that relational matrix, 
interact with each other, and also maintain each other‘s presence.  
Regression to the narcissistic internal world: The groups, like 
individuals, can regress towards more primitive levels of developmental 
organization. In the face of despair and frustration at the social level, the 
society may display narcissistic characteristics which have not dominantly 
appeared before. The periods in which nationalist discourses gain ground 
may be described as regressive processes. In these processes, the 
maintenance of current social constructs may be threatened (real or 
perceived) in various ways and people may have a sense of powerlessness 
and a fear of annihilation which can also be triggered and/or reinforced by 
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nationalist discourses themselves. In such a case, people who fear a loss of 
identity may withdraw into the narcissistic world consisting of a sense of 
wholeness and homogeneity and cling to their ethnic and/or national 
belongings, which is more trustworthy than the actual world that is the 
source of conflict and frustration. From this narcissistic stance, members 
perceive their national and/or ethnic identity as superior to others. This 
illusionary perception may create a sense of entitlement. Besides, the group 
claims itself to be the sole object of desire as it possesses everything that the 
other groups wish to have. Ultimately, these narcissistic fantasies are 
doomed to collapse. In that case, the other is perceived as responsible for 
this collapse, and, as a result, is the object of hate. 
Displaying of the characteristics of fight-flight assumption: Using 
Bion‘s conceptualization of basic assumptions which refer to the regressive 
processes within the group, it can be argued that the groups -in which 
nationalist discourses prevail- predominantly display the characteristics of 
fight-flight assumption group. Some of these characteristics are similar to 
those of narcissistic phenomenon. The members of the group idealize their 
―all good‖ group, deny the aggression within the group and project their 
aggression onto the other groups which are perceived as enemy. The 
common defense mechanism used in this kind of group is projective 
identification. To various extents, nationalist discourses draw attention to 
internal and external enemies against the nation and they promise to protect 
their members. Because the good and the bad parts of the group are not 
integrated while aggression is denied and projected, the reality is distorted. 
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Due to the tendency of distortion, their shared ideology is not coherent 
either. Likewise, the group cannot tolerate any criticisms directed at their 
ideology. The value system of these groups is based on basic object 
relations composed of simplistic, conventional, black-or-white morality. 
Impairment of thinking process: Because primitive defense 
mechanisms are predominantly used, thinking processes are impaired. 
―Good‖ and ―bad‖ parts of the group cannot be integrated and unwanted 
parts of the group are projected onto the other. However, development of 
integration capacity is crucial for complexity and flexibility of thinking; 
because otherwise the reality is distorted and/or rigid and stereotyping 
thinking process emerges. In nationalist discourses, this distortion of reality 
and rigid thinking stand out to various extents. 
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3. Method 
 
3.1. Sources of Materials 
To analyze nationalist discourses in Turkey, fifteen political parties, 
one governmental organization, five non-governmental organizations and 
one political journal were selected. Additionally, two national organizing 
texts which were mainly presented in the national education curriculum, 
―Atatürk‘ün Gençliğe Hitabesi‖1 [Atatürk‘s Address to Youth] and 
―Andımız‖ (Öğrenci Andı‖)2 [―Our Pledge‖ (―Student‘s Pledge‖)] were 
included in the study (See Table I).  
All political parties which participated in the July 22, 2007 
Parliamentary General Election were included in this study, except for 
―Aydınlık Türkiye Partisi‖ [Bright Turkey Party] because there was access 
to neither its election declaration nor the party program. In addition to the 
parties participated in the election, ―Büyük Birlik Partisi‖ [Great Union 
Party] and ―Demokratik Sol Parti‖ [Democratic Left Party] were also 
included in this study since they finally made their way to the parliament 
through elected independents or through candidates elected on another 
party‘s list. Since this study aims to look solely at Turkish nationalist 
discourses, Demokratik Toplum Partisi [Democratic Society Party] was 
excluded because the members of this party largely consist of Kurdish 
                                                 
1
 Atatürk‘ün Gençliğe Hitabesi was the last part of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk‘s ―Nutuk‖ 
[Address] which was made in Second General Assembly of Republican People‘s Party [Cumhuriyet 
Halk Fırkası] in 1927. 
 
2
 Andımız (Öğrenci Andı) was written and put into practice in 1933 by the Minister of 
Education Reşit Galip. According to the Ministry of Education Regulation, it is still an obligation for 
every primary school student to read it every day.  
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people and the party declares that its political struggle is predominantly for 
the rights of Kurdish people. One governmental organization, Türk Silahlı 
Kuvvetleri [Turkish Armed Forces] was included as it represents the official 
ideology in Turkey. Five non-governmental organizations and one political 
journal were selected considering that their influence on the present political 
life of Turkey. The two texts, ―Atatürk‘s Address to Youth‖ and ―Our 
Pledge‖, were included because they are the most powerful representations 
of the official/dominant nationalist ideology. These texts are commonly 
used by many political discourses and accepted as national texts which are 
internalized and carried on in the collective memory. 
 
3.2. Materials 
The materials consisted of official documents which have been 
published by the selected institutions. All of these documents have been 
published in the official web-sites of the institutions except for the program 
of Genç Parti [Young Party] because its official web-site could not be 
accessed. The election declarations of the nine political parties were 
investigated. For the six parties which did not publish election declaration, 
their party programs were studied. A press statement of the governmental 
institution, Turkish Armed Forces, was included. For the aim of analyzing 
the political discourses of non-governmental organizations, their bylaws 
and/or programs and/or declarations of organization were used. The 
manifest of the political journal was examined (See Table I). It should be 
stated that the extents of these texts were not equal.  
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3.3. Procedure 
First, the literature on nationalism, racism and psychoanalysis was 
reviewed to formulate a framework to ground the psychoanalytic literature 
on the issue of nationalism. The literature on both nationalism and 
psychoanalysis is limited, so the literature on identity, collective identity, 
group processes and dynamics, the role of the ego ideal and the superego, 
primitive defense mechanisms from psychoanalytic perspective were also 
reviewed. The theories of Freud, Klein, Bion, Kernberg and Volkan were 
especially useful to approach the main issue of this study. In sum, the 
review did not only aim to make an introduction to the concepts in this 
topic, but also aimed at developing a systematical understanding to the issue 
of nationalism from a psychoanalytical perspective. 
Sociology, political science and social psychology literatures, 
especially the ones on social identity theory were reviewed in order to 
introduce the phenomenon of nationalism through other disciplines. In order 
to describe and explain the phenomenon of nationalism and different 
nationalist discourses in Turkey, relevant sociology and political science 
literatures were reviewed. Turkish nationalism and its history were briefly 
outlined. Because the study focuses on current nationalist discourses, mainly 
contemporary studies were used. 
In the second step, the selected Turkish texts were evaluated by the 
author. All parts of the party programs and the election declarations, -for 
example internal and foreign relations, economical program, education and 
culture policies- were investigated. However the focus was mainly on the 
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ones which are more relevant such as internal politics, education and culture 
policies. The other texts were analyzed in a similar way.   
The qualitative analysis method was used to analyze the texts. They 
were analyzed in terms of their contents and discursive characteristics in the 
light of psychoanalytical conceptualizations under nine titles which were 
outlined in the Summary subsection (3.3.). The dominant and repetitious 
themes in the texts were focused. The author also paid attention to the 
conflicting statements within the texts. 
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Table 1: The Sources and Materials Used in the Case Analysis
1
 
 
Original name Abbreviation Translation of the name Source 
The election declarations 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi AKP Justice and Development Party AKP, 2007 
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi CHP Republican People‘s Party CHP, 2007 
Demokrat Parti DP Democrat Party DP, 2007 
Emek Partisi EMEP Labor Party EMEP, 2007 
Halkın Yükselişi Partisi HYP People‘s Ascent Party HYP, 2007 
İşçi Partisi İP Workers‘ Party İP, 2007 
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi MHP Nationalist Movement Party MHP, 2007 
Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi ÖDP Freedom and Solidarity Party ÖDP, 2007 
Saadet Partisi SP Felicity Party SP, 2007 
The party programs 
Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi BTP Independent Turkey Party BTP, 2003 
Büyük Birlik Partisi BBP Great Union Party BBP, 1993 
Demokratik Sol Parti DSP Democratic Left Party DSP, 2003 
Genç Parti GP Young Party GP, 2002 
Liberal Demokrat Parti LDP Liberal Democrat Party LDP, 2002 
Türkiye Komünist Partisi TKP Communist Party of Turkey TKP, 2001 
National organizing texts 
Andımız (Öğrenci Andı)  Our Pledge (Student‘s Pledge) 1933 (MEB) 
Atatürk‘ün Gençliğe Hitabesi  Atatürk‘s Address to Youth 1927 (MEB) 
A governmental institution 
Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (The 
Press Statement of April 27, 
2007) 
TSK Turkish Armed Forces TSK, 2007 
NGO’s 
Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği 
(Bylaw) 
ADD Association of Atatürkist 
Thought 
ADD, 2006 
Atatürkçü Düşünce Kulüpleri 
Federasyonu (Declaration of 
organization) 
ADKF Federation of the Clubs of 
Atatürkist Thought 
ADKF, 2000 
Kuvvai Milliye Derneği 
(Bylaw) 
 Association of Kuvvai Milliye 
(National Forces) 
Kuvvai 
Milliye 
Derneği 
(2006) 
Milli Mücadele Derneği 
(Bylaw, program, and the text 
named ‗Neden Milli Mücadele 
Derneği‘) 
MMD Association of National 
Struggle 
MMD, 2007a; 
2007b; 2007c 
Vatansever Kuvvetler Güç 
Birliği Hareketi Derneği 
(Bylaw) 
VKGB Association of the Movement 
of Power Union of Patriotic 
Forces 
VKGB, 2005 
Political journals 
Türksolu (Manifest)  Turkish left Türksolu, 
2002 
                                                 
1
 See Appendix A for brief descriptions of the political parties and institutions. See 
Appendix B for the official results of July 22, 2007 Parliamentary General Election. 
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A Case Study: Turkish Nationalism 
 
3.4. Introduction 
3.4.1. Turkish Nationalism as an Organizing Ideology of the 
Republic of Turkey 
It can be said that Turkish nationalism is the organizing ideology of 
Turkish nation-state which was established in 1923 (Bora, 2002; Kentel, 
Ahıska, and Genç, 2007; Yıldız, 2002). Turkish national identity was 
officially defined when the Republic of Turkey, Turkish nation-state, was 
built. Turkishness was accepted as the dominant identity in the Republic of 
Turkey. The strategy of nationalism in Turkey has continued to build the 
national identity since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey (Kentel, 
Ahıska, and Genç, 2007) and is still the dominant ideology in Turkey 
(Belge, 2006; Bora, 2003; 2006a; Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç, 2007). In fact, 
this nationalism is perceived as a supra-ideological and supra-political 
principle and is perceived as a natural sense and primordial bond (Bora, 
2002). 
It can be argued that in the formation of Turkish nationalism, top-
down dynamics were dominant, in other words Turkish nationalism was 
first defined at the official level and was implemented as a national project. 
Nationalism is one of the six arrows describing the political goals of 
Mustafa Kemal which was announced in the 1931 Republican People‘s 
Party program; others are republicanism, populism, laicism, 
transformationism and statism (Parla and Davison, 2004). Kemalism and 
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nationalism can be seen as the main axis of the official ideology in Republic 
of Turkey (Bora, 2002). It is appropriate here to explain the characteristic of 
the official nationalist ideology, namely Atatürk nationalism‖ (or ―Kemalist 
nationalism‖). This nationalism is based on cultural identity in Ziya 
Gökalp‘s theoretical synthesis between the principle of citizenship and 
ethnicity. However, it has oscillated between the nationalism based on 
principle of citizenship and cultural-ethnicist essentialism since the 
foundation of republic (Bora, 1995; 2006a). 
Ziya Gökalp was accepted as the ideologue of this official project 
although his theory was sometimes differently implemented at the political 
level by Kemalists (Parla, 1993). He defined Turkism as dignifying the 
Turkish nation and a way of working in the service of Turkish nation 
(Gökalp, 1923/1996). According to him, it should be accepted that Turkish 
nation consists of people who share the same culture and language, namely 
Turkish culture and language. He differentiated the culture and civilization 
[hars ve medeniyet]; whereas the former carries a national character which 
is shared by all members of the nation, the latter refers to the international, 
supra-national phenomenon. Turkish nation should protect its collective 
culture, but at the same time it should belong to the Western civilization. He 
emphasized that Turkish nation should be a part of the Western civilization 
provided that it protects its Turkish character.  
It can be argued that in Gökalp‘s theory, society has a primary role 
in the sense that collective/shared conscience along with national ideals is 
the basis of social unity and solidarity. He also emphasized that national 
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morality should be promoted in order to strengthen the national solidarity. 
Parla stated that Gökalp‘s theory can be accepted as a solidarist corporatism 
that is also the dominant ideology of many political parties (except 
fundamentalist-essentialist parties) as well as armed forces (Parla, 1993). In 
parallel with that ascertainment, it is argued that the cultural corporatism 
which has been adopted by Kemalists also affects the nationalist 
conservative ideology in Turkey (Taşkın, 2007). However, the parties and 
armed forces which adopt the solidarist corporatism may slide to fascist 
polar of the corporatism, for example in the period of the military coup in 
1980-83 (Parla, 1993).  
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk assigned what Ziya Gökalp called the ideal 
Turkish nation-state ―to reach to the level of and to be part of the Western 
civilization‖. The truth of the matter is that Ottoman Empire (OE) had 
partially started Westernization process in the mid-nineteenth century. The 
Republic of Turkey which is the successor of OE has maintained and 
transformed this project. This project was called ―attaining the rank of 
contemporary civilization‖ which is still a valid project of the present state 
ideology. However, the attitudes toward the Western world representing this 
contemporary civilization have been ambivalent since the foundation of 
Republic. On the one hand, the West is admired; on the other, it is described 
as a threat because of the perception that the West is dangerous and 
untrustworthy. In fact, the latter attitude is partially related to the first; 
because the West is accepted as a high culture, it is envied. Due to this 
sense, it is assumed that the West humiliates and excludes OE/Turkey. This 
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sense of humiliation is settled in the Turkish national identity (Akçam, 
2002). The Christian West has also been perceived as an enemy because the 
Christian countries supported the independence movements of minorities 
who lived in the OE and intended to disintegrate OE (Akçam, 1992).  
The history of Ottoman Empire has an important role on the Turkish 
collective identity. According to Yörük (2002), Turkish identity is based on 
a collective denial of the past. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire is a 
political and societal trauma which is still denied. The construction of a 
Turkish nation is parallel to the construction of the national unconscious. In 
this context, it is possible to indicate that both the great history of Ottoman 
Empire as a super-power from the 16
th
 to the 18
th   
and the traumatic history 
in 19
th
 are the strong images in the Turkish collective memory (Paker, 
2004). Paker discusses the characteristics of the super power period of 
Ottoman Empire which play an important role for the constitution of the 
dominant political culture in Turkey. Some of these characteristics are a 
grandiose sense of self; a sense of supremacy; the fantasy of 
untouchability/invincibility; leadership of the Islamic world; high emotional 
investment on the West as the other/object. The West is disdained for being 
infidel, but at the same time wished for its conquest. In the 19
th
 century the 
Ottomans lost against the West and Russia which resulted with the loss of 
most of its territories. The major characteristic of the dominant political 
culture in this period was the sense of being heavily humiliated by the West 
and by Russia. The narcissistic injury was very deep because of the prior 
grandiose sense of self. Among the other characteristics were survival 
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anxiety; blaming Western powers and ethnic minorities (especially non-
Muslim minorities) as ―external and internal enemies‖; blaming plurality 
and desire for homogeneity; an ambivalent relationship with the West, 
caught in between envy and hate; and the rise of a Turkish nationalism. The 
Republic of Turkey was founded upon this traumatic history. According to 
Paker (2004), the Republic was founded on multi-layered dissociations as a 
defense in order to cope with this traumatic process. The Republican official 
ideology accepted the National Independence War as a ground zero. 
Ottoman trauma was expelled from the political culture and ignored. The 
nation chose only to identify with the successful periods.  
The Republic of Turkey was desired to be a homogeneous nation-
state where Turks are the dominant population. Here it should be noted that 
―the other‖ is crucial in the formation of self/identity. According to Yörük 
(2002), Turkish national project needed to define the ―other‖ (non-nation) 
before defining the nation and the other was formulated as non-Muslims. 
This choice is also related to the survival anxiety remnant of the traumatic 
fall of Ottomans and to the perception of non-Muslims as a population 
which seed of discord aiming to divide the country (Paker, 2004). The 
discourse of ―Happy is a Man who Says I am a Turk!‖ [―Ne Mutlu Türküm 
Diyene!‖] is an organizing theme of the Turkish nation-state. Claiming any 
other ethnic/cultural identity was seen as treason. Here, it can be argued that 
ignored Muslim minorities, such as Kurds and Arabs as well as non-
Muslims have been defined as the ―other‖ in Turkish national project. 
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National education process regenerates this nationalist ideology throughout 
generations.  
Bora argues that the survival anxiety (beka kaygısı) is settled down 
to the Turkish national memory (Bora, 1995). The geopolitical position of 
Turkey is usually idealized but also there is generated and regenerated 
conspiracy theories assuming that the enemies set their sights on the 
territories of Turkey. It is argued that Turkish nationalism develops and 
shapes a myth of history which is the myth of supremacy (Belge, 2006). The 
common fear of disintegration and annihilation partially rests on this sense 
of supremacy. In the texts of Ömer Seyfettin which are seen as the 
organizing texts of Turkish nationalism, these themes are frequently seen. 
He stated that Turks have a glorious history and also they are superior to the 
other cultures. In Vatan Yalnız Vatan that was published in Türklük Üzerine 
Yazılar, he also awakened the society to the enemies and he stated that 
humanity and internationalism are very dangerous because they cause 
hostility against the homeland. The Europeans are conceived as the greatest 
enemy of Turkish homeland that intends to engulf the homeland. The Turks 
should also be alert to the internal enemies who are the extensions of the 
Western enemies. In order to protect the homeland, Turkish youth has to be 
ready to fight against these enemies (Seyfettin, 1911/2002). In this context, 
it can be noted that xenophobia is an essential part of the dominant ideology 
in Turkey. Humanism is conceived as an enemy of Turkish nationalism 
because it is a potential danger for the country. In fact, nationalism and 
racism process side by side (Belge, 2006). 
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3.4.2. Different Nationalist Discourses in Turkey 
Two forms of nationalisms -the first is based on the citizenship and 
territoriality, the second is based on blood, ethnicity, and culture bonds- can 
be visible in Turkey. Specifically, there are two nationalist polarities: 
modern-secular/ Kemalist / ―left‖ and traditional/cultural/ ―right‖ (Kentel, 
Ahıska, and Genç, 2007). Despite these polarities, in almost all nationalist 
discourses, the presence of various ethnic groups is denied and it is assumed 
that Turkey belongs only to Turks and that Turks are the ―true owners of the 
country‖. It is expected from the other ethnic groups to define themselves as 
Turks being voluntary assimilated. Otherwise, they are seen as a threat to 
the homogeneity of Turkey. According to Özbek (2005), this nationalism 
may lead to racism. He thinks that the others in Turkey are not humiliated 
mainly in terms of their biological roots, but their cultures. For example, the 
racism which is mainly directed at Kurds is based on their social and 
cultural traits. This is seen as a manifestation of new racism. 
Bora states that Turkish nationalism does not consist of a 
homogeneous discourse, it consists of four main discourses; official 
nationalism (Atatürk nationalism) that is the root-language of Turkish 
nationalism, ―left-wing‖ Kemalist nationalism (ulusçuluk or ulusalcılık), 
liberal neonationalism advocating ―civilizationism‖ and prosperity, and 
racist-ethnicist neo-Pan-Turkism (Turkist radical nationalism). He argues 
that Islamism merging with a nationalist discourse can be added as the fifth. 
The last nationalist discourse is also called as conservative nationalism. It 
emphasizes the religion, Islam, as the main element of national identity. All 
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of these nationalist discourses can be intermixed and also integrated with the 
dominant political pattern in every day life in Turkey (Bora, 2002; 2003). 
Atatürk nationalism that is the official nationalism is based on 
cultural identity in Ziya Gökalp‘s theoretical synthesis between the principle 
of citizenship and ethnicity. Although it emphasizes the principle of 
citizenship, its ethnicist and essentialist character can easily appear in the 
domains of the popular culture. This nationalism is rigid, cold, and 
stereotyped. It idealizes the symbols of the nation-state such as the flag, 
national anthem and the image of Atatürk. The army has an important role 
in the regeneration of the official nationalism (Bora, 2002; 2003). 
―Left-wing‖ Kemalist nationalism emphasizes secularism and 
modernization; its principles are anti-imperialism and independence since 
the 1960 and 1970‘s. It prefers the term ulusçuluk to milliyetçilik because 
the term millet belongs to the Ottoman language. Although it describes itself 
as a humanist-universalistic nationalism based on citizenship and 
territoriality, it can easily tend to essentialism and uniqueness; therefore its 
―left wing‖ emphasis is not convincing (Bora, 2002; 2003). 
Liberal neonationalism emphasizes the progressivist-
developmentalist aspect of the modernization. It claims that Turkey has the 
capacity for attaining the rank of contemporary civilization. The discourse 
claiming that this capacity is intrinsic displays an essentialist character. This 
nationalism emphasizes national pride. Its discourse has a loose character; 
therefore it can be integrated with the hegemony of other nationalist 
discourses (Bora, 2002; 2003). 
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Racist-ethnicist nationalism has a radical character which belongs to 
the fascist ideology. It is suggested that this type of nationalism is a more 
rigid variety of the official ideology which highlights the culturalist aspect. 
It generates Turkish mythology; the totem of original Turkism, the bozkurt 
(gray wolf) is the symbol of this ideology. The ideal of becoming purely 
Turkish is preserved (Bora, 2002; 2003). 
It can be argued that there is an apparent rise in all of these 
nationalist discourses in Turkey recently. Bora notes that Turkish 
nationalism climbed in the late 1980s and early 1990s in parallel with the 
nationalist wave around the world. To a large extent, the globalization trend 
and the collapse of bipolarization of the world are responsible for this rise. 
In Turkey, the Kurdish issue also gained momentum in those years. The 
discussions on the full membership of Turkey in the EU have also added on 
to this socio-political agenda recently. The reaction to the cultural and moral 
effects of this membership has reinforced the traditional nationalism (Bora, 
1995; 2003). According to Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç (2007), especially the 
strategy of modern secular nationalism in Turkey strives for gaining 
strength in the face of globalization. 
In the studies of Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç (2007), it is highlighted 
that Turkish nationalism has a masculine language. However, this dominant 
language of the nationalism is under the threat due to the weakening of 
modern secular nationalism. For the purpose of protection of this language, 
it is exacerbated. The researchers reports that the words such as authority, 
discipline and violence are overly used in the recent period while 
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punishment is normalized. In many nationalist discourses, the honor of the 
nation is generally associated with the honor of masculinity. This idealized 
masculinity easily displays itself in violent actions when the honor [namus] 
is contaminated. In fact, the honor of masculinity is oversensitive to 
criticism and challenge. In such cases, the sense of humiliation emerges and 
the violent actions are attempted to reverse this sense of humiliation.   
 
4.1.3. The Influence of the European Union Membership 
Negotiations of Turkey and Kurdish Issue on Turkish 
Nationalist Discourses 
The process of EU membership negotiations of Turkey beginning 
from 2004 has greatly influenced the nationalist discourses in Turkey. The 
prospect of EU membership has become the most important issue in the 
socio-political life in Turkey. This membership which can be seen as a part 
of the collective ego ideal has been desired for many years, but at the same 
time joining to a supra-national union has created an anxiety based on a 
perceived threat against the nation-state and national identity. Moreover, 
this process brings new democratization steps which lead to the weakening 
of the dominant political structure in Turkey. Therefore, the democratic 
reforms which should be required for the membership are seen as a 
concession and lead to a serious disturbance in the dominant political 
culture (Paker, 2004). 
While the political parties which have a liberal nationalist tendency 
support the EU membership of Turkey, Kemalist ―left wing‖ and 
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conservative/religious political movements sharply protest that membership. 
Gradually, some political movements which supported the membership have 
started to oppose it because of the unwillingness to give up their statist and 
authoritarian traditions. EU membership process provides a democratization 
opportunity for Turkey. The Kurdish issue, the Cyprus issue, the status and 
rights of the minorities, restriction of the authority of the army are the topics 
which are most discussed in this process.  
Liberal wing supports the EU membership mainly on the economical 
and developmental basis even though certain required democratization steps 
in this process disturb them. Some left and Kurdish political movements 
stand for the membership that promises democratic reforms. Traditional 
socialist camp oppose to the membership because of the view that EU is a 
capitalist and imperialist union. The Kemalist ―left wing‖ intelligentsia, 
namely the ―nationalist left‖ has protested the membership on the basis that 
EU membership is actually a Western imperialist project aiming at 
disintegrating Turkey and abolishing republican acquisitions. The ones who 
support the membership are accused of being traitors and collaborators 
(Paker, 2005). Some fundamental Sunni Muslim political movements also 
oppose to the EU as it is mainly a Christian union. It should be added that 
these different oppositions are not only directed to the EU but also to 
Europe and the West in general (Yeğen, 1005). 
It can be argued that the Kurdish issue meaning the social and 
political demands of the Kurdish population is at the intersection point 
where different nationalist movements organize their discourses around. 
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This issue is seen as one of the biggest sources of national insecurity 
because of the fear of disintegration. The Kurdish people are perceived as 
dangerous ―others‖, sometimes as internal enemies. According to Kentel, 
Ahıska, and Genç (2007), through the Kurdish issue the concept of ―us‖ and 
―them‖ are reproduced by the nationalist strategy attempting to achieve the 
ideal of a homogeneous nation. ―The PKK terror‖ being identified with 
Kurdish issue reinforces this national strategy. Some limited democratic 
steps, such as the use of Kurdish language in the media, and opening 
Kurdish language courses have been resisted in the dominant political 
climate because of the panic along different nationalist lines. Along with 
Kurdish issue, the rights and demands of different ethnic groups are 
conceived as unacceptable. In this socio-political process, ―unity and 
togetherness‖ [―birlik ve beraberlik‖] is given more voice. 
 
4.2. The Analysis of Turkish Nationalist Discourses 
In this section, different nationalist discourses are analyzed under the 
following titles but it should be stated that these categories are not mutually 
exclusive. As there is a theoretical continuity between the categories, these 
titles partially overlap with each other.  
In this case analysis, nationalist attitudes which are displayed 
implicitly or explicitly in the texts are examined. However it does not mean 
that all political parties display nationalist characteristics; the discourses not 
including nationalist themes are not attributed under these titles in detail. 
These discourses are mentioned briefly at the end of this section. 
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In the analysis the original statements are quoted and the emphases, 
capital letters, and italics are preserved from the originals. For many 
quotations, no specific page numbers are reported since they are unavailable 
in the original web-based documents. 
 
4.2.1. Idealization of Collective Identity 
Almost all of discourses which display nationalist characteristics to 
various extents emphasize a certain collective identity, ―national identity‖ in 
the context of Turkey. This collective identity generally consists of 
Turkishness, but in certain discourses Muslim identity is highlighted along 
with the Turkish identity. While in the former, the emphasis is on ethnicity 
and nation; in the latter in addition to nation and/or ethnicity dimension, 
religion is seen as the indicator of the collective identity. 
In many discourses, the Turkish nation is idealized and the phrases 
of ―Supreme Turkish Nation‖ [―Yüce Türk Milleti‖] (MHP), ―Beloved 
Turkish nation‖ [Aziz Türk milleti] (VKGB), ―Our Beloved Nation‖ [Aziz 
Milletimiz] (AKP, DP, SP) are frequently used. In some discourses, the 
Muslimness is also called as ―supreme‖ (BBP, VKGB). In these discourses, 
the good parts of the Turkish nation are generally introjected. Some 
crystallized examples are: 
There is no barrier that the Turkish nation, with its ever-rising self-
confidence, cannot surmount (AKP, 2007, p. 4).
1
 
 
Our country and our nation, whose history is full of golden pages 
and has every right to look with hope to the future (…) (DP, 2007, p. 
61).
2
 
 
 77 
(…) Adopting the ideal of elevating the Turkish nation to the much-
deserved glorious level, we will work undauntedly, trusting the 
noble blood in its veins, its essence, the Turkish nation and the 
Turkish history, we will love and make others love those traits which 
ennoble the Turkish culture and the Turkish nation, and make it a 
great nation (VKGB, 2005).
3
 
 
(MMD) sees the only salvation within the power inherent to the 
Turkish nation (MMD, 2007).
4
 
 
 
In some discourses, what is idealized is not the Turkish identity but 
Turkey as a country.  
Turkey, with its geographical advantage, deep-rooted historical 
accumulation, multifaceted and rich cultural existence, young and 
dynamic society, entrepreneur and hard-working people, is not a 
country that is to be adopted to such a world environment; it is 
among the few countries that has all the qualities to contribute most 
to the creation of such an environment (LDP, 2002).
5
 
 
In many discourses, an assumption of and/or claim for that national 
identity encompasses all members of the nation appear. The aim is to 
develop and promote a sense of we-ness in the context of desired collective 
identity. In parallel with that, there is a denial of the presence of other 
ethnicities and nations. 
We comprehend the Turkish nation as a collective unity of our 
people who have shared the same fate for centuries, molded with the 
same faith, aiming the same cause and who have asserted the will to 
continue to exist together (BBP, 1993).
6
 
 
(…) We pursue the aim of elevating the National consciousness, 
completing National Liberation, protecting the Nation state, 
expanding National activity and completing the Nationalization 
process, within the context of Nationalism, regarded as a crucial 
duty by Atatürk (VKGB, 2005).7 
 
There is only one nation in Turkey and that is the Turkish nation 
(MMD, 2007).
8
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The Turkish language is accepted as an indicator of the national 
identity transmitting it to the next generations. In many discourses, it is 
declared that the language of education should only be Turkish; the use of 
another language cannot be accepted. This is not desired only for the 
education process; but for daily life as well. 
The question of language is as important as defending the 
Homeland. If you taint the language of a nation, if you make sure 
different languages exist in a country, then you will be permitting 
the foreign powers‘ ploy of dividing and fragmenting the country 
(VKGB, 2005).
9
 
 
Behaviors that destroy the structure and character of our beautiful 
Turkish and degenerate it will not be permitted. The natural 
development of our mother tongue will be assured (BTP, 2003).
10
 
 
(MMD) defends the idea of one language, one flag, one state and 
one land (MMD, 2007).
11
 
 
The domination of foreign language education, which gives our 
country the image of a colony, will be put to an end. Foreign 
languages will not be used as tools of cultural invasion (HYP, 
2007).
12
 
 
Preservation, development and protection of The Turkish language, 
our eternal and never-ending Flag, will be ensured (…) (Association 
of Kuvvai Milliye, 2006).
13
 
 
There is frequently a reference to ―the Turkish culture‖, ―national 
and spiritual values‖ [―milli ve manevi değerler‖], and sometimes to the 
―sacred values‖. The national identity is composed of shared images, 
representations and ideals, although the characteristics of these images and 
representations are not clearly defined. It is evidently supposed that the 
culture and ―shared values‖ have a constant and stable character and at the 
same time they are shared by all members of the society.  
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The most important factor for a nation to continue its existence is the 
national and moral values. These values, as a whole, construct the 
identity of that nation (BTP, 2003).
14
 
 
It is our beliefs and cultural values that has made possible for our 
nation to stand on foot for centuries and enable it to occupy an 
honorable spot in history (BBP, 1993).
15
 
 
In order for a nation to have a word over the dynamics of the age, 
that nation has to have a strong national identity and self-confidence 
(MHP, 2007, p. 6).
16
 
 
We will consolidate our national unity, which rests upon the will and 
action to establish the republic, an equal citizenship bond, a common 
national culture and the wish to live together (İP, 2007).17 
 
National and spiritual values include religious values, namely Sunni 
Islamic values:  
The Justice and Development Party sees religious services as an 
important area in which moral and spiritual values can be preserved 
and national unity and solidarity can be achieved (AKP, 2007, p. 
82).
18
 
 
Moral values and the experience of a secular and democratic state 
are an important source of power for Turkey, whose population 
consists mostly of Muslims who sincerely believe in religious values 
(MHP, 2007, p. 115).
19
 
 
Our faiths, which determine the Muslim Turkish identity, provide us 
with the key principles which will take our nation to the spot that it 
rightly deserves, today and in the future (BBP, 1993).
20
 
 
It can be stated that along with the emphasis on the shared culture 
and values, in some discourses there is a stress on cultural diversity as well.  
We will emphasize our common cultural values, while preserving 
diversity (CHP, 2007, p. 60).
21
 
 
Here, it can be asked whether it is possible to respect all differences 
and diversities despite the claim for protecting the ―shared culture and 
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values‖. It is important which components are included in and excluded 
from the concept of diversity and how this diversity is protected and 
respected. In the following discourse, it can be seen that shared culture is 
composed of a nation-state identity and the properties of the republic. Can 
the criticism of this identity, properties, and basic principles be tolerated, 
and still be accepted as the manifestation of the diversity? 
The core of our common culture is our history, our geography, our 
identity as a nation-state, the qualities of our republic and the main 
principles of our Constitution (CHP, 2007, p. 60).
22
 
 
As the national identity is generally idealized, the collective values 
are also idealized in a similar way. In some discourses, it is expected from 
the members of the Turkish nation to be proud of their national and spiritual 
values in addition to belonging to this identity. For example, DP emphasizes 
―the essential values that our nation is proud to have‖ [―milletimizin sahibi 
olmaktan gurur duyduğu öz değerleri‖] (2007, p. 2). Another example as 
follows: 
(MHP) aims the growth of generations which feel proud and 
consciousness of being a part of the Turkish nation, which have 
adopted our national and moral values, whose ability to think, 
perceive and solve problems has developed, who are open to new 
developments, who have a high sense of responsibility and social 
sensitivity, who are apt for producing science and technology, 
undertaking, democrat, cultured and faithful (…) (MHP, 2007, p. 
8).
23
 
 
In some discourses, the Turkish culture is accepted as one of the 
highest cultures, even the highest culture, in the world. 
(…) It is our ideal to make sure the high Turkish culture and 
Civilization, which have set examples to all nations, are promoted, to 
ensure that the Turkish nation is sensitive in its customs, traditions, 
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folklore, music, literature, history and other similar areas, to work 
for our children and youth to grow up and be informed as patriots in 
these areas (VKGB, 2005).
24
 
 
The Turkish culture, which changes in its continuity, has also 
preserved its main character and has become one of the most 
distinguished members of the world‘s cultural heritage (AKP, 2007, 
p. 130).
25
 
 
In some discourses Turkish nation is idealized through certain myths.  
The Turkish nation is the most noble, most deep-seated and biggest 
nation of the world. The world has developed from the cave ages to 
normal lives and from the darkness of Middle Ages to today‘s 
enlightenment thanks to the Turkish Culture and Civilization 
(VKGB, 2005).
26
 
 
All members of the society are generally expected to adopt the 
collective values. Many nationalist discourses emphasize the importance of 
this acceptance and but also ask for commitment to the national and spiritual 
values from the members, especially the young people.  
A youth that is qualified, undertaker, with high self-confidence and 
upholding national values, that youth is our main richness which 
will carry our country to the place it rightly deserves (AKP, 2007, p. 
74).
27
 
 
The Real Power of a Country is neither Its Tanks nor Money, but is 
the Young Sons and Daughters that are Committed to National and 
Spiritual Values (SP, 2007, p. 19).
28
 
 
For a generation that is committed to its faiths and history and 
respectful to national values, we accept the prevention of the 
destruction of national culture as a must. The reconciliation of the 
Turkish society with its past can only be possible if elements of 
national culture can be installed in the roots of social life (BBP, 
1993).
29
 
 
It is emphasized that the maintenance and the protection of the 
collective values are as essential as adoption of them. Weakening or 
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deteriorating of these values should be prevented. The family is conceived 
as the most important agency which protects the collective values.  
We are conscious of the fact that we have to defend independence 
for Turkey to preserve its national identity and honor (ADKF, 
2000).
30
 
 
Practices that wear our national culture values and result in a 
confusion of cultural values will be prevented (MHP, 2007, p. 
106).
31
 
 
Family is the root of our society. The family institution has a crucial 
place in the enhancement of national unity and solidarity, in 
preserving and developing our values (GP, 2002).
32
 
 
Family is the root of the society. In order to preserve the power of 
the traditional Turkish-Muslim family, all societal and state activities 
which harm it will be forbidden (BBP, 1993).
33
 
 
Continuity and transfer of Turkish collective identity to the later 
generations are conceived as essential in various nationalist discourses. In 
national education programs, the national identity is formed along with the 
national and spiritual values. ―Our Pledge‖ (―Student‘s Pledge‖) which starts 
with the statement ―I‘m a Turk‖ and ends with the sentence ―Happy is a Man 
who Says I am a Turk!‖ is repeated each morning by the primary school 
students.  
(…) An educational understanding which rivets national unity and 
cooperation, which strengthens bonds of love, respect and amity, 
which adopts national values such as land, nation, flag, martyrdom 
and veteranship and which develops the consciousness of living 
together and responsibility will be dominant (MHP, 2007, p. 95).
34
 
 
It will be our main policy to give those individuals that represent with 
honor the Turkish identity, which is the guarantee of the unity and 
livelihood of the society an education that is up to modern standards 
and that is in line with our national and moral values, our traditions 
and customs (BTP, 2003).
35
 
 
Association of National Struggle sees the Unity of National 
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Education, namely Tevhid-i Tedrisat, as the basis of Atatürkist 
education and national unity (MMD, 2007).
36
 
 
Our understanding of education is to train generations that have 
national and moral values and that are up to the science and 
technology of the age, free-thinking, productive, decent and 
innovative. The education system should, besides transmitting 
national culture to individuals, also enable individuals‘ abilities to 
show up (BBP, 1993).
37
 
 
Our Education Program will be based on the consciousness and 
accumulation of ―our national identity, history and values, and the 
universal culture‖, and the principles of ―secularity, democracy and 
the rule of law‖ (CHP, 2007, p. 56).38 
 
In some discourses, it is emphasized that national education program 
should include religious education since the protection and the strengthening 
of the Muslim identity is important. 
In order to protect the individual, the family and the society; 
religious, moral and spiritual education will start from nursery 
school and be strengthened (SP, 2007, p. 34).
39
 
 
In this respect, education of religion is an element of and component 
to the National Education, as necessitated by our Constitution (BTP, 
2003).
40
 
 
The lives and philosophies of leading characters that have lived and 
enlivened the values of Turkishness and Islam will be taught as 
optional lessons in primary schools (MHP, 2007, p. 95).
41
 
 
Because the continuity of Turkish national identity is seen as 
essential, the effects of other cultures on the national identity are tried to be 
avoided as they are perceived as having destructive features. Therefore, there 
is a huge endeavor to prevent these effects of other cultures. There is a 
common fear of contamination and of being spoilt. This fear indicates a 
narcissistic phenomenon consisting of the grandiosity and psychic absence of 
the other. Here, the protection of the self from the possible ―harmful‖ effects 
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of the other is essential since it is supposed as all-good and self-sufficient; in 
other words there is no need for the other. 
Against different cultures, especially in order to prevent a culture 
shock and identity crisis in new generations, quality and necessary 
works of literature have to be produced. In order to do this, the 
national cultural values will be introduced to the nation and adopted 
by it (MHP, 2007, p. 106).
42
 
 
One of the most important issues is the fact that foreign publication 
houses have started operating in our country. It is debatable how 
useful these will be in preserving and developing our culture. In the 
aftermath of foreign acquisition of our banks, our stock market and 
big institutions, as our publishing sector also falls into the hands of 
foreigners, the danger our nation faces is highlighted (DP, 2007, p. 
51).
43
 
 
The fear of contamination is so intense that there is an expectation 
that art should carry out the mission of conserving the Turkish culture. 
Taking the Turkish culture and art to universal platforms while 
preserving their national identity, is among our primary targets 
(AKP, 2007, p. 130).
44
 
 
Culture and art are crucial in the development of nations and 
preservation of their national identity (BTP, 2003).
45
 
 
Art that is not contrary to the beliefs of the Turkish individual is an 
ongoing part of our national culture. Within this measure, it is our 
aim that art should be granted the value it deserves and the artist 
should be supported and protected (BBP, 1993).
46
 
 
Westernization efforts and recent globalization process seem to 
strengthen this powerful tendency, protection of the collective values, as 
they create an anxiety about the loss of these values under the influence of 
other cultures. The prevention of such a loss and of corruption of national 
culture in the face of these processes is an important theme.  
It is our main aim to preserve and develop our national culture 
against globalization (CHP, 2007, p. 60).
47
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We are against importing of foreign elements that have been forced 
upon our society for 150 years. The alienity of foreign cultures, 
which destroy the most essential qualities and characters of the 
Muslim Turkish society, to our people, are evident. It is our aim to 
extend our national culture to every phase of social life (BBP, 
1993).
48
 
 
A state policy that will defend and uncover the high aggregation of 
the Turkish civilization and history against Western imperialism 
should be dominant (MMD, 2007).
49
 
 
 It can be noted that some political discourses emphasize the 
protection of cultural values but at the same time they can accept the 
influence of other cultures. 
DSP whose main aim is to protect and enhance the traditional 
cultural values of our society, will also utilize modern cultural values 
of the West and the East (DSP, 2003, p. 109).
50
 
 
To summarize, as it is evidently seen, many nationalist discourses 
idealize their own nation, ethnic and religious identity which are frequently 
attributed some essential characteristics. 
 
4.2.2. The Organizing Role of Collective Traumas and Glories 
for Nationalist Discourses 
Certain historical traumas and glories are repeatedly remembered in 
many nationalist discourses. The role of The Treaty of Sèvres for Turkish 
dominant political climate is worth mentioning in this context. It can be 
argued that this treaty has a traumatic impact on Turkish nation-state and is 
                                                 

 According to the Treaty of Sèvres that was signed by Istanbul government in 1920 after 
the defeat in World War I, the territories of the Ottoman Empire would be disintegrated and shared by 
the Allies. Although this treaty was not implemented and the War of Independence was won, its 
traumatic impact has continued for many years. 
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still kept fresh in the collective memory. The influence of this traumatic 
experience becomes more visible in certain socio-political conjunctures. 
Sometimes, it is reactivated by many nationalist discourses in order to 
mobilize the citizens for the interest of the nation. The influence of this 
collective trauma appears in the fear of disintegration of Turkey. Currently, 
in the process of being a member of the European Union and in the face of 
the Kurdish issue, this fear gains ground again based on the assumption that 
the members of EU maintain their imperialist desires and intentions to 
disintegrate the territories of Turkey.  
Turkey literally faces a second Sèvres Project. These dangers and 
threats had existed during the founding of the Republic and M. 
Kemal Atatürk had talked of the resurgence of ‗internal and external 
enemies‘. Today, as if history repeats itself, the same dangerous 
developments are occurring (BTP, 2003).
51
 
 
Due to concessions, the State of Republic of Turkey is living 
through a similar period to the last days of the Ottoman Empire 
(VKGB, 2005).
52
 
 
Turkey is today pushed into the similar conditions that preceded the 
War of Independence. (...) What they are trying to do to Turkey, in 
respect to where the country is being taken toward, is same as in 
1919 (HYP, 2007).
53
 
 
Association of National Struggle calls upon all the nation to protect 
the republic against the so-called democracy front that is an enemy 
of the republic, and which was formed by the collaborator-separatist-
reactionary forces fed by Western imperialism which has united 
against the Turkish nation just as in the last periods of the Ottoman 
Empire (MMD, 2007).
54
 
 
In the face of this reactivation, recent nationalist discourses call for a 
spirit of National War of Independence which means hyperalertness and 
mobilization in daily practices.  
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The duty of the day is defending the homeland. Our future relies 
upon the success of the implementation of this duty (İP, 2007).55 
 
As the Movement of Power Union of Patriotic Forces, our aim is to 
break the chains of imperialism and reinstate our National State 
(VKGB, 2005).
56
 
 
Atatürk was successful as in 1920s, he represented the ―progressive‖ 
against the rotten ―reactionary‖. If today‘s Turkey is grappling with 
problems similar to those in 1919, if there is a need to restruggle for 
an independent, secular and democratic Turkey, we have to take 
Atatürk as an example to succeed (ADKF, 2000).57 
 
Through the national education system, these traumas are kept in the 
collective memory and transmitted to the new generations. This way, that 
traumatic experience acquires an organizing role for this national identity. 
This process is desired to be more systematized in the following statement.   
Our secondary education will include a mandatory lesson whose 
subject will be ―plans to invade Turkey in our near history and the 
Treaty of Sèvres‖ (HYP, 2007).58 
 
Another trauma that is remembered and reactivated by some 
nationalist discourses is the Crusades.  
Imperialist powers have started the twentieth Crusade in 1990. After 
the fall of the USSR, as the USA became the sole pole and the 
dominant force in the world, world zionizm and racist imperialism 
have decided that „Time to create Greater Israel has come, after 
5700 years. Then, let us start the 20
th
 crusades‟, they said (SP, 2007, 
p. 2).
59
 
 
Alongside with the role of these historical traumas, national glories 
have an organizing role for the collective identity. It can easily be seen that 
various nationalist discourses attribute a sacred feature to the time period 
which the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed after the National 
Independence War (1919-1922). There is a desire to go back to this period 
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because it is assumed that in this period Turkey reached to absolute 
independence (tam bağımsızlık) which was lost afterwards. That period 
seems to symbolize primary narcissistic phase in which the people had a 
sense of omnipotence and absolute power. In current situation, maintaining 
this illusional sense of omnipotence gets difficult. Collaboration with the 
USA, the prospect of the EU membership, and the Kurdish issue are 
perceived as threatening situations against this omnipotence.  
At the end of the day, this nation, under the leadership of the Great 
Leader Atatürk, has reinvented itself with the spirit of National 
Forces [Kuvayı Milliye] during the War of Independence. A State of 
Republic of Turkey which manifested national will was founded and 
it set an example to other nations that were struggling for freedom 
(BTP, 2003).
60
 
 
The day is one of organizing those who say ‗Liberty or Death!‘ for 
the Second War of Independence (MMD, 2007).
61
 
 
Why should Turkey, which won the first War of Independence 
against imperialism in 1919, feel the need to give away its 
independence? (ADKF, 2000).
62
 
 
Imperialism, which forms its hegemony through guns, can only be 
destroyed by guns. The Turkish War of Independence sets the 
greatest example for this (Türksolu, 2002).63 
 
Workers‘ Party, which has shown the flag to the Western states from 
Lausanne, Berlin and Paris, has proved its ability to recreate 
Atatürk‘s independent Turkey (İP, 2007).64 
 
(…) just in the salvation movement during the War of Independence, 
in 1918, today we have to unite forces and save the land, the nation 
and all humanity from the dangers and disasters they face (SP, 2007, 
p. 22).
65
 
 
Turkish national identity is idealized by focusing on the national 
glories. This is also true for the glories of Ottoman Empire, however the 
losses of the empire are not needed to be remembered; rather they are 
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repressed. In national education discourses, the high period of OE takes a 
wide place, but for the last period of the empire, internal and external 
enemies‘ intentions to destroy are highlighted. In nationalist discourses, 
Ottoman‘s glorious heritage is frequently referred to in order to identify the 
greatness of the Turkish nation, while the internal and external enemies are 
held responsible for its collapse.  
Anatolia and the people on it are the inheritors of the lands that set 
the stage for the formation and development of world history‘s 
greatest civilizations, while Turkey and the Turkish people are 
inheritors of the six-century old Ottoman Empire, which was one of 
the strongest states of world history (LDP, 2002).
66
 
 
Behind us stands the legacy of great empires of thousands of years. 
The culture of empire, in a sense, is the culture to make nations live 
together (İP, 2007).67 
 
Turkey, which had founded universal Empires, has a valuable legacy 
of history and culture, an experience of a deep-rooted state tradition 
(MHP, 2007, p. 114).
68
 
 
In summary, the historical narratives which both traumatic 
experiences and the glories are kept in the collective memory and carried 
over to the later generations and acquire the most powerful organizing role 
for the national identity. These narratives, especially traumatic ones, are 
missing as the unprocessed memories are not symbolized and included in. 
However, it is argued that even unwanted experiences are transmitted into 
the next generations although they are not symbolized, verbalized and/or 
included in the dominant collective narrative. Even the political discourses 
which do not directly mention about the past traumatic events implicitly 
make an attribution to these events. The ones which are frequently 
verbalized seem to strengthen the collective identity more directly.  Because 
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the members of a group tend to be interested in their group‘s identity in the 
face of a danger, the nationalist discourses attempt to activate the traumatic 
experiences which are not psychically processed yet. This is both an 
unconscious and conscious process. In Turkey, the undigested traumatic 
experiences still have a deep impact on the collective processes. 
 
4.2.3. Harsh Collective Superego and Claim for Obedience 
instead of Supporting the Capacity for Being Individual 
in the face of Group 
In the Turkish nationalist discourses, it is frequently seen that there 
is a demand for adopting national identity, commitment and submitting to 
the national values. The members of the society who do not identify with 
Turkish national identity, especially minorities who identify with their 
ethnic groups and describe themselves according to those, can be 
pronounced as a traitor and separatist. The presences of people who identify 
with any other ethnic identity different from Turkish identity are perceived 
as a threat against the unity of the country.  
Those who oppose the ―Happy is a Man who Says I am a Turk!‖ 
understanding of the Great Leader Atatürk, the founder of our 
republic, are the enemies of the Turkish Republic and they will 
remain as such (TSK, 2007).
69
 
 
Association of National Struggle defends the ―Turkey belongs to 
Turks‖ idea of Atatürk. (...) It rejects every identity which 
constitutes an alternative to the Turkish national identity as an 
imposition of imperialism and its local lackeys in order to divide the 
nation (MMD, 2007).
70
 
 
Minority means a potential source of treachery, privileged under 
imperialist protection (MMD, 2007).
71
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EU has embarked upon creating minorities based on religion and 
tribes, thus introducing impositions that threaten the indivisible unity 
of the land and the nation (HYP, 2007).
72
 
 
It can be argued that idealized Turkish national identity refers to a 
narcissistic agreement; therefore expressions of other identities and the 
values of other cultures are perceived as a threat against this narcissistic 
agreement. The people who do not accept this strong agreement in the 
dominant political culture face to be excluded. For example, Kurdish people 
who are assumed to be a threat against this agreement are described as 
traitor. The word ―Kurdish‖ is not used in many discourses, the presence of 
―the Kurdish issue‖ is not accepted. 
Under a MHP government, neither the terrorists in the mountains or 
treacherous separatists in the plains will be able to roam freely 
(MHP, 2007, p. 30).
73
 
 
The Prime Minister, in a speech in Diyarbakır, has accepted and 
repeated separatist rhetoric that is fed by terrorism by naming it 
―Kurdish issue.‖ As the EU demands a ―so-called solution‖ to the 
tribal provocation that is supported by terror and that aims the 
division of Turkey, it also wants sovereignty in Turkey be divided 
among two peoples, the creation of a federal state and acceptance of 
another language as an official one. Against these open and 
threatening endeavors and impositions, the government has shown 
no reaction (HYP, 2007).
74
 
 
It can be argued that this approach is not only displayed towards the 
other identities, but also towards the members who are reluctant to express 
themselves within the national culture and values. The members who 
mention the ―bad‖ parts of Turks or the Republic of Turkey, or who criticize 
the idealized Turkish identity are pronounced as enemy and threat. This 
indicates a harsh superego as well as a narcissistic phenomenon. 
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Türksolu adopts the people-military-intellectuals alliance of the 
National Forces [Kuvayı Milliye], enhancing it with the inclusion of 
youth and reacts strongly against all efforts to divide this alliance. 
Especially, it struggles against the so-called left understanding that 
sees the military as enemy (Türksolu).75 
 
Atatürkism is today an adjective that various currents such as liberal, 
fundamentalist, Graywolf nationalist and Maoist etc. put in front of 
their own ideological identities. Thus, different ideological identities 
assume an appearance of Kemalism, but those different ideological 
identities are preserved. This means that Turkey-hating, Atatürk-
hating, nation-state-hating, secular regime-hating tendencies that are 
at the heart of those liberal, fundamentalist, Graywolf nationalist, 
Maoist etc. ideologies are also hiding behind the adjective of 
Atatürkism (MMD, 2007).76 
 
The theme on the protection of the collective values is frequently 
repeated and there is a clear stress on religion in these discourses. Thus, the 
powerful collective agreement is preserved. 
An important dimension of our culture policy is protection of family, 
national and religious values that are accepted by society and are 
suitable to science and mind (HYP, 2007).
77
 
 
In order to protect the individual, the family and the society; 
religious, moral and spiritual education will start from nursery 
school and be strengthened (SP, 2007, p. 34).
78
 
  
The frequent reference to the morality which is one of the indicators 
of the harsh superego keeps an important place in these discourses. Here, 
the morality that is emphasized is communal not individual. 
The Only Party that Puts Morality and Spirituality at the Forefront is 
the Felicity Party (SP, 2007, p. 25).
79
 
 
Pre-school training, aiming to ensure the consciousness of national 
unity, to strengthen moral and spiritual values and to ensure 
socialization, will be widespread (...) (MHP, 2007, p. 94).
80
 
 
Turkey has, in recent years, undergone a serious erosion of morals. 
Our party, thus, sees a revolution of morals necessary (HYP, 2007).
81
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Because the influence of different cultures and cultural changes are 
perceived as uncanny, the theme of cultural and moral corruption prevails in 
many nationalist discourses. In the following statement, the wish for 
spreading the Turkish culture reveals in addition to the protection of this 
culture.  
To develop and spread internationally the Turkish Culture against 
the cultural degeneration seen especially in youth recently (...) 
(Association of Kuvvai Milliye, 2006).
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In many discourses, it is implied that there are some realities or 
values which cannot be criticized because if they are, it may put the status 
quo in danger. As well as the criticism against these values, non-acceptance 
of the national and spiritual values cannot be tolerated. 
To organize open and closed meeting and demonstrations when the 
National and moral values of the State of the Republic of Turkey and 
the Turkish Nation are under attack or being neglected (...) 
(Association of Kuvvai Milliye, 2006).
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We are of the opinion that our state should be amongst the modern 
states in social, political, economic, scientific and basic individual 
rights and freedoms areas, it should produce sustainable 
development projects for world peace and be successful, provided 
that those do not pose a threat to the unity and indivisibility of our 
country (VKGB, 2005).
84
 
 
We understand the principle of Oneness Amongst Abundance as 
accepting every difference and every form of opinion and 
understanding - excluding absolute truths - as legitimate and 
acceptable (BBP, 1993).
85
 
 
Although in the statement of BBP above it is not clear what the 
―absolute truths‖ are, it is likely that the members of society are expected to 
accept these absolute truths which are described by some forces; they cannot 
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express their ideas outside the boundaries of these truths, and they cannot 
criticize them. 
Politics is a tool that is necessary to order the good and ban the evil 
(BBP, 1993).
86
 
 
According to BBP‘s another statement cited above, the members of 
the society should obey the collective demands, otherwise they are 
punished. Goodness and badness are described by a societal agent; the 
members do not have any options other than accepting these demands. Here, 
it seems that individual is not described as an autonomous agent; another 
agent above the individual is emphasized. In other nationalist discourses, it 
can be encountered with the similar tendency. 
We will bring back the Law of Treason (Hıyanet-i Vataniye), against 
the Nation by extending its reach (HYP, 2007).
87
 
 
The theme of betrayal prevail in many discourses. As the collectivity 
has a position of priority, the individuality which can conflict with the 
collective agreement and the collective demands is obstructed. 
 
4.2.4. Rigid/High Collective Ego Ideal  
The collective identity inherently includes a collective ideal. When 
Turkish nationalist discourses are examined, the tracks of this collective 
ideal can easily be traced. For many nationalist discourses, the collective 
ideal is to attain (above) the rank of contemporary civilization which is 
represented by the Western society. DP, HYP, GP, and Association of 
Kuvvai Milliye directly declare that their ideal is ―to attain the rank of 
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contemporary civilization‖. AKP, DSP, VKGB and Association of Kuvvai 
Milliye declare that their ideal is ―to take/carry Turkey beyond the level of 
contemporary civilization‖. In fact, these two ideals which determined by 
Mustafa Kemal generally exist together.  
Certain political movements do not declare the Mustafa Kemal‘s 
ideal, but emphasize the ideal of being a powerful and leader country in the 
world. It can be noted that similar goal is also declared in other political 
discourses which adopt the Mustafa Kemal‘s ideal. MHP emphasizes that 
Turkey should be ―the leader country‖ [―lider ülke‖] and continues as 
follows: ―A new civilization project, taking Turkey as center, should be 
implemented‖ (MHP, 2007, p. 3).88 LDP, BTP and Association of Kuvvai 
Milliye also use the statement of ―the leader country‖ and LDP states that 
Turkey already deserves this position. The ideal of being a central/powerful 
country is emphasized in AKP‘s text. CHP states that Turkey will be a 
―pioneer and model‖ [―öncü ve model‖] country. 
 In some discourses, more ambitious and less realistic ideals are 
declared. For example BBP states that ―The era that lies ahead belongs to 
the Turkish nation with its mass that extends to a wide geography and it will 
be the era of the Turk‖.89 İP expresses that ―The 21st century is the century 
of Turkey‖ (2007).90 SP states that ―We will hold on to the National 
Opinion and with the help of God, be masters of the World one more time‖ 
(2007, p. 22)
91
 MHP‘s statement of ―A new civilization project, taking 
Turkey as center, should be implemented‖ can be included in this category. 
Although these ideals seem to be differently formulated, they have a lot in 
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common. All of them imply that Turkey has a great history because it is the 
heir of a powerful empire; therefore it has the full capacity to attain these 
ideals. Here is a clear example: 
Turkey, which had founded universal Empires, has a valuable legacy 
of history and culture, an experience of a deep-rooted state tradition 
(MHP, 2007, p. 114).
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The political discourse regarding the big task of transcending the 
contemporary civilization has two sides to it. On the one hand, the collective 
ideal that emerges in the nationalist discourses is to reach the level of 
contemporary civilization, on the other hand the Western society in which 
contemporary civilization has been actualized is perceived as dangerous 
since it can lead to a degeneration of the Turkish culture. In this context, the 
culture of Western societies is sometimes decried. It appears that the 
collective ideal is to reach the Western society only technologically and 
economically, but not culturally and politically. While the high 
technological standards of the West are to be imitated, this is not the case 
regarding its culture and political standards as the Turkish culture is to be 
protected. Especially in the extreme nationalist discourses in which the ideal 
of attaining the level of contemporary civilization is not claimed, culture 
and social values of the West are extremely devalued (all-bad) as a potential 
source of corruption.  
Democrat Party aims to create a society of prosperity that 
dominates science and technology, that consciously uses 
technology and can create new technologies, and that has gained 
the ability to turn technological developments into social and 
economic gain, in accordance to the aim of reaching the 
contemporary civilization that Atatürk has signaled (DP, 2007, p. 
27).
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(…) To create projects that can compete with World states in 
science and technology, and help their creation, whilst protecting 
the texture of Turkish Culture (…) (Association of Kuvvai 
Milliye, 2006).
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The Turkish Nation can be elevated to the level of contemporary 
civilization only if it stays loyal to its own national values (VKGB, 
2005).
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The anti-imperialism of TÜRKSOLU is not only an objection to 
the economic aspect of Western civilization. The West exists with 
capitalism and imperialism. All its values are determined by the 
anti-people character of capitalism and imperialism. Thus, 
TÜRKSOLU is against the Western civilization as a whole. The 
Western civilization is a civilization of imperialism and should be 
wiped off the face of earth together with imperialism (Türksolu).96 
 
Turkey is being pushed to being a subcontractor which carries the 
interests and rotten values of the West to our kins in Central Asia 
(BBP, 1993).
97
 
 
For some nationalist discourses, it can be argued that because the 
West is an object of desire in the context of the collective ideal, there is 
envy as a result of which, the West is decried and sometimes perceived as a 
threat. This sense of threat is related to the fear of annihilation manifesting 
itself in the fear of losing the cultural values of one‘s own. 
In some nationalist discourses, Turkey (and Turks) is already at that 
high level of civilization. In other words, Turkey is presently a powerful 
country anyway.  
The contemporary Turkey Model, unique in the world and one that is 
founded upon unconditional respect to humanity, its culture, identity, 
roots and religious beliefs, continues to dominate, empowered by 
this unique balance that was installed 84 years ago (CHP, 2007, p. 
1).
98
 
 
Turkey, with its historical legacy, vast experience of statecraft, 
national and moral values, advanced consciousness of national 
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culture and morality and with its human resources, is a great and 
powerful country (MHP, 2007, p. 114).
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In extreme versions of these discourses, one can see the tendency to 
deny the sense of powerlessness and to maintain omnipotent fantasies 
instead. These omnipotent fantasies are related to a denial of the need for 
others. The ideal of ―absolutely independent Turkey‖ [tam bağımsız 
Türkiye] which is expressed in some nationalist discourses imply this 
tendency. In addition to the manifestation of omnipotent fantasies, there is 
also a tendency to deny the richness of other countries. Thus, there is no 
need to learn from other countries‘ experiences; there is no match for 
Turkey; it cannot be compared to other countries, especially to the West. In 
this context, one can sense the assumption that Turkish culture has a 
completely different, special and self-sufficient character. 
There is nothing to learn and make use of the Western civilization 
for oppressed nations. But the endeavor to return to the roots is not a 
racist or fundamentalist dream of going back to the ―good old days‖. 
TÜRKSOLU sees the role of racism and fundamentalism especially 
in the oppressed world as one of dividing the nation and 
strengthening imperialism and defends secularity as a key value. 
Every nation has the potential to breed a contemporary civilization 
out of its own history and culture. Today, this potential is tried to be 
destroyed under the tyranny of Western civilization. Thus, returning 
to the roots is a struggle for the oppressed nations to create their own 
contemporary values in the face of Western civilization (Türksolu, 
2002).
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The narcissistic character of these discourses is also seen in the 
relationship between grandiosity and shame.  
Turkey, carrying the potential of a regional power, has been pushed 
into being a marginal, squashed and ineffective country which has 
no effect and weight in international relations and whose word 
cannot be trusted (...) (MHP, 2007, p. 114).
101
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The government was shown no reaction to the blow dealt against the 
dignity of the Turkish nation by the sacking of our soldiers [by US 
soldiers in northern Iraq]. Despite insistent warnings and proposals 
by the CHP not even a note of protest was delivered and Turkey was 
humiliated (CHP, 2007, p. 1).
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They turned this most honorable nation of history, this country that 
God has given his biggest blessings into a slave, they facilitated its 
exploitation, they left it hungry, they brought only tears, and they 
only destroyed the morals and devastated happiness (SP, 2007, p. 
27).
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Especially in SP‘s discourses, tracks of disturbed reality testing can 
be identified. In fact, it is observed that the reality is distorted a certain 
extent when the collective ego ideal very high and rigid. 
 
4.2.5. Putting a Leader in the place of the Ego Ideal  
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is accepted in various nationalist discourses 
as an idealized, omnipotent and omniscient father who cannot be criticized. 
In many of these discourses, he is called as ―Great Atatürk‖ [―Büyük 
Atatürk‖] (MHP), ―Great Leader Atatürk‖ [―Büyük Önder Atatürk‖] 
(Association of Kuvvai Milliye, BTP), ―Supreme Atatürk‖ [―Yüce Atatürk‖] 
(GP), Supreme Leader Atatürk [―Yüce/Ulu Önder Atatürk‖] (TSK, MMD), 
―Great Revolutionist Leader Atatürk‖ [―Büyük Devrimci Önder Atatürk‖] 
(İP), ―Mustafa Kemal who is one of the greatest history creators‖ [―Tarih 
yaratanların en büyüklerinden biri olan Mustafa Kemal‖] (HYP) etc. The 
name of Atatürk is frequently typed by bold and/or capital letters.  
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Faithfulness to this omnipotent leader, his ideals, and ―principles and 
transformations‖ (―revolutions‖ in some discourses) are frequently 
emphasized in different discourses. 
Our party is committed to the Principles and Revolutions of Atatürk, 
to the liberal [hürriyetçi] parliamentary democratic system, to the 
Constitution and to the law (BTP, 2003).
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Those who believe that Atatürk‘s principles and revolutions have the 
quality of being a source of light and a creative force in solving our 
social problems, have founded the ―Association of Atatürkist 
Thought‖ feeling the need to contribute that His revolutions and 
principles should continue to dominate and be protected (ADD, 
2006).
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HYP is at the same time committed both to our thousand-year 
spiritual roots and Atatürk principles. It is a center of mentality and 
politics that aims to unite these two (HYP, 2007).
106
 
 
The Nationalist Democratic Left is the path of Atatürk (DSP, 2007, 
p. 107).
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Toward the adoption, protection and spreading of the revolutions 
and principles of Veteran Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (...) 
(Association of Kuvvai Milliye, 2006).
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Protection of the collective ideal crystallized on Atatürk‘s character, 
of his principles and transformations is accepted as essential. In order to 
maintain the collective ideal that was defined by Atatürk is defended via 
education of all members of the Turkish society according to ―the principles 
and transformations of Atatürk‖. The nationalist discourses which are 
described as Kemalist (or Atatürkçü – Atatürkist) persist on the idea that 
children should be educated according to these principles in order for them 
to internalize national values. 
We will not make concessions from Atatürk‘s principles and 
revolutions and the understanding of the unity of education in the 
field of education (CHP, 2007, p. 56).
109
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We aim to work to create a national youth and a patriotic generation 
which is aware of Atatürk‘s speech to the Turkish youth, which 
protects our national, spiritual and moral values and which is proud 
to be a citizen of the Republic of Turkey (VKGB, 2005).
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Association of National Struggle sees the Unity of National 
Education, namely Tevhid-i Tedrisat, at the basis of Atatürkist 
education and national unity. (...) Association of National Struggle 
advocates an Atatürkist National Education Mobilization, to be 
launched by the state (MMD, 2007).
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In many of the discourses, the ideal of reaching the contemporary 
civilization is defined through Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In other words, the 
ideal of Atatürk has also become the national ideal. 
(…) Contributing to the adoption, protection and spreading of the 
understanding of “We will elevate our national culture above the 
level of contemporary civilization”  that is written in the Tenth 
Anniversary Speech of Veteran Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (…) 
(Association of Kuvvai Milliye, 2006).
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The aim of “surpassing contemporary civilization” that Atatürk 
has pointed to Turkey was a vision of the beginning of last century. 
In this civilization, surpassing that aim necessitates being an 
effective country in the “knowledge society” (DSP, 2007, p. 
101).
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Aiming to reach the level of contemporary civilization in accordance 
with the Supreme Atatürk‘s principles and revolutions (...) (GP, 
2002).
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The CHP will, in power, realize the aspiration of Atatürk and ensure 
that Turkey ranks among the most advanced countries in the world 
in every area (CHP, 2007, p. 4).
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We believe that the area of education, which embodies fundamental 
values of our republic, is a center of opportunity and acceleration for 
our country to reach the level of ―contemporary civilization‖ that 
Atatürk has pointed to (AKP, 2007, p. 45).116 
 
(ADD) works to realize national sovereignty fully and prioritize 
reason, science and pacifism in accordance with the principle of full 
independence, thus trying to elevate the Nation above the level of 
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contemporary civilization that was the aim of Atatürk (ADD, 
2006).
117
 
 
It can be argued that the members of the nation gain a sense of unity 
by projecting their ego ideal to this leader and unquestionably following 
him. This leader brings the members a sense of unity and protects the group 
from losing its sense of identity. Moreover, putting Atatürk in the place of 
the group‘s ego ideal, the members attribute the responsibility for their 
actions to him. This seems to be especially true for Kemalist/Atatürkist 
political discourses.  
We are wholeheartedly committed to our Republic and the aims and 
thoughts of Veteran Mustafa Kemal, the founder of our Republic 
(VKGB, 2005).
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The aim of the association is to research and study the Turkish 
Revolution led by Atatürk, the foundations of that Revolution which 
are Atatürk‘s principles, in essence the Six Arrows, his system of 
thought that are open to advancement in every area and that carry the 
quality of continuous enhancement, results of the Revolution today 
and its reflections to the future, his thoughts, actions, fights and 
works and wage a war of ideas in accordance with the laws with 
undertakings, steps and currents against those (ADD, 2006).
119
 
 
We will unconditionally claim the ATATÜRK principles and 
revolutions, the values and institutions of ―Our Secular, Democratic 
Republic‖ (CHP, 2007, p. 13).120 
 
In many discourses, there is an emphasis on accepting Atatürk‘s 
principles unconditionally which enables the people to identify with him. 
This devotion also helps them free themselves from any self-criticism. This 
is because any criticism is thought to be a betrayal to Atatürk.  
(MMD) wages a struggle of law to prevent the violation of Atatürk‘s 
Principles, whose practices are deemed mandatory by the 
constitution and legal guarantees (MMD, 2007).
121
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Putting restrictions and conditions to the Sovereignty of the Nation 
is treason to Atatürk and his Republic (VKGB, 2005).122 
 
It is expected from the members of the society to maintain Atatürk‘s 
revolutions in a rigid way. Disagreement with and criticism of so-called 
revolutions (or transformations) by the members of the society are seen as a 
disobedience and treason. Because the ideals and principles of Atatürk are 
also the collective ideal of Turkish nation-state, the criticism of these 
principles is seen as a betrayal to the homeland. Therefore, this disobedience 
should be prevented and punished.  
Under such conditions, being an Atatürkist or saying that ―one loves 
Atatürk‖ is only possible if one defends him and his creations. 
Turkey‘s youth will, of course, not stay silent in the face of attacks 
against Atatürk and the Republic (ADKF).123 
 
Association of National Struggle aims to create the organized power 
of the Turkish nation against those elements at the very top which 
are ―unaware, gone astray or even in treason‖ and against those 
lackeys at the bottom, which wage an organized struggle against the 
independence of the Republic of Turkey, its unity and unchangeable 
principles set forth by Atatürk (MMD, 2007).124 
 
Atatürk as a leader is not only a representation of the father; it can 
also be stated that he is a carrier of an illusion which is desired to be 
maintained. He protects the members of the nation from conflictual 
situations. This illusion is related to the narcissistic assumption which 
implies that Turkish nation is a self-sufficient nation. Atatürk‘s presence 
serves an opportunity for denying the sense of helplessness and 
powerlessness. Attributing him omnipotent characteristics, the members 
identifying with him also acquire the same omnipotence. Therefore, in the 
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face of a sense of threat against this omnipotence, the aggression is directed 
to the other.  
The members of the nation are alerted by some political parties and 
institutions against the exploitation of Atatürk and his principles for the sake 
of different political interests. Sometimes, Turkish citizens are invited to 
punish the enemies of the homeland and the nation who exploit the name of 
Atatürk.  
(…) those who have handed over our economic means to the West 
are implementing these actions of unawareness, gone astrayness and 
treason by using the name of ―Atatürk” (VKGB, 2005).125 
 
Thus, Atatürk is being exploited shamelessly (HYP, 2007).126 
 
Thereby, those who exploit name of “Atatürk” and by enmity 
toward the land and the nation, aiming to condemn the Turkish 
nation to slavery will be given the necessary lesson by our citizens 
(VKGB, 2005).
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Finally, it should be stated that not all nationalist movements put 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the place of the collective ego ideal. For 
example, the name of Atatürk is not used in the discourses of BBP and SP 
since they do not adopt his ideal, principles and transformations but they 
cannot find any other leader who is replaced by Atatürk. In fact, one can 
come across the name of Mehmed the Conqueror, ―Sultan Mehmed‖, and 
Necmettin Erbakan in SP‘s declaration. This party seems to put Necmettin 
Erbakan in the place of their collective ego ideal rather than Mehmed the 
Conqueror. BBP does not use the name of a leader but emphasizes the 
importance of obedience to the authority in the statement ―Politics is a tool 
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that is necessary to order the good and ban the evil‖. The party leader is 
likely to put into place the collective ego ideal. This is also true for MHP. 
 
4.2.6. Excessive Use of Splitting, Projection, Projective 
Identification, Idealization, and Devaluation  
In the nationalist discourses in Turkey, the primitive defenses are 
excessively used. The supposition that many enemies have a plan to split 
and share the territories of Turkey prevails. As mentioned before, this 
discourse is partially based on the past traumatic experiences. Because the 
influence of these experiences still lasts, there are frequent attributions to 
them. Besides, there is still a reference to the founding and organizing 
national texts which have acquired affective, ritualistic, and religious values 
throughout time. For example ―Atatürk‘s Address to Youth‖ that was 
written in 1927 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk has been frequently used 
recently. In this text, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was talking about the potential 
internal and external enemies and advised the young people to be aware of 
these enemies and to take the responsibility of saving the Republic against 
such threats.  
Turkish Youth, Your first duty is to preserve and to defend Turkish 
independence and the Turkish Republic forever. This is the very 
foundation of your existence and your future. This foundation is 
your most precious treasure. In the future, too, there may be 
malevolent people at home and abroad, who will wish to deprive you 
of this treasure‖ (Atatürk‘s Address to Youth, 1927).128 
 
VKGB frequently quotes from this text, and emphasizes especially 
the statement of ―internal and external enemies‖.  
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The Great Leader, in this address, has given the Turkish nation the 
recipe for salvation against possible developments that the State of 
the Republic of Turkey could live through in the future. It has only 
been 66 years since Atatürk has passed on to eternity, but activities, 
rooted inside and outside, which have started right after his passing 
on to eternity, have given inconsiderable damage to our country and 
this process still continues (VKGB, 2005).
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Discourse of ―the internal and external threats‖ can be seen in many 
texts although these threats are different in each discourse. 
Developments faced by Turkey, in one aspect, include strategic 
attacks and threats against the existence of the country (...) (MHP, 
2007, p. 3).
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For the last few years, the delicate balance of our nations, the 
unchangeable articles of our constitution, are under attack from 
inside and outside (CHP, 2007, p. 1).
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Now our country and our nation face the danger of fragmentation 
and division, being made a province to Israel and destruction (SP, 
2007, p. 11).
132
 
 
As a result of the provocations of foreign sources, our internal peace, 
unity and indivisibility are under grave threat (BTP, 2003).
133
 
 
Turkey should immediately cease the ―alliance‖ trick with the West, 
which has besieged it and aims to fragment and invade it (MMD, 
2007).
134
 
 
The fear of disintegration and the perception of ―internal and 
external threats‖ are not only based on the traumatic experience in the past; 
but also an indicator of the defense mechanisms, i.e. splitting, projection and 
projective identification. While the Turkish identity is idealized, the other -
generally the Western countries, Kurdish people, the minorities, and the 
religious groups- is devalued; the bad parts of the own is projected onto 
these others. As a result of this projection, the other is started to be 
perceived as persecutory and malevolent. Especially EU process, Kurdish 
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issue, and the political ascendancy of a religious party reinforce this self-
fulfilling prophecy. The use of similar defense mechanisms by the other 
groups also strengthens the nationalist discourses in Turkey. For example, 
certain groups within the Western countries have strong negative attitudes 
toward the EU membership of Turkey. 
The recent history of relations between Turkey and EU is a story of 
disappointment full of blackmails, preconditions, unjust demands 
and pressures. The EU sees Turkey literally as a crippled nation. In 
this process, Turkey has always been excluded. It is now clear that 
the EU does not wish to accept Turkey in it as a country of equal 
rights (MHP, 2007, p. 119).
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4.2.7. Regression to the Narcissistic Internal World 
The influence of the EU process, globalization wave, Kurdish issue, 
and the democratization steps is obviously observed in many nationalist 
discourses. These socio-political changes seem to create a serious anxiety 
and strengthen the nationalist wave in Turkey because they bring radical 
political and social changes given Turkey‘s rigid, conventional political 
structure.  
In different nationalist discourses, the globalization wave and the EU 
process are directly referred. In the context of EU process, there is a 
common perception that the Western countries humiliate Turkey by not 
accepting it as it is. Here, an archaic feeling of inferiority appears. Basically, 
Turkey is reluctant to confront with its unwanted parts which were 
repressed, denied and/or projected. Moreover, this membership is seen as 
threat to the nation-state leading to a survival anxiety. This indicates a 
regressive movement which reveals the archaic and long standing anxieties, 
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fear of annihilation. The common discourse of ―absolutely independent 
Turkey‖ which implies an omnipotent fantasy is worth mentioning again in 
this context. 
Today and always, there are individuals, organizations and countries 
that eye our land and that have treacherous aims. Efforts to make 
foreign domination dominant in the country are of great extent and 
activity. The incapable running of the country should be prevented at 
all costs. Nation-States and walls that protect citizens are being 
brought down with the jive of New World Order. Through 
international secret powers and some shadowy international 
companies, even citizens of imperialist countries are bred with 
imperial thoughts and feelings (VKGB, 2005).
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Through globalization and the process of EU, literally a new Sèvres 
is being imposed (HYP, 2007).
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 The European Union, wishing to annul Lausanne and implement 
SÈVRES (...) (SP, 2007, p. 21).138 
 
There is impoverishment, fragmentation, landmines and bombs at 
the door and under the guidance of the EU (İP, 2007).139 
 
Many arrangements and activities that aim to create the basis for the 
destruction of the self-esteem of the nation, make it lose hope in the 
future, create an anonymous, characterless society and a system that 
irregularity pays, destroy the unitary structure of the state via 
attacking the fundamental dynamics of our State, have all been 
realized under the AKP government‘s term (MHP, 2007, p. 5).140 
 
(…) Activities to transfer the right to “Sovereignty”, that belongs to 
the Turkish Nation unconditionally, to another Nation, a 
Supranational organization, Institution, State, union of States or 
Unity are accelerating (VKGB, 2005).
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Association of National Struggle is against every kind of 
membership process to the EU, be it ―honorable‖ or without honor. 
It fights for sovereignty to be given back ―to the nation 
unconditionally‖ and against this process which is also against the 
basic principles of the Republic and the Constitution (MMD, 
2007).
142
 
 
In these discourses, it is also encountered with the fear of 
contamination is based on an assumption that the nation has a homogenous 
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character. This fear is also related to seeking for sameness which means that 
the members of the group have same values and ideas which are actually 
determined by the owner of the nationalist discourses. It is implied that ‗the 
members of the nation cannot be different from each other, they must be the 
same‖. In this sense, there is a wish for regaining the lost oneness that 
implies primary narcissistic state in which the other does not exist. There is 
not a tolerance for the existence of the other; the other can only be a 
narcissistic extension.  
Everything that symbolizes the power, self-confidence and character 
of the country is open to looting. Foreign supermarkets are selling 
our own products to us and exploit us. Brands that make us us, that 
symbolize Turkey‘s name and character are being destroyed. On the 
one hand our subconscious and on the other our safes and purses are 
being emptied (HYP, 2007).
143
 
 
We are against importing of foreign elements that have been forced 
upon our society for 150 years. The alienity of foreign cultures, 
which destroy the most essential qualities and characters of the 
Muslim Turkish society, to our people, are evident. It is our aim to 
extend our national culture to every phase of social life (BBP, 
1993).
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As it is seen in BBP‘s discourses, the other is accepted all different 
while the characteristics of Turkish nation are described as essential and 
shared by all members. In other extreme versions of these kinds of 
discourses, the other is attributed bad characteristics and is also seen as 
dangerous. 
(…) the destroyed, rotten social structure of those under the control 
of racist imperialism and the cruelties they endured are before our 
eyes, but we are to be like them, leaving our essence and our core 
aside. To do this, we will negotiate for 30 years if necessary and 
destroy every national presence. Is there a desperation bigger than 
saying these? (SP, 2007, p. 20).
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As mentioned previously, because of grandiosity and arrogance 
recognized in the perception that the nation is seen as supreme, the shame is 
experienced excessively in the face of failure. Due to this sense of 
grandiosity, the criticism coming from the other may be perceived as a 
humiliation that creates rage and hatred.  
Our national interests have been made subject to cheap bargains and 
thrown under danger, our national causes have been regarded as 
burdens and humps, sacrificed with the understanding of give and be 
saved, and our national honor and dignity have been wounded 
severely (MHP, 2007, p. 114).
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We were subjected to a slave treatment from the EU and faced every 
possible insult unsuitable with our honorable history (SP).
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4.2.8. Displaying of the Characteristics of Fight-Flight 
Assumption 
It can be seen that the characteristics of various nationalist 
discourses which are examined in this study are similar to fight-flight 
assumption group developed by Bion (1959). These kinds of groups which 
have difficulty dealing with the anxiety enter a regressive process in which 
the members have a sense of threat against their groups from the outside.  
Our beloved nation has been besieged from inside and outside; our 
country is facing great dangers as a result of the activity of lackeys. 
Those activities have accelerated since the last six years. The State 
of the Republic of Turkey is facing a global conspiracy that is a 
hundred-fold stronger than that led the Ottoman Empire to 
annihilation (VKGB, 2005).
148
 
 
This is the real threat that should not be overlooked. The essential hit 
squads against Turkey, which is besieged from outside and collapsed 
from inside, are the Islamic Fundamentalists and Kurdists (MMD, 
2007).
149
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The sense of threat is directly linked to distrustfulness to the other, 
which is directly articulated in the following discourse: 
We will take Turkish foreign policy, which rests upon the principle 
of trusting others, and put it onto a base that rests upon the principle 
of not trusting others (HYP, 2007).
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The fight-flight assumption groups come together against this threat 
and therefore attempt to maintain their presence. A similar tendency can be 
seen in many nationalist discourses in Turkey to different extents. In these 
discourses there is an intention and sometimes a promise for fighting against 
the enemies. Atatürk‘s Address to Youth is frequently attributed in this 
psycho-political process. 
If some day you are compelled to defend your independence and 
your Republic, you must not hesitate to weigh the possibilities and 
circumstances of the situation before doing your duty (...) Youth of 
Turkey's future, even in such circumstances it is your duty to save 
Turkish Independence and the Republic. You will find the strength 
you need in your noble blood (Atatürk‘s Address to Youth, 1927).151 
 
Imperialist powers that have besieged Turkey from the inside and 
outside have reactivated themselves, aiming to destroy the Republic, 
fragment the country, invade the Turkish homeland and annihilate 
the Turkish nation. Every Turkish son and daughter which carries 
―the Noble Turkish blood in his/her veins‖, has to rise up to tear up 
this death decree brought upon the nation (MMD, 2007).
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It will be provided that the youth will be trained with national 
values, in order to be well-prepared to fight against those elements 
that aim to destroy the indivisible unity of the state with the land and 
the nation (MHP, 2007, p. 101).
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The Turkish youth will, of course, not stay silent in the face of 
attacks against Atatürk and the Republic. (...) With the force that we 
derive from the glorious history of struggle of the Turkish youth, we 
are ready for any sacrifice to do our duties (ADKF, 2000).
154
 
 
Turkey, in every front, faces that ―vulgar raid‖ coming from the 
West. The duty of the day is defending the homeland. Our future 
rests upon the successful implementation of this duty (İP, 2007).155 
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TÜRKSOLU, in this war, leads the nationalist fight against 
imperialist and their left agents (Türksolu, 2002).156 
 
In the face of the 20
th
 Crusades that racist imperialism has launched 
and is waging, are we to stand and watch and support them, like the 
AKP, while they devour Muslim nations one by one and then aim to 
destroy our beloved homeland, make it a province to Greater Israel 
and to annihilate it? Or like our forefathers did for centuries, in the 
name of the happiness of our nation and whole humanity, prevent the 
earth being turned into a bloodbath like Palestine and do our duty of 
humanity to turn this “World of Oppression” to a “World of 
Felicity” (SP, 2007, p. 3).157 
 
The other important dynamic activating the fight-flight assumption 
characteristics is the Kurdish issue that is perceived as a huge threat against 
―national unity and togetherness‖. Kurdish armed struggle against the state, 
in official words, ―PKK terror‖, is the determining factor which shapes the 
Kurdish issue within the dominant political culture. Political and cultural 
demands of the Kurdish population are seen as treason, not democratic 
demands. However as EU expects the cultural and social rights of minorities 
to be protected, the possible membership of EU creates anxiety since these 
rights are seen as dangerous for ―national unity and togetherness‖. In this 
context, not only Kurdish issue, but also the demands of other minority 
groups are perceived as threats. Tolerance for the other and for the 
difference is very limited. 
The biggest problem and threat Turkey faces is bloody terror, 
political separatism and ethnic provocations which aim an ethnical 
division (MHP, 2007, p. 28).
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EU has embarked upon creating minorities based on religion and 
tribes, thus introducing impositions that threaten the indivisible unity 
of the land and the nation (HYP, 2007).
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Those who oppose the ―Happy is a Man who Says I am a Turk!‖ 
understanding of the Supreme Leader Atatürk, the founder of our 
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republic, are the enemies of the Republic of Turkey and they will 
remain as such (TSK, 2007).
160
 
 
Association of National Struggle objects to the policy of creating 
new minorities, imposed to Turkey by the West (MMD, 2007).
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The sense of threat against secularism is commonplace in some 
nationalist discourses, especially in Kemalist discourses. The central focus 
of these discourses is on the threat against secularism; therefore they invite 
the members to defend their nation against this threat, namely ―Shari‘a 
threat.‖ 
Efforts to besiege ―public administration, judiciary, politics, 
education and commerce‖ with reactionary sects, lairs of religious 
interest and mischief and corrode the unitary structure are spreading 
(CHP, 2007, p. 1).
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It is being observed that some circles, which have been striving 
endlessly to corrode basic values of the state of Turkish Republic, 
especially secularity, are augmenting their efforts nowadays (TSK, 
2007).
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We defend secularism, as we are against the threat of Sharia which 
wishes to take Turkey back to Middle Ages (ADKF, 2000).
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In some discourses, it is accepted that these different threats are 
integrated and endangers the state and political order. 
Those elements that have created disturbance and division in Turkey 
as Islamic Fundamentalist and Kurdist movements, have now 
attained a power to demand a Kurdish-Islam state (MMD, 2007).
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In these discourses, the sense of threat as a result of projection is a 
distorted reality; sometimes the threat is completely unreal, sometimes it is 
exaggerated. Turkey‘s deficiencies and defects are not seen; but Turkey is 
conceived as an excellent and powerful country as long as external forces do 
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not impede. There is almost no effort for self-evaluation and self-criticism 
due to the simplistic and black-or-white value system. 
Despite this future that offers hope, many obstacles are being put in 
front of us from today, a thousand plots are concocted to strangle our 
rising force (BBP, 1993).
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Thus, it is impossible to understand how the noble Turkish Nation, 
which has been and still is an example to the world with its way of 
life, purity, high moral values, Culture and civilization, is being 
made to wear a dress 20-sizes smaller than its size (VKGB, 2005).
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In many discourses, the statements related to strengthening of 
military forces prevail. Here, it should be noted that military forces have a 
dominant role in the political life of Turkey. The press statement of TSK 
which is included in this study proves this fact. In this statement, TSK 
declares that it is ready to interfere in the political process in case of 
necessity. The role of TSK on the political life is approved by many groups. 
There is a strong perception of the military being the de facto power holder 
of Turkey, although it is not explicitly manifested in the texts.  
One of the most important forces that defend the unity of the Turkish 
state, the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey is Atatürk‘s 
Army, the Turkish Armed Forces (MMD, 2007).
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An indication of the power of states is a strong military. Thus, the 
Turkish Armed Forces is to be made one of the prominent super 
powers of the world in order to enhance the force of the State of the 
Republic of Turkey and protection of its existence (BTP, 2003).
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Parallel to the idealization of the armed forces, fighting in defense of 
one's country is glorified as seen in the idealization of martyrdom. 
Turkey‘s most valuable underground wealth is the bones of the 
martyrs below the soil. The duty to protect the Republic and the land 
includes protection of veterans and the families of martyrs. The 
National Government, in this respect, strengthens the consciousness 
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of respect and gratitude to martyrs and veterans in our society. The 
memories of our martyrs and heroes will be enlivened, their graves 
and monuments built (İP, 2007).170 
 
4.2.9. Impairment of Thinking Process 
Excessive use of primitive defense mechanisms, such as denial, 
projection and projective identification causes the impairment of thinking 
process. When intense affective situations cannot be contained and 
moderated, they are likely to remain unsymbolized and the reality can be 
distorted as a result of denial and projection. The tendency to split the good 
and bad weakens the complex thinking and understanding the reality, and 
the complexity of the situations. Idealization and devaluation which are 
frequently applied in nationalist discourses in Turkey consist of 
simplification of the reality corresponding to rigid and stereotyping 
thinking.  
The intolerance of the anxiety not only leads to an impairment of 
reality testing but also an emergence of omnipotent fantasies. The 
omnipotent fantasy reveals itself in the wishful thinking that something will 
become real since it is wished to be. This kind of thinking is not emanated 
from a rational thinking.  
In the past, the Turkish Nation has ruled the world and taught 
justice, human rights, science, technology and civilization to 
humanity, at the time when it claimed the historical mission that lifts 
up and exalts itself (BTP, 2003).
171
 
 
Today, the scientific acceptability of the Turkish history thesis is 
even more, but instead of that, books that take the West‘s Indo-
German and Indo-European thesis as a basis are being written. 
Taking these books as example, the thousands-years history of the 
Turkish nation is being neglected and with the allegation that some 
of our citizens, which constitute the veins of the same race and 
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essence, have come from different races, our national unity and 
indivisibility is trying to be destroyed (VKGB, 2005).
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Atatürk had created a crucial opportunity. If that opportunity was 
enhanced a little, Turkey would have outpaced the Japanese miracle 
today (HYP, 2007).
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The era that lies ahead belongs to the Turkish nation with its mass 
that extends to a wide geography and it will be the era of the Turk 
(BBP, 1993).
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Catching the rapid development in data processing and Internet and 
using these areas ideally, thus making the age of knowledge into the 
“Golden Age of Turks” (...) (Association of Kuvvai Milliye, 
2006).
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The sense of insecurity originating from excessive anxiety and 
distortion of the reality is likely to foster each other. In the following 
statements, one can see the exaggerated interpretations or distortion of the 
reality based on this sense of insecurity. 
The picture of public order and security facing Turkey is terrifying in 
every sense. There is no security of life and property, Turkey has 
been turned into a heaven for crime and criminals (MHP, 2007, p. 
26).
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Under guises such as “Garden of Religions”, “Dialogue”, and 
“Meeting of Civilizations” steps have been taken in accordance 
with the wishes of racist imperialism to change the essence and core 
of Islam (SP, 2007, p. 19).
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The foremost target of [US administration] is Turkey. They have not 
hesitated to reflect maps that show Turkey divided into pieces in 
NATO meetings (İP, 2007).178 
 
The lack of mentalization capacity refers not only to a lack of 
understanding the feelings, intentions and attitudes of the other but also lack 
of self-monitoring. For instance, in nationalist discourses in Turkey, it is 
difficult to see the effort to understand the feelings and experiences of other 
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ethnic and cultural groups. This is not only limited to the experiences of 
ethnic and cultural groups, but all the members of the nation who describe 
themselves outside dominant political culture. 
(…) with pressure from the USA and the EU, ethnical languages are 
being concocted and forced upon institutions of education (MMD, 
2007).
179
 
 
The question of language is as important as defending the 
Homeland. If you taint the language of a nation, if you make sure 
different languages exist in a country, then you will be permitting 
the foreign powers‘ ploy of dividing and fragmenting the country 
(VKGB, 2005).
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It should be stated that some political parties not displaying 
nationalist attitudes, ÖDP and EMEP, do not emphasize national identity or 
idealize Turkishness. Accordingly, they do not display the psychic 
characteristics related with nationalist attitudes. Along with these parties, 
TKP has no explicitly nationalist emphasis however it is not true that this 
party which describes itself as patriot [yurtsever] and organizes ―Patriotic 
Front‖ [―Yurtsever Cephe‖] is free of nationalist tendency. As Bora (2006b) 
states, patriotism of TKP like any other patriotisms is an extension of 
nationalist ideology. 
 It can be stated that LDP and DSP which have different ideological 
and political tendencies do not display nationalist characteristics dominantly 
according to their party programs, however it does not mean that these 
parties do not adopt a nationalist line. The fact that the political praxises of 
these parties are very different from the party programs should be 
emphasized. Moreover, it can be remembered that the political discourses 
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along with the group dynamics which shape these nationalist discourses are 
neither static nor constant. 
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5. Discussion 
 
5.1. The Limitations of the Study 
It must be considered that the nationalist discourses in Turkey 
are not limited to the ones which have been represented in this study. 
Different nationalist discourses are reproduced at micro levels. 
Therefore, this case analysis may not be an exact representation of 
the whole picture. The second limitation is that the official texts of 
the political institutions are examined in this study; however the 
political praxis of each cannot be reduced to the discourses of these 
official texts. Many times, the nationalist tone of the discourses 
becomes more visible and sharper in practice. . In addition to this 
limitation, it should be noted that some political parties and 
institutions elaborate on their ideologies and political programs 
whereas some others only summarize their views. Therefore, 
inevitably more comprehensive discourses have been given more 
weight in this study than the others. 
Besides the limitations concerning the materials, there are 
some methodological limitations. Psychoanalytical exploration is 
more effective when the spontaneous processes within a certain 
frame are followed. Free association which is a sine qua non for 
individual psychoanalytical process is naturally not applicable to the 
analysis of social phenomena. The case analysis is limited to the 
written structured materials. However it must be kept in mind that 
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this is a limitation of the psychoanalytical approach in itself when it 
comes to social research. It must be also emphasized that the 
psychoanalytical understanding of the social phenomena do not 
ignore and/or substitute the social, cultural, political, and economical 
explanations; rather it provides a specific comprehension which can 
be integrated with other explanations. 
 
5.2. Evaluation of the Psychic Characteristics of Different 
Nationalist Discourses in Turkey 
5.2.1. Common Characteristics 
This study aimed to analyze the Turkish nationalist 
discourses through certain psychoanalytic conceptualizations. In this 
analysis, the socio-political context in Turkey at the time of this 
study must be considered since both individual and social processes 
cannot be understood without the consideration of the context. 
Globalization in general and European Union membership process in 
particular has brought some ―new‖ issues into the agenda and 
changed the socio-political climate in Turkey. Turkey has handled 
many different economical, social and political problems up to now, 
but problems such as ―the Kurdish issue‖ and situation of minorities 
have been more visible and started to be discussed more within the 
terms of democratic reforms. The different political discourses 
examining within the framework of this study should be analyzed 
and understood in light of this socio-political context. In addition to 
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these points, recognizing the history of social and political culture in 
Turkey is sine qua non for this analysis. A psychoanalytical 
understanding of individual or social phenomena cannot be feasible 
without consideration of the history, the past, and the present. 
It can be argued that to various extents most of the political 
discourses in Turkey have a nationalist tendency. In many 
discourses, globalization process, the possibility of joining EU, 
Kurdish issue, and increasing demands of minorities are frequently 
attributed. To a large extent, these developments are perceived as 
having a potential of danger/threat against the status quo which is 
assumed to be trustworthy. In this ground, the nationalist emphasis 
seems to be strengthened. Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç (2007), state 
that nationalism provides a meta-language for the people who are in 
a state of trust-seeking in the face of these new socio-political 
processes which can lead to social crisis. This ascertainment is 
consistent with the Turquet‘s understanding of the groups. 
According to him, the groups may need for creating homogeneity in 
case of participating in a larger group (Hopper, 2003). When the 
members encounter with multiple stimuli in the face of a new group 
process, they perceive a threat against their identity. In view of these 
circumstances, they tend to cling to the some social discourses which 
highlight a homogenous collective identity. It can be argued that the 
increase of the nationalist wave in Turkey seems to indicate such 
regressive movement.  
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When different nationalist discourses in Turkey are 
examined, it can be seen that, to a certain degree, their discursive and 
psychic characteristics overlap although their intensity differs and 
specific characteristics are identified for each of them. The pervasive 
theme is the ―national and spiritual values‖ and ―national unity and 
togetherness‖ referring to a certain collective identity which is 
described based on the Turkish nationality in almost all political 
discourses except the few ones which do not display nationalist 
characteristics. The rigidity of this emphasis is varied according to 
the ideological tendency and it can be argued that this emphasis 
increases as the essentialist characteristics are more visible. The 
idealization of these values and the wish for the protection of the 
unity and togetherness show themselves more in rigid nationalist 
discourses. In parallel with that, projection mechanisms are 
commonly used in order to get rid of unwanted parts of own. In case 
of excessive use of projection, devalued other is perceived as 
malevolent.   
The discourse of ―national and spiritual values‖ refers to a 
nationally shared culture which is assumed to consist of shared 
images, representations, and the ideals. This discourse reflects the 
desire that the culture has a homogenous, stabile and constant 
character. The fact that the culture should acquire a national 
character is seen as unquestionable. The expression of ―national and 
spiritual values‖ also refers to a collective identity which is supposed 
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to exist or wished to exist. It highlights the similarities among 
Turkish people and also dissimilarities in relation with the others. In 
other words, what appears in these discourses is the need to 
differentiate oneself from the others with its unique features. It can 
be said that the identification with Turkish identity characterized 
with some national and spiritual values is desired but rather than 
identification, introjection mechanism is at work. Identification is a 
more mature process referring to the capacity of evaluating oneself 
in a complex and multi-dimensional way; whereas in introjection, 
only selected good parts are taken in. As Volkan (1998) emphasizes, 
identification requires an integration of both good and bad parts of 
oneself and the other. In case of Turkish nationalisms, as intrinsic to 
all nationalist attitudes, predominantly good parts of own nation are 
introjected while the ―bad‖ ones are tended to be denied and/or 
projected onto the other. The political discourses which have 
nationalist tendency, the so-called ―shared‖ national and spiritual 
values are attributed high and ideal traits. This tendency heightens as 
the essentialist emphasis increases. In the end, these values are 
positioned as uncritisizable, and are desired to be protected at all 
costs. Some political approaches, for example those of MHP, BBP, 
SP, VKGB, and HYP which highlight ethnic and/or religious identity 
emphasize the national and spiritual values in a more rigid way not 
leaving any space for criticism (self-reflection). Erikson (1956) 
stated that the ideologies which display totalistic and exclusive 
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tendencies are dominated by a rigid collective superego manifesting 
itself with the themes of commitment, obedience, protection, and 
conservation. In this study, it is observed that the political discourses 
in which essentialist emphasis is evident call for obedience to the 
tradition as well as the national and religious values more than the 
others. 
According to Erikson (1956), all ideologies call for 
commitment to a certain value system and rigid principle of conduct. 
He continues that an ideology may ask for total obedience to the 
tradition when the eternalization of ancestry is promised. The 
discourses of ethnicist/religious nationalism are understood within 
this framework. The discourses which overemphasize Atatürk and 
his principles also call for similar commitment, but to the Republican 
tradition.  
In many discourses the (re)activation of the historical trauma, 
the Treaty of Sèvres, and the historical glory, National Independence 
War, are frequently mentioned. The historical traumas of Ottoman 
Empire are not frequently recalled in these discourses but they are 
crystallized in the Treaty of Sèvres. In fact, the victimhood due to 
Treaty of Sèvres is remembered as the treaty was reversed through 
national independence struggle, therefore it does not lead to a sense 
of shame. In certain socio-political circumstances, it is reactivated in 
order to mobilize the people under the spirit of Kuvayı Milliye 
[National Forces]. While the historical trauma is reactivated, 
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collective glory which provides pride is reactivated, as well. In fact, 
this historical trauma has been carried over in the collective memory 
for many decades (especially through the national education system); 
therefore it does not require being reactivated because this traumatic 
experience is more accessible psychically in the sense that it took 
place in the recent past and has a place in the collective memory at 
the conscious level. Thus it gains a more mobilizing effect because 
of the current socio-political circumstances. Possibility of joining a 
supra-national organization and its requirements are perceived as a 
threat against the nation-state, republic, and status quo.  
The (re)activation of the collective traumas cannot be 
understood only as a conscious and purposeful process or as a 
political strategy, but also it emerges as a result of a psychic process 
remained unconscious. These traumas and the glories have been 
stored in the collective memory and transmitted from one generation 
to the next, thus they acquire an organizing role for the national 
identity of the next generations, as well. Volkan (1998) indicates that 
when a collective trauma is not mourned properly, its influence on 
the present is more severe. It can be argued that the difficulties 
accepting the ―bad‖ parts of Turkey or ―Turkish nation‖ are rooted in 
the unassimilated trauma where the badness is projected onto the 
enemies, and the tendency to perceive oneself ―all-good‖ emerges 
due to the sense of being ―victimized‖. In many discourses, the 
propensity not to forget the prior trauma and being victimized 
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explicitly appears. As Volkan and Itzkowitz point out (1994), such 
traumas are mythologized. This tendency also serves for the next 
generations‘ identification with that victimization. When it is 
formulated with Kestenbaum‘s conceptualization (2003), the 
narratives concerning with that trauma and following national glory 
has acquired an organizing function for the collective identity. The 
importance of ―Atatürk‘s Address to Youth‖ can be understood as an 
effort of the next generations to carry on the ―national‖ trauma and 
glory of their ancestors in their memory. 
 It is argued that the huge trauma due to the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire is rarely remembered; rather the traumatic 
memories of the past are re-experienced (Paker, 2004). Although the 
attributions to Treaty of Sèvres are frequent in dominant political 
climate, it cannot be said that the traumatic memoirs are remembered 
and processed at the psychic level. This is truer for the prior 
traumatic experiences of the empire. Remembering and re-
experiencing are different psychic phenomena; the former requires a 
psychic processing, for the latter that kind of processing is not 
possible, therefore the traumatic memories are repressed, denied, 
and/or dissociated. This psychic process requires mourning for the 
losses which involves accepting the vulnerability and also allowing 
or submitting to transformation due to these losses (Butler, 2005b). 
When it is not possible to mourn for the losses, the people continue 
to deny their vulnerabilities leading to the fantasy that the losses will 
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be regained. In the context of Turkish nationalisms, it can be argued 
that because the official ideology and dominant political discourses 
have not gone through a psychic processing for the collective 
traumas and losses, people find themselves re-experiencing similar 
sense of threats. As a result of this tendency, dominant political 
approaches are unwilling to confront Turkey‘s weaknesses and 
wrongdoings; they rather project them onto the others. In the 
dominant political culture, there is a reluctance to accept the 
responsibility of Turkey as a perpetrator of the violence against the 
other ethnic and cultural groups, i.e. Armenians, Kurds (Paker, 2004; 
Sancar, 2007). The nationalist discourses do not face up to certain 
disabilities and wrongdoings of Turkey. Hence, such attempt to 
confront these wrongdoings in unofficial level by the help of the 
democratic reforms in the EU process leads to the rise of nationalist 
wave (Paker, 2007).  
As the nationalist discourses gain ground, the fear of 
disintegration based on the sense of threat become more visible. This 
finding is consistent with the observation of Kentel, Ahıska, and 
Genç (2007) who suggest that the danger of disintegration is the 
most important element in new nationalist discourses in Turkey. It is 
connected to the fact that Turkey‘s cultural diversity is expressed 
more openly recently. This kind of expression is perceived as a 
threat against the narcissistic agreement implying that the Turkey is 
a homogeneous country.  
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5.2.2. Specific Characteristics 
To explore the specific characteristics of nationalist 
discourses, it is possible to group them in terms of their discursive 
and psychic features although this grouping is synthetic, flexible and 
labile, and are not mutually exclusive. If Bora‘s (2002, 2003) 
grouping of nationalist discourses in Turkey is followed, it would be 
possible to identify official nationalism/―Atatürk nationalism‖, ―left-
wing‖ Kemalist nationalism, liberal neonationalism, racist-ethnicist 
nationalism, and conservative nationalism including Islamism. Bora 
differentiates these nationalist lines according to their ideological 
tendencies but he adds that these lines are not mutually exclusive, in 
other words a discourse which dominantly display characteristics of 
a certain nationalist line is also likely to interfuse with other lines 
and can be integrated with the dominant political discourse. In fact, 
different nationalist approaches are nourished by the others by 
spreading their ideologies. In this study, as a preliminary step this 
grouping can be useful to examine different nationalist discourses 
keeping in mind that most of them can be put into more than one 
group. It can be argued that to various extents, the psychic dynamics 
as well as their ideological tendencies of the discourses clustering 
around a group are similar. 
The discourses of Turkish Armed Forces General Military Staff 
(TSK) and ADD are examined within the official nationalism/ ―Atatürk 
nationalism‖. As for CHP‘s discourse, it may be included in the group 
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official nationalism/‖Atatürk nationalism‖, although its ideological tendency 
has been claimed as ―left-wing‖ or ―centre-left‖ in certain political 
conjunctures in Turkey. However, in the recent period, CHP has slid into its 
prior political position, a line of conservative republicanism and statism, 
namely official nationalism which is claimed by the armed forces (Laçiner, 
2005). The change in its political tendency can be linked with increasing 
sense of threat against certain characteristics of republican regime, statism, 
and laicism. Consequently CHP, as a party which was advocate of 
civilization/Westernization project, refused to support EU membership and 
democratic reforms, and adopted an anti-Westernist, anti-minority line 
(Alper, 2006). It can be argued that it became close to current Kemalist 
―left-wing‖ discourses, but for now its ideological tendency is not same as 
these discourses which display ethnicist-racist tendencies. As for DSP‘s 
discourse, although the party program of DSP does not include nationalist 
themes frequently, it describes itself as ―nationalist democratic left‖. It can 
be argued that DSP, as a social democratic party, has slid into more 
nationalist and statist position, like CHP. In fact, these two parties have 
already that political tendency (Alper, 2006). 
The discourses being assessed under the official nationalism 
excessively idealize Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who is perceived as the 
substitute for the collective ego ideal. He is described as an excellent 
leader who rescued the homeland and who must be followed. The 
language of authority and obedience is predominantly used in these 
discourses while the loyalty to the custody of Mustafa Kemal is 
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demanded. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, immortal leader/chief, is the 
person who cannot be criticized. Freud (1921) described such groups 
in which the members are expected to have passion for authority and 
obedience as artificial groups; he also gave some examples for those 
kinds of groups such as the army and the Christian Church. In the 
context of Turkey, it is not a casual event that the army that is also 
the nation founder maintains the official nationalist discourses and 
its followers from civil society are the groups in which ego ideal is 
rigidly developed and projected onto an omnipotent leader. Ökten 
(2006) emphasizes that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as an omnipotent 
leader who is feared can be seen as the united power of the society. 
The members of the society are afraid of this omnipotent leader but 
also protected by him; they express their wishes, demands and 
complaints through his name. It can be argued that Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk seems to represent the primal father which Freud thought 
was a substitute for the ego ideal of the society (Freud, 1921).  
The protection of republican tradition and Atatürk‘s 
principles and transformations is the dominant theme in the official 
nationalist discourses. In fact, they display hypervigilance for threat 
against the republic, its acquisitions, and Atatürk‘s principles and 
transformations. Consequently, certain internal and external enemies 
are identified. This perception of threat is partially related to the 
assumption/fear that the current government, i.e. AKP as a 
conservative party, opposes the laicism and other Atatürk‘s 
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transformations. The Kurdish issue and PKK terror are the other 
sources of this fear. Besides, it seems to be emanated from the 
European Union membership process and some required democratic 
reforms which would lead to the destruction of the power of the 
official ideology which nationalist characteristics are intrinsic into. 
Paker (2001) argues that this prospect of membership disorientates 
the official ideology which places the West on the position of the 
ego ideal on the one hand, but perceives it as an external danger on 
the other; this settled perception of threat reveals the paranoid 
position. As Paker indicates, the collective ideal of attaining (above) 
the rank of contemporary civilization is implicitly or explicitly 
declared in these discourses. In fact, for this kind of nationalism like 
any other nationalism, the West seems to represent the economical 
and technological aspects of the civilization, not cultural and social 
ones. 
In the official nationalist discourses, the presence of a rigid 
collective superego stands out. The criticism of ―settled values‖ 
cannot be tolerated; this criticism and also expressing oneself 
differently from these values are seen as a manifestation of treason. 
Here, it can be noted that some issues, for example the demands of 
the Kurdish people, are likely to be seen as going to the extremes in 
social life as shown in the research of Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç 
(2007). In this case, setting limits to the extremes can be perceived 
as necessary. The statement of ―extreme‖ seems to imply a priority 
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of the collective agreement which is possibly directed by a harsh 
collective superego. In official nationalist discourses, people‘s or 
group‘s efforts to place themselves in a different position can be 
sufficient for being declared as ―traitor‖, ―internal enemies‖ or 
―collaborators of external enemies‖. Here, the value system seems to 
consist of the ―black or white‖ morality as Kernberg (1998a) 
formulates. In parallel with that, the thinking process is sometimes 
impaired in this nationalist tendency.  
It can be argued that new socio-political processes which 
cause anxiety in the official nationalism lead to a regression to the 
narcissistic world, to the fight-flight assumption in Bion‘s 
conceptualization (Bion, 1959). In these discourses, the military 
forces are idealized and the role of these forces on the political 
process is seen as required. The press statement of Turkish Armed 
Forces Military General Staff which has been included in the study is 
an indicator in itself for the role of the army on the political life. As 
Aydın states (2006), the army is accepted as the security of the 
republican regime. When the sense of threat against the republican 
values increases, these discourses expect from the army to combat 
against these enemies and to protect the country. 
 Discourses of İP, Türksolu, ADKF and MMD can be 
examined in ―left-wing‖ Kemalist nationalism when Bora‘s grouping 
is followed. These discourses explicitly display fight-flight group 
characteristics developed by Bion (1959). The discourses become 
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firmly fixed to the perception of enemy. The statement of ―allies and 
enemies‖ is frequently used; the enemies refer to the Western 
countries and their values, and also to the internal enemies which 
attempt to disintegrate Turkey. In these discourses, there is a call for 
a national independence as if Turkey is under an occupation. As 
Bion described (1959), the members (as well as military forces) are 
expected to come together against that external enemy. This 
perception of threat has a paranoid character as well as a narcissistic 
one as a result of which many conspiracy theories are generated. The 
historical trauma, the Treaty of Sèvres is continuously evoked. 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who fought against the annihilation of 
national territories is extremely idealized. A myth of national savior 
is maintained while a new messiah is expected to combat against 
current threat.  
In ―left-wing‖ Kemalist nationalist discourses, Turkey is 
assumed to be an ―all-good‖ country having a glorified history, and 
the other countries, especially the Western countries having all-bad 
characteristics intend to destroy Turkey. The omnipotent fantasy 
appears in these discourses; Turkey as a self-sufficient country is 
assumed not to need anybody. ―Absolute independence‖ is a 
dominant discourse. Due to the use of excessive splitting in 
narcissistic-paranoid level, the thinking process (e.g., sense of 
reality) is seriously impaired. 
It can be argued that the discourses of MHP, BBP, VKGB, 
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and Association of Kuvvai Milliye correspond to racist-ethnicist 
nationalism according to Bora‘s grouping. Bora (2002, 2003) states 
that Turkishness is defined based on culturalist ethnicity by this kind 
of nationalism in Turkey; it displays essentialist characteristics at 
cultural and historical dimensions. Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç (2007) 
argue that the discourse of pure Turkishness constructs itself 
highlighting an ethnic essential and seeking homogeneity. Here, it 
can be noted that in some periods Kemalist ideology has slid to a 
semi-totalitarian and fascist line although it has never adopted that 
line entirely (Parla, 1993). The discourses of VKGB and Association 
of Kuvvai Milliye seem to carry Kemalist ideology to a fascist line.  
When these ethnicist discourses are examined in terms of 
their psychic structures, the wish for homogeneity discloses itself. 
The themes of the commitment to the national identity, national and 
spiritual values, religious and family values and also of the 
protection of the national identity and values are dominant. The 
values of other cultures are devalued and Turkish values are 
excessively idealized. The influence of other culture cannot be 
accepted; the fear of contamination and degeneration is a 
considerable feeling. National honor, dignity and pride [milli onur, 
milli haysiyet, milli şeref, and milli gurur ] are strongly emphasized 
by essentialist nationalism as well as by other nationalist discourses 
in varied degrees. An assumption that Turkish nation has essential 
characteristics and values which are fixed and constant is intrinsic to 
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these discourses. The past, history of Turkish nation, is idealized. 
The ego ideal is very high and rigid but also very far from the reality 
as seen in the expression ―twenty first century will be the century of 
the Turks‖. This is an indicator of a narcissistic structure and 
grandiosity. Due to that narcissistic tendency, the feeling of shame 
frequently emerges in the face of international conditions which 
activate the sense of weakness. As Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç point 
out (2007), essentialist movements in Turkey are preoccupied with 
their feelings of humiliation due to their difficulties accepting to be a 
small community while being a glorious community in the past. 
According to Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985), feeling of ―inferiority‖ is 
related to shame and this feeling of shame is translated to arrogance. 
Yet, shame and arrogance are two sides of the same coin.  Shame is 
generally attributed to a conflict between the ego and the ego ideal.  
The collective superego is very harsh and punitive in this 
essentialist ideology. The concept of ―morality‖ is frequently 
attributed in these discourses. The themes of protection and 
prohibition are pervasive. Being individual in the face of the group is 
not allowed. Supreme power and authority is perceived as given. The 
people or groups who do not accept to submit to this authority are 
likely to face exclusion and/or punishment. The criticism of and 
―disobedience‖ to national values cannot be tolerated. The people 
who attempt to criticize or disobey are easily described as traitors. 
There is a direct reference to the term ―traitor‖ in MHP‘s discourse. 
 136 
In these racist-essentialist nationalist discourses along side other 
nationalist discourses which highlight essential characteristics and 
values of the Turkish nation to various degrees, the aggressivity is 
more visible. In the narcissistic world, the tolerance for otherness 
does not exist; the other is perceived as having a discomposing 
influence. In the face of an attack against the illusion of 
homogeneity, aggression shows itself. This aggressive tendency is 
also projected onto the other, the West and Kurdish ―terrorists‖ who 
are perceived as a threat against the unity of Turkey and then a fight 
against those threats is called for. This intense aggressivity is also 
responsible for a harsh collective superego that demands for 
obedience, prohibits the acts threatening the narcissistic agreement. 
This harsh superego has a controlling function in these discourses. 
In the discourses of VKGB and Association of Kuvvai 
Milliye, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is extremely idealized. His ideal of 
attaining to rank of contemporary civilization is protected; however 
it is not clear what contemporary civilization means and who 
represents it. The West does not seem to represent the contemporary 
civilization; their political, social and cultural values are devalued, 
different than Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who is accepted as the 
substitute of the ego ideal of the group. Turkish nation is extremely 
idealized and seen as ―all-good‖ and self-sufficient country almost 
having acquired (above) the level of contemporary civilization. In 
this narcissistic and omnipotent world, the presence of the other is 
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denied; the existence of the other ethnic groups, minorities, is not 
accepted. The EU membership process is perceived as a huge threat 
against the independence of Turkey; therefore there is an evident call 
for fighting against this so-called threat. The historical trauma, the 
threat of disintegration of the territories of Ottoman Empire and the 
Treaty of Sèvres, is frequently remembered and also (re)activated in 
order to mobilize the people around the struggle for independence. 
Due to excessive use of primitive defenses, the reality is distorted to 
a great extent. 
The discourse of SP can be discussed within Islamism 
merging with nationalism. The ideology of BBP which emphasizes 
the Muslim identity partially overlaps with this Islamist line. Here, 
Islamism displaying nationalist characteristics and Islamic-
conservative nationalism can be distinguished. While SP‘s discourse 
should be described as Islamism, discourses of HYP and BTP 
display mixed characteristics. In SP‘s discourse, Muslim identity of 
Turkish nation is extremely idealized; the people who live in Turkey 
are expected to describe themselves Muslim; the Muslim identity 
refers to Sunni Muslimness in that discourse. In parallel with an 
extreme idealization of oneself, the ego ideal is very high, rigid and 
unrealistic as reflected in the objective of ―being the masters of the 
world one more time‖. Here, one can see the traces of a narcissistic 
fantasy and a wish/illusion to go back to the lost perfection. As 
Chassequet-Smirgel points out (1985), this kind of narcissistic 
 138 
fantasy is related to the wish to return to a state of primary fusion 
referring to primary narcissistic perfection. In SP‘s discourse in 
which this wish is obviously declared, the past is mystified 
attributing a sense of perfection to it. Chasseguet-Smirgel reminded 
that the reality testing is lacking in such ideologies; the loss of that 
―perfection‖ is not accepted; the truth of the matter is that there is a 
serious difficulty accepting the fact that there is no such perfection. 
Therefore in order to maintain the narcissistic fantasy, the reality is 
distorted; otherwise that fantasy is to collapse. In SP‘s discourse, 
shame (and arrogance as the other side of the coin) which is 
emanated from narcissistic structure is also visible. The deficiencies, 
failures, sense of ―smallness‖ and criticism from the other cannot be 
tolerated due to this grandiosity and arrogance. Rather, they cause a 
sense of humiliation as an indicator of shame.  
As expected, the extreme idealization indicates the 
mechanism of splitting in SP‘s discourse. While the Muslim identity 
is idealized as a manifestation of grandiosity, the other religious 
identities are devalued. Moreover, the paranoid tendencies are 
evident; a huge threat from other religious identities against the 
Turkish nation and the Muslim identity is perceived. Because of the 
wish to regain the lost sovereignty, the other is also perceived as 
having the same wish. In fact, the other religious nationalisms, 
Christian and Jewish nationalisms may have similar tendencies but 
those nationalist attitudes are attributed to all members of the other 
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groups in SP‘s discourses. Here, it can be argued that these different 
religious nationalisms feed each other like any other nationalism 
does. In SP‘s discourses, the historical traumas, Crusade and Treaty 
of Sèvres, are reactivated; there is again a call for fighting against 
this perceived threat. In this context, SP seems to regress to a deep 
level of paranoid-narcissistic situation in the face of cultural ―liberal‖ 
politics being maintained in Turkey. Besides, the seeking for 
wholeness and homogeneity is observed as the theme of protection is 
overemphasized. In consistent with that, the superego has a harsh 
character; morality is frequently emphasized. There is a frequent 
attribution to the spiritual leader, Necmettin Erbakan, who is most 
likely to put in the place of the ego ideal.  
In the discourses of HYP, religious identity - Muslimness - is 
emphasized; but the national identity, Turkishness is valued as much 
as the Muslim identity. This political approach endeavors to 
compromise with the official ideology. The laicism and the ideal of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his principle and transformations are 
protected in this discourse differently from SP. This discourse is 
based on a perception of a threat against the unity of Turkey, as well 
as of its national and religious identity. This perceived threat seems 
to have currently an organizing role for their nationalist emphasis. 
Due to that sense of threat, they call for fight against the enemy, the 
Western forces. In this context, the activation of national trauma, 
Treaty of Sèvres is frequently used. The discourse of ―absolutely 
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independent Turkey‖ is explicitly or implicitly dominant. Here, an 
omnipotent fantasy that ―we do not need anybody‖ displays itself as 
well as the wish for return back to years of National Independence 
War.  
In HYP‘s discourse, the Muslim Turkish identity is subtly 
idealized while the influence of the other cultures is tried to be 
dismissed. In consistent with that idealization, the need for 
homogeneity is intense. Diversity of ethnic, cultural or other 
identities tend to be denied; the existence of ethnic identities other 
than Turkishness cannot be accepted. Moreover, the people who 
attempt to express this existence is seen as collaborators of the 
external enemies who intend to disintegrate Turkey. The members of 
society are assumed not to have their own will, their individuality. 
The people‘s own will may exist but if they express the ideas that are 
not consistent with the national values, they are seen as traitors. In 
this context, it can easily be stated that the collective superego is 
harsh which means that the individual conscience is not allowed in 
the case of contradiction with collective conscience. The themes of 
protection, fidelity and punishment are prevalent. Due to excessive 
narcissistic needs, grandiosity and the impairment of thinking 
process are evident.  
To a certain degree, BTP‘s discourse resembles HYP‘s 
discourse in terms of ideological tendency and psycho-political 
characteristics when their political texts are compared. Although it is 
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well known that BTP highlights the Muslim identity in its political 
life, this emphasis on Muslim identity does not explicitly appear in 
its party program; rather Turkish identity is emphasized and 
idealized. It can be argued that BTP tends to show itself as faithful to 
official ideology and republican tradition. According to the party 
program, the national glory following National Independence War 
and also Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a savior are frequently idealized. 
It is also stated that Atatürk‘s principles and transformations are 
adopted by the party. The historical trauma, the Treaty of Sèvres, is 
frequently attributed in order to draw attention to a similar threat 
against Turkey by EU process and globalization wave. While 
remembering the trauma, a sense of pride also emerges just like the 
conditions of Sèvres were not accepted resulting in the national 
glory.  
 DP and GP develop a liberal nationalist discourse, although 
their ideological tendencies are not identical. LDP does not 
overemphasize Turkish ethnic identity, differently from DP and GP, 
but it can be included in this political line. A high collective ego 
ideal seems to organize the discourses of these political parties. 
Turkey which is already assumed to be a powerful country deserves 
a leading position in the world. In the discourse of DP and LDP, the 
validity of this ideal is grounded on the glorious history in the past, 
on the Ottoman heritage. The ego ideal, here, is emanated from prior 
narcissistic perfection which consists of an illusion. In the discourses 
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of DP and GP, the collective ego ideal which is to attain the level of 
contemporary civilization level is protected. To a certain extent, 
Turkish identity and national values are idealized, and the national 
pride is emphasized. These values are qualified as ―essential values‖ 
of which Turkish people should be proud of reflected in the term 
―cultural genetic‖. It can be argued that the claim for homogeneity is 
crystallized in this statement along with the expression of ―cultural 
genetic‖. In these discourses, the other cultures are not explicitly 
devalued while there is a clear idealization of the Turkish national 
identity; however the Turkish identity is intended to be protected 
from the influence of others. It should be noted that the EU 
membership has been supported by DP, especially in terms of 
economical aspect of that membership.  
 AKP deserves to be evaluated under a separate title for 
reason of its specific characteristics and also its success with 46.58% 
in the last election (See Appendix I). AKP can be described as a 
party whose ideological tendency is a synthesis of 
conservative/religious and liberal neonationalism, according to 
Bora‘s categorization (2002, 2003). However, AKP seems to be 
closer to the liberal line than the conservative/religious nationalism 
which is represented by HYP and BTP in this study. In AKP‘s 
discourse, the ego ideal is to attain above the level of contemporary 
civilization and also to be a big and central country. It can be argued 
that the ego ideal is neither rigid nor irrational although it is high. 
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Differently from other nationalist discourses, this ideal is not 
frequently highlighted. The dominant theme in that discourse is the 
search for homogeneity, crystallized in the statement of ―one nation, 
one flag, one homeland, and one state‖ [―tek millet, tek bayrak, tek 
vatan, tek devlet‖] (AKP, 2007, p.4). The protection of the 
characteristics of the national identity which are assumed to be 
stabile and constant is frequently emphasized. Moral, religious and 
spiritual values of Turkish nation are highlighted. It can be argued 
that AKP‘s political discourse promise the citizens to carry higher 
standards while protecting and strengthening the national identity. In 
order to do these, it does not need to devalue the others or to indicate 
a threat; it seems to have self-confidence to a certain degree. The 
protection theme indicates the role of collective superego; the 
collective superego appears as a providing a sense of ―we-ness‖ and 
as having a protecting function; the prohibitive and punitive 
characters of the superego are not highlighted.  
 To a large extent the 22 July 2007 Parliamentary General 
Election results show that , the conservative and liberal nationalist 
discourse of AKP, based on the ―the unity and togetherness‖ theme 
seems to be adopted by many people in Turkey. AKP highlights the 
sense of ―we-ness‖ by also promising higher standards for the 
citizens. Its discourse is not based on an ―aggressive‖ theme, namely 
on a sense of threat and call for fight against certain enemies; rather 
it tends to provide the citizens with a sense of security. It can be 
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argued that the election results indicate that many people in Turkey 
do not buy the sense of threat rhetoric which is highlighted by almost 
all nationalist discourses. Taşkın (2007) also draws attention to the 
fact that highlighting only malevolent sides of the socio-political 
processes and reacting with the rage in the face of social crisis do not 
give hope to the masses. The success of AKP in last election seems 
to be related to its more positive discourse differently from those of 
other political parties.  
On the other hand, it should be stated that the ratios of vote of 
CHP (20.88%) as an official nationalist party and MHP (14.27%) as 
an essentialist nationalist party, show that this sense of threat cannot 
be disdained in the society. It can be suggested that prevalent 
nationalist discourses highlighting the sense of threat and also calling 
for fight against those threats influence the psychic condition in the 
society, in other words, the dominant themes take hostage the 
collective mood. The discourses of many nationalist movements 
seem to increase xenophobic and exclusive attitudes based on the 
perception of threat from the others. MHP‘s election success is likely 
to be related to this fact. For example, the harsh discourses of ―left-
wing‖ Kemalist movements do not increase their own ratio of vote 
but contribute to the success of MHP and CHP. This argument is 
consistent with the observation of Yaşlı who states that ―left-wing‖ 
nationalist [ulusalcı] line strengthens the dominant nationalist 
movements (2006). 
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Table 2: The Psychic Characteristics of Different Nationalist Discourses in Turkey 
 
 
 * The institutions which are in brackets partially display the characteristics of that type of nationalism. 
Psychic characteristics 
Types of Turkish nationalisms 
Official/―Atatürk 
nationalism‖ 
―Left-wing‖ 
Kemalist nationalism 
Liberal 
neonationalism 
Racist-ethnicist 
nationalism 
Conservative 
nationalism 
Islamism 
Idealization of collective identity High Extremely high Moderate to high Extremely high High Extremely high 
The organizing role of collective traumas 
and glories 
High Extremely high Low to moderate Extremely high 
High to extremely 
high 
Extremely high 
Harsh collective superego  High Extremely high Moderate Extremely high Extremely high Extremely high 
Rigid/high collective ego ideal High Extremely high Moderate Extremely high 
High to extremely 
high 
Extremely high 
Putting a leader in the place of the ego ideal Extremely high Extremely high Moderate Extremely high 
High to extremely 
high 
Extremely high 
Excessive use of primitive defenses High Extremely high Low to moderate Extremely high Extremely high Extremely high 
Regression to the narcissistic world High Extremely high Low to moderate Extremely high Extremely high Extremely high 
Characteristics of fight-flight assumption High Extremely high Low Extremely high 
High to extremely 
high 
High to 
extremely high 
Impairment of thinking process High Extremely high Low to moderate Extremely high 
High to extremely 
high 
Extremely high 
Institutions 
TSK, ADD, CHP, 
DSP 
İP, Türksolu, ADKF, 
MMD, (CHP)* 
AKP, DP, GP, 
(LDP)* 
MHP, BBP, VKGB, 
Kuvvai Milliye 
HYP, BTP, (AKP)* SP, (BBP)* 
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5.3. Reexamination of the Psychoanalytic Conceptualizations 
This study aimed to explore the psychic characteristics and the 
dynamics of the nationalist discourses. Psychoanalytic conceptualizations 
which have been introduced in the beginning of this study seem to be 
convenient for this exploration. As seen in the Turkish case, to a large 
extent, different psychoanalytic conceptualizations which are connected to 
the questions of the study are integrated with each other. In the beginning, it 
has already been stated that the questions of the study were not completely 
independent; a fortiori they are inherently related to each other. 
Typically, all nationalist discourses refer to a collective, namely, 
national identity that is assumed to encompass all citizens. Basically, many 
social/political discourses tend to describe a collective identity but the 
attributions to a collective identity are varied in each of them. In nationalist 
discourses, the characteristics of the national identity are generally positive 
and also tend to be idealized more, many times described as ―all-good‖ as 
the nationalist emphasis increases. Members usually wish to introject the 
good parts instead of identifying with both good and bad/disliked parts. 
More rigid nationalist discourses, essentialist ideologies, have difficulty 
adopting the characteristics of other cultures which are devalued repeatedly; 
rather they wish to cling to and protect theirs. Besides, such discourses 
attribute certain essential features to the national identity which is described 
by them. These essentialist features are likely to be perceived as constant 
and permanent indicating a search for homogeneity that is a mere 
narcissistic illusion. This narcissistic tendency explains why rigid social and 
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political discourses are generally essentialist ideologies. Essentialist 
ideologies which usually display racist tendencies apply to primitive defense 
mechanisms much more than to others. The seeking for ―purity‖ is a 
narcissistic fantasy per se. When the national characteristics are supposed to 
be pure and homogeneous, they are also likely to be extremely idealized, 
while the other nations are devalued and/or hated. This tendency is related 
to the fact that the other group is also described as a homogeneous union 
that is composed of malevolent individuals. In such cases a fear of 
contamination emerges in the effort to avoid from the so-called malignant 
parts of the other arises. Essentially, this nationalist tendency is an end 
result of the avoidance of confronting the bad parts that they own which 
have been splitted and projected; as if the bad parts annihilated the good 
ones. Therefore, the members who criticize the society, namely the 
―nation‖, are objected to the aggression. This tendency refers to the basic 
level of self/object (Kernberg, 1998a).  
 The excessive use of primitive defense mechanisms is responsible 
for the impairment of thinking process. In other words, sophisticated 
thinking process remains not well-developed in case of applying to 
primitive defenses. These discourses try to repress or deny the traumatic 
past of the nation instead of processing it. For almost all nations, traumatic 
experiences did exist in the past; what is important is how to deal with these 
experiences. Sometimes traumatic past as a victim and/or perpetrator are not 
confronted and processed psychically because of the difficulties in accepting 
the vulnerable position. Consequently, there is no capacity for the toleration 
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of frustration. In this case, the reality principle does not develop well. As 
Bion emphasizes (1962), the frustration toleration and the capacity to think 
are interconnected acquisitions. The low frustration tolerance obstructs the 
capacity to think; the lack of capacity to think leads to intolerable 
frustration. 
It is suggested that the severity of nationalist emphasis is also related 
to the toleration threshold for the criticism against the characteristics by the 
people both from own and other nations. Here, the rigidity of the collective 
superego has a determining role for how the collective identity is perceived. 
It can be suggested that while examining the large group processes and the 
character of the collective identity in these groups, there is a need to see the 
role and the function of the collective superego. In the groups in which 
collective identity is rigidly idealized and the other identities are devalued, 
the collective superego tends to be harsh. Erikson (1956) highlighted that 
the superego has a dominating role in totalistic and exclusive ideologies; in 
these kinds of social processes the identity is like a manifestation of the 
superego. The nationalist discourses which have a rigid collective superego 
also tend to have a rigid collective ego ideal. Here, the conceptualization of 
Freud about the superego and ego ideal is verified as he viewed that the ego 
ideal is a part of the superego (Frank, 1999). Freud (1921) stated that people 
transfer their ego ideal to the leader of the group and/or give up their ego 
ideal and identify with the group‘s ego ideal. The passion for authority and 
obedience is related to this psychic process. As essentialist and exclusive 
tendency increases, the collective ego ideal becomes more high, rigid and 
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irrational. In consistent with that, the rigidity of the superego also increases 
due to the wish to maintain the narcissistic agreement indicated by the 
collective ego ideal. In order to maintain the narcissistic fantasy, the 
punitive aspect of the superego stands out.  
Nationalist discourses tend to gain ground in the face of social 
change. This leads to a regression that implies a wish for and an 
unconscious attempt to return back to the psychic world which is assumed 
to be more trustworthy than that of the current. Volkan (1998) points out 
that individuals do not care much about their large group identities unless a 
sense of threat against those identities emerges. Kernberg (1998a) also 
shares this point of view reminding the reader that the sense of threat 
appears in the face of possibility of losing the ordinary social structures in 
which case the groups may regress towards more primitive levels of 
psychological functioning. Bion‘s conceptualization about the group 
assumptions is consistent with these theoretical approaches as well. When a 
group is not able to tolerate the anxiety which has emerged in the group 
process, tends to regress towards more primitive levels, namely dependency 
or fight-flight or pairing group assumption processes (Bion, 1962). 
Nationalist movements tend to show fight-flight group characteristics. In 
such case, these nationalist approaches activate and reinforce the sense of 
threat in the society in order to strengthen the collective identity and 
mobilize the people. To a large extent, whereas the former is an unconscious 
process, the latter implies a presence of conscious dynamics. Nationalist 
movements in which primitive defense mechanisms are predominantly used 
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are likely to attempt consciously to expand their psycho-political world 
view.  
Nationalist discourses are not usually generated in the group process 
of fight-flight assumption. As formulated by Turquet, the groups may 
regress to a situation which is characterized with seeking for homogeneity 
(Hopper, 2003). In case of participating in a large group, as it is in the 
globalization process today, people face multiple stimuli which may lead to 
a perception of a threat against the existing identity of the people. As a 
defense against this threat of loss of identity, they tend to cling their identity 
and to create an illusion of homogeneity indicating an absolute sameness of 
belief and a sense of wholeness. It can be argued that the tendency of 
homogeneity is likely to lead to intolerance for the individuality in the face 
of the group and to bring the perception of threat against that stronghold. 
One can follow the tracks of that tendency in Turkish case related with the 
process of socio-political changes. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This study aimed to examine the concept of nationalism from a 
psychoanalytical perspective and to explore the psychic characteristics of 
the nationalist discourses through certain Turkish cases. The most important 
outcome of this study is that psychoanalytic conceptualizations can enrich 
and also deepen the frame of understanding the nationalism issue. It can be 
concluded that in the light of the questions of the study, the psychic 
characteristics of Turkish nationalist discourses are discovered.  
Nationalist discourses are likely to gain ground in the regressive group 
processes which are frequently triggered by new socio-political 
circumstances, as seen in the Turkish case. When the large groups face to 
lose their relatively ordinary structures, they may cling to their collective 
identities which provide them security (Hopper, 2003; Kristeva, 1993). 
Similarly seeking for homogeneity is evident and the distinction between 
―we‖ and the ―other‖ is sharper. These dynamics are commonly observed in 
different Turkish nationalisms in varied degrees. Sometimes, the group may 
regress to a position which the group members project their aggression onto 
the homogenized other. This ―other‖ is perceived as a threat against the 
group. In such case, the members tend to come together against this 
threat/enemy and at the same time need a protection. Turkish nationalist 
discourses frequently promise the members such protection while also 
calling for a struggle.  
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Nationalist discourses in Turkey frequently use primitive defenses, i.e. 
splitting, projection, projective identification, idealization, and devaluation. 
Due to excessive use of these mechanisms, the thinking process is impaired 
and consequently reality is distorted to various extents. These defenses 
impede mature thinking processes which enable to understand and also 
interpret the world. Under these circumstances, the frame of understanding 
may be boxed in a simple categorization of good and bad.  
The collective identity is described in a rigid way in many nationalist 
discourses, while this identity is also idealized. Unmourned collective 
traumas increase the tendency of this rigidity because they could not be 
processed psychically. The idealized collective images and representations 
are homogenized especially in the presence of a rigid collective superego. 
The group members are expected to identify with the national identity 
voluntary but also be obedient to that demand. It is difficult to tolerate the 
individuality and individual conscience that may conflict with the harsh 
collective superego. In such group processes, collective ego ideal is also 
high, rigid, and less realistic. This kind of collective ego ideal indicates a 
narcissistic phenomenon. As the essentialist nationalist emphasis increase, 
these agencies, namely collective superego and the ego ideal tend to be 
more rigid. 
 
6.1. Suggestions for Overcoming Nationalism 
It is important to take these powerful psychic dynamics into account 
in a long-term struggle for overcoming nationalism. As nationalist attitudes 
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are shaped and reinforced through psychic dynamics within the group 
processes, these take powerful psychic roots. Therefore, these are likely to 
be ingrained and long lasting attitudes. Usually, these attitudes are 
regenerated again and again in the socio-political contexts. Nationalist 
discourses also shape these psychic dynamics in the groups. In any case, 
since thinking processes are simplistic in the groups in which nationalist 
attitudes are powerful, the way of interpreting the world has no complexity. 
As Özmen (2006) emphasizes, people need to get rid of their sense of 
helplessness and powerlessness in the face of ambiguity of the current world 
and as a result of this need paranoid regression can be seen. Therefore, 
nationalist discourses which provide people a simple way of understanding 
are easily accepted and it is very hard for them to leave this powerful 
position. Besides, since criticisms against the settled values are not 
tolerated, breaking this closed loop is not a simple struggle.  
It can be concluded that the struggle against the nationalism requires a 
long time and, thus, also patience. In the face of questioning the common 
attitudes, the severity of nationalist discourses tends to increase. In fact, 
such struggle can meet with success in a long term process. Development of 
thinking process, in other words, change in the simple, conventional, and 
black-or-white mentality is very crucial for overcoming nationalist attitudes. 
In this long-term process, confrontation with the weak and ―bad‖ parts of 
the own group and then accept them is necessary. To accept the deficiencies 
and weaknesses requires giving up the narcissistic fantasies, the sense of 
omnipotence. As well as this acceptance, mourning of the historical losses is 
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a sine qua non component of this process. These psychic processes 
contribute to development of self-reflecting capacity. Permanent change 
requires an experience of confrontation with ourselves, especially with the 
parts which are repressed and/or denied. Such continuous attempt leads to a 
transformation of thinking process into a more mature and complex state. 
In the case of Turkish nationalisms, the homogenization of the 
collective characteristics is prevalent. Despite the fact that it is not observed 
in detail in the official texts of the nationalist institutions, the characteristics 
of the other, i.e. the Western countries, Kurdish population, and minorities 
are homogenized as well. Homogenization of the devalued other generally 
brings dehumanizing. Here, it is concluded that to be receptive to the 
heterogeneity in both own group and the other groups lead to a rupture of 
rigid and stereotyped perception of ―us‖ and ―them‖. In Butler‘s words, 
acceptance of the fragility and vulnerability of the other as a subject is 
required in order to overcome dehumanizing attitudes (Butler, 2005). This 
acceptance reduces the power of nationalist attitudes in a long-term process. 
However, nationalist discourses are likely to resist such rupture because of 
the conventional, simplistic and black-or white thinking and they are even 
likely to grow stronger due to their need/wish for maintaining this tendency. 
In fact, to accept the heterogeneity and differences of the own group can be 
more possible as the people are more open to interpersonal contact with the 
people who are within the same group. Such experience can enable to meet 
the ―other‖ as a subject and to see the heterogeneity of the other groups. In 
this long-term process, the nationalist approaches can lose their power.  
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6.2. Suggestions for Further Study 
This study is based on the written texts of the different 
nationalist approaches. It can be suggested that further studies which 
focus on the political praxis more will make an important 
contribution to the understanding of the psychic dynamics of 
nationalist discourses. In a future study, nationalist discourses can be 
explored in different socio-political contexts in a comparative way. 
Besides, for a better exploration of group dynamics, it is suggested to 
conduct a research study on small groups in which spontaneous 
processes can be directly observed.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 Özgüveni giderek yükselen Türk milletinin aşamayacağı hiçbir engel yoktur (AKP, 2007, 
p. 4). 
 
2
 Tarihi altın sayfalarla dolu olan ve geleceğe aynı umutla bakması için her türlü haklı 
nedeni bulunan ülkemiz ve milletimiz (…) (DP, 2007, p. 61). 
 
3
 (…) Türk Milletini tarihte hak ettiği şanlı yerine oturtmak ülküsünü benimseyerek 
yılmadan çalışacak, damarlarındaki asil kana, cevhere, Türk milletine, Türk tarihine güvenerek, Türk 
kültürünü, Türk milletini yükselten ve büyük millet yapan hasletlerimizi sevecek ve sevdirmeye 
çalışacağız (VKGB, 2005). 
 
4
 (MMD) Yegane kurtuluşu Türk Milletinin kendi öz gücünde görür (MMD, 2007). 
 
5
 Türkiye, coğrafi avantajı, köklü tarihsel birikimi, çok yönlü ve zengin kültürel varlığı, 
genç ve dinamik toplum yapısı, girişimci ve çalışkan insanları ile böylesi bir dünya ortamına değil 
uyum sağlamak, bu ortamın oluşmasına en büyük katkıda bulunacak tüm özelliklere sahip, dünya 
üzerindeki sayılı ülkeden biridir (LDP, 2002). 
 
6
 Türk milletini, yüzyıllardır kader birliği etmiş, aynı inançla yoğrulmuş, aynı gayeye 
yönelmiş, bundan böyle de birlikte varolma iradesini serdetmiş insanlarımızın müşterek birliği olarak 
idrak ediyoruz (BBP, 1993). 
 
7
 (…) Atatürk'ün esaslı bir vazife olarak telakki ettiği Milliyetçilik, Milli şuuru yükseltmek, 
Milli  İstiklali tamamlamak, Milli devleti korumak, Milli faaliyeti genişletmek, Milletleşmeyi 
tamamlamak gayesini gütmekteyiz (VKGB, 2005). 
 
8
 Türkiye‘de tek bir millet vardır. O da Türk milletidir (MMD, 2007). 
 
9
 Dil meselemiz Vatan topraklarının savunulması kadar önemli bir meseledir. Bir milletin 
dilini bozdunuz mu, bir ülkede farklı diller oluşmasını temin ettiniz mi dış mihrakların ülke üzerinde 
bölme ve parçalanma oyunlarına geçit vermiş olursunuz (VKGB, 2005). 
 
10
 Güzel Türkçe‘mizin yapısı ve karakterini bozacak, onu yozlaştıracak hareketlere yol 
verilmeyecek, ana dilimizin gelişimi tabii seyri içinde temin edilecektir (BTP, 2003). 
 
11
 (MMD) Tek dil, tek bayrak, tek devlet tek vatan düşüncesini savunur (MMD, 2007). 
 
12
 Ülkemize bir tür sömürge görüntüsü veren yabancı dille eğitim egemenliğine son 
verilecektir. Yabancı diller, kültür istilasının birer aracı olmaktan çıkarılacaktır (HYP, 2007). 
 
13
 Ezeli ve ebedi Bayrağımız olan Türkçe'mizin  öncelikle  korunması, geliştirilmesi ve 
yozlaşmaması için çalışmalar yürütmek (…) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 2006). 
 
14
 Bir milletin varlığını devam ettirmesinde en önemli amil, o milletin milli ve manevi 
değerleridir. Bu değerler bir bütün olarak o milletin kimliğini oluşturur (BTP, 2003). 
 
15
 Milletimizi yüzyıllardır ayakta tutan ve tarihte şerefli bir mevki işgal etmemizi sağlayan 
inançlarımız ve kültürel değerlerimizdir (BBP, 1993). 
 
16
 Çağın dinamikleri üzerinde söz sahibi olmanın yolu, güçlü milli kimliğe ve özgüvene 
sahip bir millet olmaktan geçer (MHP, 2007, p.6). 
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17
 Cumhuriyeti kurma iradesi ve eylemine, eşit yurttaşlık bağına, ortak millî kültüre ve 
birlikte yaşama arzusuna dayanan millî birliğimizi pekiştireceğiz (İP, 2007). 
 
18
 Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi din hizmetlerini, ahlaki ve manevi değerlerin yaşatılması ve 
milli dayanışma ve bütünleşmenin sağlanması için önemli bir alan olarak görmektedir (AKP, 2007, p. 
82). 
 
19
 Nüfusunun çoğunluğu dini değerlerine samimiyetle inanan Müslümanlardan oluşan 
Türkiye‘nin manevi değerleri ile laik ve demokratik devlet tecrübesi de önemli bir güç kaynağıdır 
(MHP, 2007, p. 115). 
 
20
 Müslüman Türk kimliğinin belirleyicisi olan inançlarımız, milletimizi bugün ve 
gelecekte layık olduğu yere ulaştıracak vazgeçilmez prensipleri vermektedir (BBP, 1993). 
 
21
 Çeşitliliği koruyarak ortak kültürel değerlerimizi öne çıkaracağız (CHP, 2007, p. 60). 
 
22
 Ortak kültürümüzün özü, tarihimizdir, coğrafyamızdır, ulus-devlet kimliğimizdir, 
Cumhuriyetimizin nitelikleridir, anayasamızın temel ilkeleridir! (CHP, 2007, p. 60). 
 
23
 (MHP) Türk Milleti‘ne mensubiyetin gurur ve şuuruna sahip, milli ve manevî 
değerlerimizi özümsemiş, düşünme, algılama ve problem çözme yeteneği gelişmiş,  yeni gelişmelere 
açık, sorumluluk  duygusu  ve toplumsal  duyarlılığı yüksek, bilim   ve teknoloji üretimine yatkın, 
girişimci,  demokrat, kültürlü ve inançlı nesillerin yetiştirilmesini (...) hedeflemektedir (MHP, 2007, 
p. 8). 
 
24
 (…) Bütün milletlere örnek olmuş yüksek Türk Kültürü ve Medeniyetinin tanıtılmasını 
sağlamak, Türk Milletinin adet, töre, anane, folklor, müzik, edebiyat, tarih ve benzeri alanlarda duyarlı 
kılınması, çocuklarımızın ve gençlerimizin bu yönlerde vatansever olarak, yetişmeleri ve 
bilgilendirilmeleri için çalışmak ülkümüzdür (VKGB, 2005). 
 
25
 Süreklilik içinde değişen Türk kültürü, aynı zamanda temel kimliğini muhafaza etmiş ve 
dünya kültür mirasının en seçkin üyelerinden biri haline gelmiştir (AKP, 2007, p. 130). 
 
26
 Türk Milleti dünyanın en asil, en köklü, en büyük milleti olup, dünya mağara devrinden 
normal yaşam biçimine, Ortaçağın karanlığından bu günkü aydınlığa, Türk Kültür ve Medeniyeti 
sayesinde ulaşmıştır (VKGB, 2005). 
 
27
 Nitelikli, girişimci, özgüveni yüksek ve milli değerlerine sahip çıkan bir gençlik, 
ülkemizi hak ettiği yere taşıyacak temel varlığımızdır (AKP, 2007, p. 74). 
 
28
 (…) ―Bir Ülkenin Asıl Gücü, Ne Tankıdır, Ne Parasıdır. Milli Ve Manevi Değerlere 
Bağlı Genç Evlatları‖dır (SP, 2007, p. 19). 
 
29
 Türkiye'de inançlarına, tarihi geçmişine bağlı, milli değerlerine saygılı olarak 
yetişmesini istediğimiz bir nesil için, milli kültürün tahrip edilmesinin önlenmesini önşart olarak 
kabul ediyoruz. Türk toplumunun mazisiyle tekrar barışması, ancak Türkiye'de sosyal hayatın 
temeline milli kültür unsurlarının yerleştirilmesiyle gerçekleşebilecektir (BBP, 1993).  
  
30
 Türkiye‘nin ulusal kimliğini ve onurunu koruması için bağımsızlığı savunmak zorunda 
olduğumuzun bilincindeyiz (ADKF, 2000). 
 
31
 Milli kültür değerlerimizin yıpratılması sonucunu doğuran ve kültürel değerler 
kargaşasına sebebiyet veren uygulamalar önlenecektir (MHP, 2007, p. 106). 
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32
 Aile toplumumuzun temelidir. Ulusal bütünlüğün, dayanışmanın pekiştirilmesinde, 
değerlerimizin korunması ve geliştirilmesinde aile kurumu çok önemli bir yer tutar (GP, 2002). 
 
33
 Aile toplumun temelidir. Geleneksel Türk-İslam ailesinin gücünü muhafaza etmek için 
toplum ve devlet her türlü faaliyet men edilecektir (BBP, 1993). 
 
34
 (…) Milli birlik ve beraberliği perçinleyen, sevgi, saygı ve dostluk bağlarını güçlendiren, 
vatan, millet, bayrak, şehitlik ve gazilik gibi milli değerleri özümseten, bir arada yaşama ve sorumluluk 
bilincini geliştiren bir anlayışla eğitim vermesi sağlanacaktır (MHP, 2007, p. 95). 
 
35
 Toplumun birlik ve dirliğinin teminatı olan Türk kimliğini onurla temsil eden bireylerin, 
milli ve manevi değerlerimize, gelenek ve göreneklerimize uygun olarak çağdaş standartlarda bir 
eğitim alması temel politikamız olacaktır (BTP, 2003). 
 
36
 Milli Mücadele Derneği, Atatürkçü eğitimin ve ulusal birliğin temelinde Milli Eğitim 
Birliğini yani Tevhid-i Tedrisatı görür (MMD, 2007). 
 
37
 Eğitim anlayışımız, milli ve manevi değerlere sahip, çağın ilim ve teknolojisiyle 
mücehhez, hür düşünceli, üretken, ahlaklı ve yenilikçi nesiller yetiştirmektir. Eğitim sistemi, fertlere 
milli kültürün aktarılması yanında, fertlerin kabiliyetlerinin ortaya çıkmasını sağlayacak bir 
uygulamanın içinde olacaktır (BBP, 1993). 
 
38
 Eğitim Programımız; ―Ulusal kimliğimiz, tarihimiz ve değerlerimiz ile evrensel kültür‖ 
bilinç ve birikimleri, ―laiklik, demokrasi ve hukukun üstünlüğü‖ ilkelerini temel alacaktır (CHP, 
2007, p. 56). 
 
39
 Fert, aile ve toplumun korunması için dini, ahlaki ve manevi eğitim anaokulundan 
başlatılacak ve güçlendirilecektir (SP, 2007, p. 34). 
 
40
 Bu kapsamdaki din eğitimi ve öğretimi, Anayasa‘mızın gereği olarak Milli Eğitimin bir 
parçası ve tamamlayıcısıdır (BTP, 2003). 
 
41
 Türklüğün ve İslamın değerlerini yaşayan ve yaşatan önder şahsiyetlerin hayatı 
ve felsefesi ilköğretim okullarında seçmeli ders olarak okutulacak (MHP, 2007, p. 95). 
 
42
 Farklı kültürler karşısında, özellikle yeni nesillerin kültür şokuna uğramasına ve kimlik 
bunalımına düşmesine engel olacak kaliteli ve ihtiyaca cevap veren edebi eserler ortaya konmasına 
yönelik millî kültür değerlerinin millete tanıtılması ve benimsetilmesi sağlanacaktır (MHP, 2007, p. 
106). 
 
43
 En önemli meselelerden biri ise yabancı yayınevlerinin ülkemizde faaliyet göstermeye 
başlamasıdır. Yabancı yayınevlerinin kültürümüzü korumak ve geliştirmek konusunda ne kadar faydalı 
olacağı tartışmalıdır. Bankalarımızın, borsamızın ve büyük kuruluşlarımızın yabancıların eline 
geçmesinden sonra yayıncılık sektörümüzün de yabancıların eline geçmesi ülkemizin ne kadar büyük 
bir tehlike ile karşı karşıya olduğunu göstermektedir (DP, 2007, p. 51). 
 
44
 Türk kültür ve sanatının milli kimliğini muhafaza ederek evrensel platformlara 
taşınması, öncelikli hedeflerimiz arasındadır (AKP, 2007, p. 130). 
 
45
 Kültür ve sanat, milletlerin gelişmesi ve ulusal kimliklerini korumak bakımından çok 
önemlidir (BTP, 2003). 
 
46
 Türk insanının inançlarıyla ters düşmeyen sanat, milli kültürümüzün de süregelen bir 
parçasıdır. Bu ölçüler içerisinde sanata, haiz olduğu kıymetini verip, sanatçının desteklenmesi ve 
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korunması hedeflerimiz arasındadır (BBP, 1993). 
 
47
 Ulusal kültürümüzün, küreselleşme karşısında korunarak geliştirilmesi temel 
hedefimizdir (CHP, 2007, p. 60). 
 
48
 Türkiye‘de son 150 yıldır toplumumuza dayatılan yabancı unsurların ithaline karşıyız. 
Müslüman Türk toplumunun en asli özelliklerini ve hasletlerini günden güne tahrip eden yabancı 
kültürlerin insanımıza olan yabancılığı açıktır. Milli kültürümüzü sosyal hayatın her safhasına 
yaymak hedefimizdir (BBP, 1993). 
 
49
 Türk medeniyetinin ve tarihinin yüksek birikimini Batı emperyalizmine karşı koruyacak 
ve açığa çıkaracak bir devlet politikası egemen kılınmalıdır (MMD, 2007). 
 
50
 Toplumumuzun geleneksel kültürel değerlerini korumayı ve geliştirmeyi temel hedef 
alan DSP, Batı’nın ve Doğu‘nun çağdaş kültürel değerlerinden de yararlanacaktır (DSP, 2003, p. 
109). 
 
51
 Türkiye‘ye adeta ikinci bir Sevr Projesi dayatılmaktadır. Bu tehlike ve tehditler 
Cumhuriyet‘in kuruluşunda da aynıyla yaşanmış M. Kemal Atatürk de bizzat ‗dahili ve harici 
düşmanların‘ olacağından bahsetmiştir. Bugün sanki tarih tekerrür ediyor gibi aynı tehlikeli 
gelişmeler yaşanıyor (BTP, 2003). 
 
52
 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti verilen tavizler nedeniyle Osmanlı Devletinin son günlerini 
yaşar hale gelmiştir (VKGB, 2005). 
 
53
 Türkiye bugün, Kurtuluş Savaşı‘na ön gelen günlerin şartları içine itilmiş bulunuyor. (...) 
Türkiye‘ye yapılmak istenenler Türkiye‘nin götürülmek istendiği yer bakımından durum 
1919‘dakinin aynı (HYP, 2007). 
 
54
 Milli Mücadele Derneği, tıpkı Osmanlı‘nın son dönemlerinde olduğu gibi Türk milletine 
karşı birleşmiş olan, Batı emperyalizminin beslediği işbirlikçi-bölücü-gerici güçlerin Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti‘ne karşı oluşturduğu Cumhuriyet düşmanı sözde demokrasi cephesine karşı tüm milleti 
Cumhuriyeti savunmayı çağırır (MMD, 2007). 
 
55
 Günün görevi vatan savunmasıdır. Geleceğimiz, bu görevin başarıyla yerine 
getirilmesine bağlıdır (İP, 2007). 
 
56
 Vatansever Kuvvetler Güç Birliği Hareketi olarak amacımız emperyalizmin zincirlerini 
kırarak Milli Devletimizin yeniden tesisini sağlamaktır (VKGB, 2005). 
 
57
 Atatürk 1920'lerde çürümüş ―geri‖ye karşı ―ileri‖yi temsil ettiği için başarılı olabildi. 
Bugünün Türkiyesi de 1919'un Türkiyesi'ne benzer sorunlarla boğuşuyorsa, bağımsız, laik ve 
demokratik bir Türkiye için yeniden mücadele vermek gerekiyorsa, başarılı olmak için tarihimizdeki 
o büyük örneği, Atatürk'ü örnek almalıyız (ADKF, 2000). 
 
58
 Orta eğitime ‗yakın tarihimizde Türkiye‘yi işgal planları ve Sevr Antlaşması‘ gerçeğini 
konu edinen zorunlu bir ders konacaktır (HYP, 2007). 
 
59
 (…) Emperyalist güçler, 1990 yılında 20. Haçlı Seferi‘ni başlatmışlardır. SSCB 
çöktükten sonra, ABD tek kutup olup dünyaya hâkim tek güç olarak gözükünce, dünya siyonizmi 
ırkçı emperyalizm, „Artık 5700 seneden beri beklediğimiz, Büyük İsrail‟i kurmanın vakti gelmiştir. O 
halde 20. haçlı seferini başlatalım‟ dediler (SP, 2007, p. 2). 
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60
 Neticede İstiklal Savaşı‘nda bu millet, Büyük Önder Atatürk'ün öncülüğünde Kuvayı 
Milliye ruhuyla kendine dönmüştür. Milli iradenin, tecelli ettiği, bir Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti 
kurulmuş ve özgürlük mücadelesi veren ülkelere örnek olmuştur (BTP, 2003). 
 
61
 Gün ‗Ya İstiklâl, Ya Ölüm‘ diyenlerin İkinci Kurtuluş Savaşı için örgütlenme günüdür 
(MMD, 2007). 
 
62
 1919'da emperyalizme karşı ilk Bağımsızlık Savaşı‘nı kazanmış Türkiye, 
bağımsızlığından neden vazgeçmek zorunda olsun? (ADKF, 2000). 
 
63
 Hegemonyasını silahla kuran emperyalizm ancak silahla yıkılabilir. Türk Kurtuluş 
Savaşı bunun en güzel örneğidir (Türksolu, 2002). 
 
64
 İşçi Partisi, Lozan, Berlin ve Paris‘ten Batı devletlerine bayrak göstererek, Atatürk‘ün 
bağımsız Türkiye‘sini yeniden kurma yeteneğini kanıtlamıştır (İP, 2007). 
 
65
 (…) tıpkı 1918‘de İstiklal Savaşımızı yaparken gerçekleştirdiğimiz kurtuluş harekâtında 
olduğu gibi, bugünde elbirliğiyle vatanımızı, milletimizi ve bütün insanlığı karşı karşıya bulunduğu 
tehlikelerden ve felaketlerden kurtarmamız gerekmektedir (SP, 2007, p. 22). 
 
66
 Anadolu ve Anadolu halkı, dünya tarihinin en büyük medeniyetlerinin kurulduğu ve 
yeşerdiği toprakların; Türkiye ve Türk halkı dünya tarihinin en güçlü devletlerinden biri olan, 600 
yıllık Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun mirasçılarıdır (LDP, 2002). 
 
67
 Arkamızda binlerce yıllık büyük imparatorluklar mirası bulunuyor. İmparatorluk kültürü, 
bir yönüyle kavimleri birarada yaşatma kültürüdür (İP, 2007). 
 
68
 Evrensel İmparatorluklar kurmuş olan Türkiye, çok değerli bir tarih ve kültür mirasına, 
köklü bir devlet geleneği ve tecrübesine sahiptir (MHP, 2007, p. 114). 
 
69
 Cumhuriyetimizin kurucusu Ulu Önder Atatürk‘ün, ―Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene!‖ 
anlayışına karşı çıkan herkes Türkiye Cumhuriyeti‘nin düşmanıdır ve öyle kalacaktır (TSK, 2007). 
 
70
 Milli Mücadele Derneği Atatürk‘ün ―Türkiye Türklerindir‖ düşüncesini savunur (...) 
Türkiye‘de tek bir millet vardır. O da Türk milletidir. Emperyalizmin dayattığı ve yerli işbirlikçilerin 
ulusu bölmek için ortaya attığı Türk ulusal kimliğine alternatif her türlü kimliği Milli Mücadele 
Derneği reddeder (MMD, 2007). 
 
71
 Azınlık demek emperyalist koruması altında imtiyaz sahibi olan potansiyel ihanet odağı 
demektir (MMD, 2007). 
 
72
 AB, Türkiye‘de dine ve kavmiyete bağlı azınlıklar yaratma gayreti içine girerek ülkenin 
ve milletin bölünmez bütünlüğünü tehdit edici dayatmalar getirmiştir (HYP, 2007).  
  
73
 MHP iktidarında teröristler dağlarda, bölücü hainler ovalarda cirit atamayacaktır (MHP, 
2007, p. 30). 
 
74
 Başbakan da Diyarbakır‘da yaptığı bir konuşmada, terörle beslenen bu bölücü 
söylemleri, ‗Kürt sorunu‘ adını vererek kabul ve tekrar etmiştir. AB, Türkiye‘nin bölünmesini 
amaçlayan terörle desteklenen kavmiyetçi kışkırtmaya ‗sözde çözüm‘ isterken Türkiye‘de 
egemenliğin iki halk arasında bölünmesini, federal bir devlet oluşturulmasını, Türkçe‘den başka bir 
dilin de resmî bir dil olmasını istemektedir. Bu açık ve tehditkâr teşebbüs ve dayatmalara karşı 
hükûmet hiçbir tepki ortaya koymamıştır (HYP, 2007). 
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75
 (Türksolu) Kuvayı Milliye‘nin, halk-ordu-aydın ittifakını, gençliği de katarak geliştirir 
ve bu ittifakı bölmeye yönelik tüm çabalara şiddetle karşı çıkar. Özellikle de Türkiye‘de orduyu 
düşman olarak gören sözde sol anlayışla mücadele eder (Türksolu, 2002). 
 
76
 Atatürkçülük bugün liberal, dinci, ülkücü, maocu vb. akımların kendi ideolojik 
kimliklerinin önüne koydukları bir sıfattır. Dolayısıyla farklı ideolojik kimliklere Atatürkçü bir hava 
verilmektedir ama farklı ideolojik kimlikler korunmaktadır. Bu ise liberal, dinci, ülkücü, maocu vb. 
ideolojilerin özünde var olan, Türkiye düşmanı, Atatürk düşmanı, üniter devlet düşmanı, laik rejim 
düşmanı eğilimlerin de Atatürkçü sıfatı ardında saklanması, gölgelenmesi demektir (MMD, 2007). 
 
77
 Kültür politikamızın önemli bir boyutu toplumda kabul gören, bilime ve akla uygunluk 
zemini taşıyan ailevi, ulusal ve dinsel değerleri korumaya yöneliktir (HYP, 2007). 
 
78
 Fert, aile ve toplumun korunması için dini, ahlaki ve manevi eğitim anaokulundan 
itibaren başlatılacak ve güçlendirilecektir (SP, 2007, p. 34). 
 
79
 Önce Ahlak ve Maneviyat Diyen Tek Parti Saadet Partisi‘dir (SP, 2007, p. 25). 
 
80
 Milli bütünlük bilincinin geliştirilmesi, ahlaki ve manevi değerlerin güçlendirilmesi ve 
sosyalleşmenin sağlanması için okul öncesi eğitim yaygınlaştırılacak (...) (MHP, 2007, p. 94). 
 
81
 Türkiye son yıllarda ağır bir ahlak erozyonuna uğramıştır. Bu erozyonun giderilmesi için 
partimiz bir ahlak devrimini gerekli görür (HYP, 2007). 
 
82
 Son zamanlarda özellikle gençlerde görülen kültürel yozlaşmaya karşı, Türk Kültürünü 
geliştirerek dünyaya yaymak (…) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 2006). 
 
83
 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletinin ve Türk Milletinin Milli ve manevi değerlerine 
saldırıldığında ya da kayıtsız kalındığında kamuoyu oluşturmak amacıyla kapalı ve açık hava 
toplantıları ve gösterileri düzenlemek (…) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 2006). 
 
84
 Ülkemizin birliğine, bütünlüğüne yönelik tehlikeler teşkil etmemesi kaydıyla 
devletimizin sosyal, siyasal, ekonomik, bilimsel ve kişi temel hak ve hürriyetleri alanlarında çağdaş 
dünya devletleri arasında yer alması, onlarla dünya barışı adına sürdürülebilir kalkınma projeleri 
üreterek başarılı olması için atılacak her adıma ve alınacak olumlu her karara destek verilmesine özen 
göstermek düşüncesindeyiz (VKGB, 2005). 
 
85
 Çokluk İçinde Birlik prensibini, mutlak hakikatler dışında her türlü farklılığın, her türlü 
görüş ve kavrayış biçiminin meşru ve makul kabul edilmesi olarak anlıyoruz (BBP, 1993). 
 
86
 Siyaset iyiliği emretmek, kötülükleri yasaklamak için lüzumlu olan bir vasıtadır (BBP, 
1993). 
 
87
 Devre dışı bırakılan Vatana İhanet (Hıyanet-i Vataniye) Kanunu‘nun kapsamını 
genişleterek geri getireceğiz (HYP, 2007). 
 
88
 Türkiye merkezli yeni bir medeniyet projesi hayata geçirilmelidir (MHP, 2007, p.3). 
 
89
 Önümüzdeki çağ, Türk milletinin, geniş bir coğrafyaya uzanan kütlesiyle, Türk asrı 
olacaktır (BBP). 
 
90
 21. yüzyıl, Türkiye‘nin yüzyılıdır (İP, 2007). 
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91
 Milli Görüşe sarılacağız, Allahın yardımıyla yeniden Dünyanın efendisi olacağız (SP, 
2007, p. 22). 
 
92
 Evrensel İmparatorluklar kurmuş olan Türkiye, çok değerli bir tarih ve kültür mirasına, 
köklü bir devlet geleneği ve tecrübesine sahiptir (MHP, 2007, p. 114). 
 
93
 Demokrat Parti, Atatürk'ün işaret ettiği muasır medeniyet seviyesine ulaşma hedefi 
doğrultusunda, bilim ve teknolojiye hâkim, teknolojiyi bilinçli kullanan ve yeni teknolojiler 
üretebilen, teknolojik gelişmeleri toplumsal ve ekonomik faydaya dönüştürme yeteneği kazanmış 
bir refah toplumunu var etmeyi hedeflemektedir (DP, 2007, p. 27). 
 
94
 (…) Türk Kültürü dokusunu koruyarak, Dünya devletleri ile bilim ve teknoloji 
konusunda yarışacak projeler üretmek, üretilmesine katkı sağlamak (…) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 
2006). 
 
95
 Türk Milleti, muasır medeniyet seviyesinin üzerine kendi milli değerlerine bağlı olursa 
çıkabilir (VKGB, 2005). 
 
96
 TÜRKSOLU‘nun antiemperyalizmi Batı uygarlığının sadece ekonomik yönüne yönelik 
bir karşı çıkış değildir. Batı, kapitalizm ve emperyalizmle birlikte vardır. Onun tüm değerleri ister 
istemez kapitalizmin ve emperyalizmin halk düşmanı karakteri ile belirlenmiştir. Bu nedenle 
TÜRKSOLU, Batı medeniyetine tümüyle karşı çıkar. Batı uygarlığı emperyalizmin uygarlığıdır ve 
emperyalizmle birlikte yeryüzünden silinmelidir (Türksolu, 2002). 
 
97
 Türkiye, Orta Asya‘daki soydaşlarımıza Batı‘nın menfaatlerini, çürümüş değerlerini 
taşıyan bir taşeron konumuna itiliyor (BBP, 1993). 
 
98
 Dünyada eşi benzeri olmayan, insana, onun kültürüne, kimliğine, kökenine ve dini 
inancına koşulsuz saygıyı esas alan çağdaş Türkiye Modeli, 84 yıl evvel çakılmış bu çok özgün 
dengeden güç alarak egemenliğini sürdürmektedir (CHP, 2007, p. 1).  
 
99
 Türkiye, tarihi mirasıyla, engin devlet tecrübesiyle, milli ve manevi değerleriyle, yüksek 
milli kültür ve ahlak şuuruyla ve insan kaynaklarıyla büyük ve güçlü bir ülkedir (MHP, 2007, p. 114). 
 
100
 Ezilen ulusların Batı medeniyetinden öğrenecekleri, faydalanacakları bir şey yoktur. 
Ancak öze dönme çabası, ırkçı ve dinci bir ‗eski güzel günlere‘ dönme hayali değildir. TÜRKSOLU, 
özellikle ezilen dünyada ırkçılığın ve dinciliğin ulusu bölücü ve emperyalizmi güçlendirici rolünü 
görür ve laikliği vazgeçilemez bir değer olarak savunur. Her ulus, kendi tarihinden ve kültüründen 
çağdaş bir uygarlık çıkarma potansiyeline sahiptir. Bugün Batı medeniyetinin tahakkümü altında bu 
potansiyel yok edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu nedenle öze dönüş, Batı medeniyetine karşı ezilen 
ulusların kendi çağdaş değerlerini yaratma mücadelesidir (Türksolu, 2002). 
 
101
 Bölgesel bir güç potansiyeli olan Türkiye, uluslararası ilişkilerde hiçbir etkisi ve ağırlığı 
olmayan, sözüne itibar edilmeyen marjinal, ezik ve etkisiz bir ülke konumuna itilmiş (…) (MHP, 
2007, p. 114). 
 
102
 Hükümet, askerlerimizin başına çuval geçirilerek Türk milletinin haysiyetine vurulan 
darbeye karşı da hiçbir tepki gösterememiştir. CHP‘nin ısrarlı uyarı ve önerilerine rağmen bir protesto 
notası bile vermemiş, Türkiye‘yi küçük düşürmüştür (CHP, 2007, p. 1).  
 
103
 Tarihin en şerefli milletini, Allahın en büyük nimetlerini vermiş olduğu bu ülkeyi; 
sadece köle yaptılar, sadece sömürttürdüler, sadece aç bıraktılar, sadece gözyaşı getirdiler, sadece 
ahlak tahribatı yaptılar, sadece saadeti tahrip ettiler (SP, 2007, p. 27). 
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 Partimiz; Atatürk İlke ve İnkılaplarına, hürriyetçi parlamenter demokratik sisteme, 
Anayasa‘ya ve kanunlara bağlıdır (BTP, 2003). 
 
105
 Atatürk devrim ve ilkelerinin, toplumsal sorunlarımızın çözümlenmesinde ışık tutucu 
niteliğe ve yaratıcı güce sahip olduğuna inananlar, ―Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği‖ni kurarak, O'nun 
devrim ve ilkelerinin gelecekte de egemen olmasına katkıda bulunma ve onlara bekçilik yapma 
zorunluluğunu duymuşlardır (ADD, 2006). 
 
106
 HYP, bin yıllık ruh köklerimizle Atatürk ilkelerine aynı anda bağlı ve bu ikisini 
bütünleştirmeyi esas alan bir zihniyet ve siyaset ocağıdır (HYP, 2007). 
 
107
 (…) Ulusalcı Demokratik Sol, Atatürk‘ün yoludur (DSP, 2007, p. 107). 
 
108
 Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk‘ün inkılâp ve ilkelerinin benimsenmesi, korunması, 
yaygınlaştırılmasına yönelik (…) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 2006). 
 
109
 Eğitimde, Atatürk ilke ve devrimleriyle öğretim birliği anlayışından ödün vermeyeceğiz 
(CHP, 2007, p. 56). 
 
110
 (…) Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olmaktan gurur duyan milli, manevi ve mukaddes 
değerlerimizi koruyan Atatürk'ün Türk gençliğine hitabesinin idrakinde olan milli gençliğin 
vatansever bir kuşağın yetişmesi için çalışmak amacındayız (VKGB, 2005). 
 
111
 Milli Mücadele Derneği, Atatürkçü eğitimin ve ulusal birliğin temelinde Milli Eğitim 
Birliğini yani Tevhid-i Tedrisatı görür. (…) Milli Mücadele Derneği, devletin başlatacağı Atatürkçü 
Ulusal Eğitim Seferberliğini savunur (MMD, 2007). 
 
112
 (…) Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk‘ün Onuncu Yıl Nutku‘nda yer alan ―Millî 
kültürümüzü muasır medeniyet seviyesinin üstüne çıkaracağız.‖ anlayışının benimsenmesi, korunması 
ve yaygınlaştırılmasına katkıda bulunacak (…) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 2006). 
 
113
 Atatürk'ün Türkiye'ye gösterdiği "çağdaş uygarlığı aşma" hedefi, daha geçen 
yüzyılın başlarındaki bir vizyondu. O hedefi aşmanın yolu, bu yüzyılda "bilgi toplumu"nda etkin bir 
ülke olmaktan geçmektedir (DSP, 2007, p. 101). 
 
114
 Yüce Atatürk'ün ilke ve devrimleri doğrultusunda çağdaş uygarlık düzeyine erişmeyi 
hedef alan (…) (GP, 2002). 
 
115
 CHP, iktidarında Atatürk'ün özlemini gerçekleştirecek ve Türkiye'nin her alanda 
dünyanın en ileri ülkeleri arasında yerini almasını sağlayacaktır (CHP, 2007, p. 4). 
 
116
 Cumhuriyetimizin temel değerlerine vücut veren eğitim alanının, ülkemizin Atatürk‘ün 
işaret ettiği ―muasır medeniyet‖ seviyesine ulaşması için bir fırsat ve ivme merkezi olduğuna 
inanmaktayız (AKP, 2007, p. 45). 
 
117
 (ADD) Ulusal egemenliği tam olarak gerçekleştirmek, Ulusu tam bağımsızlık ilkesi 
uyarınca usa, bilime ve barışseverliğe öncelik vererek Atatürk'ün amaçladığı çağdaş uygarlık 
düzeyinin üstüne çıkarmak için gerekli çalışmaları yapar (ADD, 2006). 
 
118
 Cumhuriyetimize, Cumhuriyetimizin kurucusu Gazi Mustafa Kemal'in hedef ve 
düşüncelerine yürekten bağlıyız (VKGB, 2005). 
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 Derneğin amacı; Atatürk'ün önderi olduğu Türk Devrimi'ni ve bu Devrimin temelini 
oluşturan başta Altıok, Atatürk ilkelerini her alanda ilerlemeye açık ve sürekli geliştirici nitelikteki 
düşünce sistemini, Devrimin bugünkü sonuçlarını ve yarınlara uzantılarını, Atatürk'ün düşüncelerini, 
davranışlarını, savaşımlarını ve yapıtlarını inceleme, araştırma konusu yapmak, bunlara karşı girişim, 
adım ve akımlarla yasalar çerçevesinde düşün savaşımı vermektir (ADD, 2006). 
 
120
 ATATÜRK ilke ve devrimlerine, ―Laik Demokratik Cumhuriyetimizin‖ değer ve 
kurumlarına koşulsuz olarak sahip çıkacağız (CHP, 2007, p. 13). 
 
121
 (MMD) Anayasal ve yasal güvencelerle uygulanması şart koşulan Atatürk İlkelerinin 
çiğnenmesini engellemek için hukuksal mücadele eder (MMD, 2007). 
 
122
 Milletin Egemenliğine bir takım kayıt ve şartların konulmak istenmesi Atatürk'e ve 
onun Cumhuriyetine ihanettir (VKGB, 2005). 
 
123
 İşte bu koşullarda Atatürkçü olmak ya da "Atatürk'ü seviyorum" demek onu ve onun 
yarattıklarını savunmakla mümkün olabilir. Türkiye gençliği Atatürk'e ve Cumhuriyet'e yapılan 
saldırılara tabii ki sessiz kalmayacaktır (ADKF). 
 
124
 Milli Mücadele Derneği, en tepedeki ―gaflet, dalalet ve hatta hıyanet içinde‖ olan 
unsurlardan, en dipteki işbirlikçilere kadar Türkiye Cumhuriyeti‘nin bağımsızlığına, bütünlüğüne ve 
Atatürk tarafından saptanmış değiştirilemez ilkelerine karşı örgütlü mücadele yürütenlere karşı, Türk 
milletinin örgütlü gücünün oluşturulmasını hedefler (MMD, 2007). 
 
125
 (…) ekonomik imkanlarımızı Batı'ya teslim edenler gaflet, dalalet ve ihanet 
içerisindeki bu davranışlarını "Atatürk" adını kullanarak yapmaktadırlar (VKGB, 2005). 
 
126
 İşte, Atatürk böylesine hayasızca istismar ediliyor (HYP, 2007). 
 
127
 Böylece ―Atatürk‖ adını sömürenler, onun adına vatan ve millet düşmanlığı yaparak 
Türk milletini esarete mahkûm etmek isteyenlere vatandaşlarımız gerekli dersi verecektir (VKGB, 
2005). 
 
128
 Ey Türk gençliği! Birinci vazifen, Türk istiklâlini, Türk Cumhuriyet'ini, ilelebet, 
muhafaza ve müdafaa etmektir. Mevcudiyetinin ve istikbalinin yegâne temeli budur. Bu temel, senin, 
en kıymetli hazinendir. İstikbalde dahi, seni bu hazineden mahrum etmek isteyecek, dahilî ve haricî 
bedhahların olacaktır. (Atatürk‘ün Gençliğe Hitabesi, 1927). 
 
129
 Büyük Önder bu hitabede Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletinin ileride yaşaması muhtemel 
hadiselere karşı Türk Milletine kurtuluş reçetesi sunmuştur. Atatürk ebediyete intikalinin henüz 66. 
yılı olmasına rağmen onun ebediyete intikaliyle başlayan iç ve dış mihraklı faaliyetler ülkemize 
büyük zararlar vermiş halen vermeye devam etmektedir (VKGB, 2005). 
 
130
 Türkiye‘nin karşısına çıkan olaylar bir yönüyle ülkenin varlığına yönelen tehditleri ve 
stratejik saldırıları ihtiva ederken (…) (MHP, 2007, p. 3). 
 
131
 Son birkaç yıldır, ülkemizin bu hassas dengesi, anayasamızın değiştirilemez kuralları, 
içeriden ve dışarıdan tehdit altındadır (CHP, 2007, p. 1). 
 
132
 Şimdi ülkemiz ve milletimiz, parçalanma ve bölünme, İsrail‘e vilayet yapılma ve yok 
olma tehlikesiyle karşı karşıya bulunmaktadır (SP, 2007, p. 11). 
 
133
 Dış odakların kışkırtması sonucu iç barış, birlik ve bütünlüğümüz ciddi tehdit altındadır 
(BTP, 2003). 
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134
 Türkiye, kendisini kuşatan, parçalayıp işgal etmeyi hedefleyen Batıyla ―müttefiklik‖ 
aldatmacasını derhal terk etmelidir (MMD, 2007). 
 
135
 Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin yakın geçmişi; şantajlar, önşartlar, dayatmalar, haksız  talep ve 
baskılarla dolu   bir hayal kırıklığı hikayesidir. AB, Türkiye‘yi adeta özürlü bir ülke olarak 
görmektedir. Bu süreçte Türkiye sürekli dışlanmıştır. AB‘nin Türkiye‘yi eşit haklara sahip bir ülke 
olarak içine kabul etmek  istemediği artık anlaşılmıştır (MHP, 2007, p. 119). 
 
136
 Bugün ve her zaman yurt topraklarımız üzerinde gözü olan, hain emellere sahip kişi, 
örgüt ve ülkeler bulunmaktadır. Ülkeye yabancı etkenliğini egemen kılma gayretleri büyük bir ölçüde 
ve eylemli olarak girmiştir. Memleketin kötü yönetilmesinin mutlaka önlenmesi gerekmektedir. Milli 
Devletler ve vatandaşlarının korunduğu duvarlar; Yeni Dünya Düzeni yutturmacası ile yıkılmaktadır. 
Uluslar arası gizli güçler ve bir takım arkası karanlık Uluslararası şirketler vasıtasıyla emperyalist 
ülkelerin vatandaşları dahi emperyal düşünce ve duygularla yetiştirilmektedir (VKGB, 2005). 
 
137
 Küreselleşme ve AB süreciyle ülkemize adeta yeni bir Sevr dayatılmaktadır (HYP, 
2007). 
 
138
 Avrupa Birliği‘nin Lozan‘ı kaldırıp, açıkça SEVR‘i uygulamak istemesi üzerine (…) 
(SP, 2007, p. 21). 
 
139
 AB güdümünde ve AB kapısında yoksullaşma var, parçalanma var, mayın var, bomba 
var (İP, 2007). 
 
140
 Milletin öz güvenini yok etmek, gelecekten ümidini kesmek, kimliksiz ve kişiliksiz bir 
toplum ile kuralsızlığın prim yaptığı bir düzen oluşturmak ve Devletimizin temel dinamiklerine 
saldırmak suretiyle üniter devlet yapısını tahrip etmek amacına yönelik alt yapıyı oluşturmayı hedef 
alan bir çok düzenleme ve eylem, AKP döneminde gerçekleştirilmiştir (MHP). 
 
141
 (…) Kayıtsız şartsız Türk milletine ait olan “Egemenlik” haklarının Türk Milleti 
dışındaki bir başka Ulus, Ulus üstü kurum, Kuruluş, Devlet, Devletler topluluğu veya Birliğe devir ve 
kullanımına yönelik faaliyetler hızla devam etmektedir (VGKB, 2005). 
 
142
 Milli Mücadele Derneği, AB‘ye ―onurlu‖ veya onursuz her türlü üyelik sürecine 
karşıdır. Cumhuriyet‘in ve Anayasa‘nın temel ilkelerine de karşı olan bu sürece karşı egemenliğin 
yeniden ―kayıtsız şartsız millete‖ teslim edilmesi için mücadele eder (MMD, 2007). 
 
143
 Ülkenin gücünü, güvenini ve kişiliğini ifade eden ne varsa talana açık haldedir. Yabancı 
süper marketler, kendi mallarımızı bize pazarlayıp bizi sömürmekteler. İçeride bizi biz yapan, 
Türkiye‘nin adını, kişiliğini simgeleyen tüm markalarımız yok ediliyor. Bir yandan bilinçaltımız, öte 
yandan kesemiz ve kasamız boşaltılıyor (HYP, 2007). 
 
144
 Türkiye‘de son 150 yıldır toplumumuza dayatılan yabancı unsurların ithaline karşıyız. 
Müslüman Türk toplumunun en asli özelliklerini ve hasletlerini günden güne tahrip eden yabancı 
kültürlerin insanımıza olan yabancılığı açıktır (BBP, 1993). 
 
145
 (…) ırkçı emperyalizmin kontrolündeki onların çökmüş, çürümüş sosyal yapısı ve 
yaşadıkları zulümler göz önünde dururken aslımızı özümüzü bırakıp onlara benzeyeceğiz. Bunun için 
gerekirse 30 sene müzakere yapıp, her türlü milli varlığımızı ortadan kaldıracağız demekten büyük 
bedbahtlık olur mu? (SP, 2007, p. 20). 
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 Milli çıkarlarımız ucuz pazarlıkların konusu haline getirilerek tehlikeye atılmış, milli 
davalarımız adeta bir yük ve kambur olarak görülmüş ve ver-kurtul anlayışıyla feda edilmiş ve milli 
onur ve haysiyetimiz ağır yara almıştır (MHP, 2007, p. 114). 
 
147
 AB‘nin yaptığı köle muamelesine muhatap olunmuş ve şerefli tarihimize yakışmayan 
her türlü hakarete maruz kalınmıştır (SP). 
 
148
 Güzel vatanımız içeriden ve dışarıdan kuşatılmış, ülkemiz işbirlikçilerin faaliyetleri 
neticesinde büyük tehlikelerle karşı karşıya bırakılmıştır. Bu faaliyetler bilhassa son altı yıldır 
hızlandırılmış bir şekilde devam etmektedir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti, Osmanlı Devletini 
yıkılmaya götüren hadiselerin en az yüz misli şiddetinde bir global komplo ile karşı karşıyadır 
(VKGB, 2005).  
 
149
 İşte üzerinden atlanmaması gereken gerçek tehdit de budur. Dışardan kuşatılan, içerden 
çökertilen Türkiye‘de esas vurucu güç Şeriatçılar ve Kürtçülerdir (MMD, 2007). 
 
150
 Türk dış politikasını başkalarına güven esasından çıkarıp başkalarına güvenmeme 
esasına oturtacağız (HYP, 2007). 
 
151
 Bir gün, istiklâl ve cumhuriyeti müdafaa mecburiyetine düşersen, vazifeye atılmak için, 
içinde bulunacağın vaziyetin imkân ve şeraitini düşünmeyeceksin! (…) Ey Türk istikbalinin evlâdı! 
İşte, bu ahval ve şerait içinde dahi, vazifen; Türk istiklâl ve cumhuriyetini kurtarmaktır! Muhtaç 
olduğun kudret, damarlarındaki asil kanda, mevcuttur! (Atatürk‘s Address to Youth, 1927). 
 
152
 Türkiye‘yi içten ve dıştan kuşatan emperyalist güçler Cumhuriyeti yıkmak, Türkiye‘yi 
parçalamak, Türk vatanını işgal etmek ve Türk milletini yok etmek için yeniden harekete geçmiştir. 
―Damarlarında asil Türk kanı‖ taşıyan her Türk evladına düşen, milletine biçilen bu ölüm fermanını 
yırtmak için ayağa kalkmaktır (MMD, 2007). 
 
153
 Gençliğin; devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğünü ortadan kaldırmayı 
hedefleyen unsurlara karşı mücadele etmek üzere milli değerlerle mücehhez yetişmeleri sağlanacaktır 
(MHP, 2007, p. 101). 
 
154
 Türkiye gençliği Atatürk‘e ve Cumhuriyet‘e yapılan saldırılara tabii ki sessiz 
kalmayacaktır. (...) Türkiye gençliğinin şanlı mücadele tarihinden aldığımız güçle üzerimize düşeni 
yerine getirmek için her türlü fedakarlığa hazırız (ADKF, 2000). 
 
155
 Türkiye, her cephede Batı‘dan gelen o ―hayasız akın‖la karşı karşıyadır. Günün görevi 
vatan savunmasıdır. Geleceğimiz, bu görevin başarıyla yerine getirilmesine bağlıdır (İP, 2007). 
 
156
 TÜRKSOLU bu savaşta hem emperyalistlere hem de onların sol komradorlarına karşı 
milliyetçi mücadelenin önderliğini yürütür (Türksolu, 2002). 
 
157
 Irkçı Emperyalizmin başlatmış olduğu ve yürütmekte olduğu 20. Haçlı Seferi karşısında 
AKP gibi onlara destek verip, Müslüman ülkelerin bir bir yutulmasına ve arkadan aziz vatanımızın 
parçalanıp, bölünüp Büyük İsrail‘e vilâyet yapılıp yok olmasına seyirci mi kalacağız, yoksa asırlar 
boyu ecdadımızın yaptığı gibi Milletimizin ve bütün insanlığın saadeti için yeryüzünün, Filistin gibi 
kan gölüne çevrilmesini önlemek, hâlihazır “Zulüm Dünyası” yerine, bir “Saadet Dünyası”nı 
kurmak için üzerimize düşen insanlık görevimizi mi yapacağız (SP, 2007, p. 3). 
 
158
 Etnik bölünmeyi amaçlayan kanlı terör, siyasi ayrılıkçılık ve etnik tahrikler Türkiye‘nin 
önündeki en büyük sorun ve tehdittir (MHP, 2007, p. 28). 
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 AB, Türkiye‘de dine ve kavmiyete bağlı azınlıklar yaratma gayreti içine girerek ülkenin 
ve milletin bölünmez bütünlüğünü tehdit edici dayatmalar getirmiştir (HYP, 2007). 
 
160
 Cumhuriyetimizin kurucusu Ulu Önder Atatürk‘ün, ―Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene!‖ 
anlayışına karşı çıkan herkes Türkiye Cumhuriyeti‘nin düşmanıdır ve öyle kalacaktır (TSK, 2007). 
 
161
 Milli Mücadele Derneği, Batının Türkiye‘de dayattığı yeni azınlıklar yaratma 
politikasına karşı çıkar (MMD, 2007). 
 
162
 ―Kamu yönetimini, yargıyı, siyaseti, eğitimi ve ticareti‖, gerici tarikat odaklarıyla, dini 
çıkar ve fesat yuvalarıyla kuşatma, üniter yapıyı aşındırma çabaları giderek yaygınlık kazanmaktadır 
(CHP, 2007, p. 1). 
 
163
 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devletinin, başta laiklik olmak üzere, temel değerlerini aşındırmak 
için bitmez tükenmez bir çaba içinde olan bir kısım çevrelerin, bu gayretlerini son dönemde 
artırdıkları müşahede edilmektedir (TSK, 2007). 
 
164
 Türkiye‘yi tekrar ortaçağa döndürmek isteyen Şeriat tehdidine karşı çıktığımız için 
laikliği savunuyoruz (ADKF, 2000). 
 
165
 Düne kadar Şeriatçı ve Kürtçü hareketler olarak, Türkiye içinde huzursuzluk yaratan, 
bölücülük yaratan unsurlar artık Kürt-İslam devletini talep eden bir güce erişmiştir (MMD, 2007). 
 
166
 Bu umut vaad eden geleceğe karşılık daha şimdiden önümüze bir yığın engel 
çıkartılıyor, doğmakta olan gücümüzü boğmak için bin türlü oyun oynanıyor (BBP, 1993). 
 
167
 Bu nedenle dünyaya yaşam biçimiyle, temizliğiyle, yüksek ahlaki değerleriyle, Kültür 
ve medeniyetiyle örnek olmuş, halende örnek olmaya devam eden asil Türk Milletine kendisinden 
yirmi beden küçük bir elbisenin giydirmeye çalışılmasını anlamak mümkün değildir (VKGB, 2005). 
 
168
 Türk devletinin bütünlüğünü, Türk vatanının topraklarını, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti‘ni 
koruyan en önemli güçlerden biri Atatürk‘ün Ordusu, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri‘dir (MMD, 2007). 
 
169
 Devletlerin gücünün göstergelerinden birisi de güçlü orduya sahip olmalarıdır. Bundan 
hareketle Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti‘nin gücünün artması ve varlığının muhafaza edilebilmesi için 
Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, dünyanın sayılı süper güçlerinden biri haline getirilecektir (BTP, 2003). 
 
170
 Türkiye‘nin en değerli yeraltı zenginliği, toprağın altındaki şehit kemikleridir. Şehit 
ailelerinin ve gazilerin korunması, Cumhuriyet‘in ve vatanın savunulması görevi içindedir. Milli 
Hükümet, bu anlayışla toplumumuzda şehit ve gazilere minnet ve saygı bilincini güçlendirir. 
Şehitlerimizin ve kahramanlarımızın anıları yaşatılacak, mezarları ve anıtları imar edilecektir (İP, 
2007). 
 
171
 Geçmişte Türk Milleti, kendisini yükselten ve yücelten tarihi misyonuna sahip çıktığı 
dönemlerde dünyaya hükmetmiş; insanlığa adaleti, insan haklarını, ilmi, teknolojiyi ve medeniyeti 
öğretmiştir (BTP, 2003). 
 
172
 Bu gün ilmi gerçekliği daha da kabul edilir halde bulunan, Türk tarih tezi yerine ilmen 
hiçbir geçerliliği bulunmayan Batı'nın İndo Germen - Hint Avrupa nazariyeleri esas alınarak kitaplar 
yazılmış, bu kitaplar örnek gösterilerek Türk milletinin binlerce yıllık tarihi yok sayılmak ve aynı 
ırkın, aynı cevherin damarları olan bir kısım vatandaşlarımızın farklı ırklardan geldiği iddiasıyla milli 
birliğimiz  ve bütünlüğümüze kastedilmek istenmiştir (VKGB, 2005). 
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 Atatürk, çok büyük bir imkân yaratmıştı. Ona en küçük bir ekleme yapılsaydı Türkiye 
bugün Japon mucizesini geride bırakmış olacaktı (HYP, 2007).  
 
174
 Önümüzdeki çağ, Türk milletinin, geniş bir coğrafyaya uzanan kütlesiyle, Türk asrı 
olacaktır (BBP, 1993). 
 
175
 Bilişim ve internet alanında hızlı bir gelişimi yakalamak ve bu alanları ideal şekilde 
kullanarak, bilgi çağını “Türk’lerin Altın Çağı”  haline getirmek (…) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 
2006). 
 
176
 Türkiye‘nin karşısındaki asayiş ve güvenlik tablosu her bakımdan ürkütücüdür. Can ve 
mal güvenliği kalmamış, Türkiye suç ve suçlular cenneti haline gelmiştir (MHP, 2007, p. 26). 
 
 
177
 “Dinler Bahçesi” “Diyalog” “Medeniyetlerin Buluşması” gibi kamuflaj arkasında 
yine ırkçı emperyalizmin istediği şekilde İslam‘ın aslının ve özünün değiştirilmesine yönelik adımlar 
atılmıştır (SP, 2007, p. 19). 
 
178
 [ABD yönetiminin] Bugün öncelikli hedefleri Türkiye‘dir. Ülkemizi parçalanmış 
gösteren haritaları NATO toplantılarında duvara yansıtmaktan çekinmediler (İP, 2007). 
 
179
 (…) ABD ve AB‘nin baskısıyla etnik diller yaratılmakta ve zorla eğitim kurumlarına 
sokulmak istenmektedir (MMD, 2007). 
 
180
 Dil meselemiz Vatan topraklarının savunulması kadar önemli bir meseledir. 
Bir milletin dilini bozdunuz mu, bir ülkede farklı diller oluşmasını temin ettiniz mi dış 
mihrakların ülke üzerinde bölme ve parçalanma oyunlarına geçit vermiş olursunuz (VKGB, 
2005). 
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Appendix A: 
Brief Descriptions of the Political Parties and Institutions 
 
a. Political parties  
1. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) [Justice and Development Party] 
was established in 2001. It is a right-wing political party and its 
dominant ideological tendencies are conservatism and neo-
liberalism. 
2. Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi (BTP) [Independent Turkey Party] was 
established in 2001. Its ideological tendencies are nationalism, 
conservatism, and Islamism. 
3. Büyük Birlik Partisi (BBP) [Great Union Party] established in 1993. 
It is an ethnicist-essentialist, radical right party. Its ideological 
tendencies are ultra-nationalism and Islamism. 
4. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) [Republican People‟s Party] was 
established in 1923. It is the first political party in the republican 
regime and the parliament in Turkey. It defines itself as a centre-left 
party. Its dominant ideological tendencies are Kemalism, secularism 
and statism. 
5. Demokrat Parti (DP) [Democrat Party] was established in 2007. It is 
the successor to Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP) [True Path Party] which 
was established in 1983. It is a right-wing party and its dominant 
ideological tendencies are secularism, conservatism and neo-
liberalism. 
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6. Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP) [Democratic Left Party] was established 
in 1985. It presents itself as a social democrat, center-left party. Its 
dominant ideological tendencies are social democracy and 
secularism. 
7. Emek Partisi (EMEP) [Labor Party] was established in 1996. Its 
ideological tendency is declared as scientific socialism. 
8. Genç Parti (GP) [Young Party] was established in 2002. Its 
dominant ideological tendencies are nationalism, secularism and 
liberalism.  
9. Halkın Yükselişi Partisi (HYP) [People‟s Ascent Party] was 
established in 2005. Its dominant ideological tendency is declared as 
a combination of Islamic conservatism, secularism, and Kemalism. 
10. İşçi Partisi (İP) [Workers‟ Party] was established in 1992. Its 
ideological tendency is nationalist socialism and Kemalism. Its 
political aim is an anti-imperialist struggle for absolute 
independence. 
11. Liberal Demokrat Parti (LDP)[ Liberal Democrat Party] was 
established in 1994. Its dominant ideological tendency is liberalism. 
12. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) [Nationalist Movement Party] was 
established in 1969. It is an extremist nationalistic party which 
emphasizes an ethnicist-essentialist ideology. “Greywolf” is the 
symbol of MHP. 
13. Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (ÖDP) [Freedom and Solidarity 
Party] was established in 1996. It was founded by several left-wing 
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political groups. Its dominant ideological tendencies are libertarian 
socialism and democracy. 
14. Saadet Partisi (SP) [Felicity Party] was established in 2001. A group 
from Fazilet Partisi [Virtue Party] founded it, while the Justice and 
Development Party was founded by another group from the Virtue 
Party. The ideological tendency of SP is Islamism. 
15. Türkiye Komünist Partisi (TKP) [Communist Party of Turkey] was 
established in 2001. Its ideological tendency is the Stalinist version 
of Marxism, Soviet communism. It founded Yurtsever Cephe 
[Patriotic Front] in 2005 with an attempt to organize a struggle 
against the membership of EU and liberalism.  
b. Governmental institutions 
1. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri [Turkish Armed Forces General Military 
Staff] is the governmental institution which is officially overseen by 
the Prime Ministry, but it has a de facto influence over the politics in 
Turkey which experienced four military coups, in 1960, 1971 
(memorandum), 1980, and 1997 (a post-modern coup). The 
statement of General Military Staff in April 27, 2007, during the 
crisis over the election of the President of the Republic, can also be 
accepted as a memorandum.  
c. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO‟s) 
1. Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (ADD) [Association of Atatürkist 
Thought] was founded in 1989. It is a country-wide association 
which also has branches in four countries. Its ideological tendencies 
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are Kemalism, Turkish nationalism, and laicism. Its main aim is to 
preserve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk‟s principles and transformations. 
2. Atatürkçü Düşünce Kulüpleri Federasyonu (ADKF) [Federation of 
the Clubs of Atatürkist Thought] was founded in 2000. It is a 
country-wide youth organization which aims to mobilize the young 
people around “left-wing” Kemalism, Turkish nationalism, laicism, 
and anti-imperialism.  It is closely linked with Türksolu [Turkish 
Left]. 
3. Kuvvai Milliye Derneği [Association of Kuvvai Milliye (National 
Forces)] was founded in 2006. It is a country-wide association which 
has limited number of branches. Its ideological tendencies are 
Kemalism, Turkish nationalism, and anti-imperialism. 
4. Milli Mücadele Derneği (MMD) [Association of National Struggle] 
was founded in 2007. It is a country-wide association which aims to 
mobilize Turkish people around “left-wing” Kemalism, Turkish 
nationalism, laicism, and anti-imperialism. It is closely linked with 
Türksolu. 
5. Vatansever Kuvvetler Güç Birliği Hareketi Derneği [Association of 
The Movement of Power Union of Patriotic Forces] was founded in 
2005. It is a country-wide paramilitary organization. Its dominant 
ideological tendency is ethnicist-essentialist nationalism.  
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d. Political journal 
1. Türksolu [Turkishleft] started to be published in 2002. Its 
ideological position is described as “national left” which consists of 
“left-wing Kemalism” and anti-imperialism. 
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Appendix B: 
Official Results of July 22, 2007 Parliamentary General Election 
(YSK, 2007) 
 
Total number of registered voter 42.799.303 
Total number of voter who voted 36.056.293 
Total number of valid vote 35.049.691 
Total number of invalid vote 1.006.602 
The ratio of participation in election 84,25% 
 
 
The Name of the Party Translation of the Name Vote Ratio(%) 
Aydınlık Türkiye Partisi Bright Turkey Party 100.982 0,29  
Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi Independent Turkey Party 182.095 0,52    
Saadet Partisi Felicity Party 820.289 2,34  
İşçi Partisi Workers‟ Party 128.148 0,37  
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Republican People‟s Party 7.317.808 20,88  
Halkın Yükselişi Partisi People‟s Ascent Party 179.010 0,51  
Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi Freedom and Solidarity Party 52.055 0,15  
Genç Parti Young Party 1.064.871 3,04  
Demokrat Parti Democrat Party 1.898.873 5,42  
Liberal Demokrat Parti Liberal Democrat Party 35.364 0,10  
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Nationalist Movement Party 5.001.869 14,27  
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Justice and Development Party 16.327.291 46,58  
Emek Partisi Labor Party 26.292 0,08  
Türkiye Komünist Partisi Communist Party of Turkey 79.258 0,23  
Bağımsızlar Independents 1.835.486 5,24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
